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SUMMARY 
The object of this work is the development of politeness in children. 
In the first part of the dissertation, the relevant literature is reviewed and a model 
for the development of politeness is presented. This model is based upon analysis of the 
social cognition needed for polite communication and generates a set of related 
developmental hypotheses. In general, it was expected that children would first achieve 
conventional use of politeness and only later be capable of positive, sympathetic 
politeness in social intercourse. Positive politeness was expected to be related to the 
ability to monitor the social interaction by means of recursive thinking involving self- 
reflection. 
In the second part of the dissertation, six studies are reported, all taking into 
account three age levels: 5-, 7- and 9-year-olds. Overall, 369 children were individually 
tested. Several methods were adopted: naturalistic and experimental observation, role- 
playing experiment', interview. The main results showed that: 1) politeness increases as a 
function of age; 2) young children possess a linguistic repertoire of politeness before 
being able to use it in real life situations; 3) conventional politeness is achieved earlier 
than sympathetic politeness; 4) although basic understanding of politeness is achieved at 
the age of 7, the understanding and use of politeness as a means to monitor cooperative 
discourse is achieved at the age of 9; 5) self-reflection related to politeness in 
communication emerges only at the age of nine. 
The results of the six studies show that the development of politeness starts from 
possession of a linguistic repertoire of polite words and phrases, progresses to the 
recognition of the social conventions of polite usage, and finafly develops into 
understanding and care of people's feelings. By the age of nine, children are aware that 
politeness can indeed be used to it make people feel good". 
PART 
Review of the literature and hypotheses 
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CHAPTER 1 
Politeness 
Introduction 
The main aim of this work is to describe the development of linguistic politeness. 
As a first step into the field, let us consider two spontaneous conversations among 
children. The first was tape recorded in a kindergarden and involved three 5-year-old 
children. The second was tape recorded in a day care centre and involved two 3-year-olds 
(D'Aniello, Morra Pellegrino, 1991, p. 86). 
Example 1 
Yader: No, no ... mi serve! mi serve a me! (a Paola che gli ha preso un bastoncino) (No, no .... I 
need it! I need it for myself! - addressing Paola who has snatched a stick from his hand) 
Paola: Anche a me mi serve a fare cosl! Ecco! (I need it too to do this! Tbere! ) 
Romina: Ma se le serve anche a lei, scusa! (but, if she needs it, too! if you please! - addressing 
Yader) 
Yader: Se vuoi te lo do (offre un altro bastoncino) (if you wish, I will give you this - offering 
another stick) 
Paola: No! questo non mi serve! Mi serve questo! (No! I do not need that one! I need this one) 
Romina: Ma dai! (Oh, come on! ) 
Yader: No 
Romina: Yader. per favore. se tu le dai quel bastone io ti do questo (offre un cambio) (Yader. 
please. f you give her that stick, I will give you this one - offering something in change) 
Yader: Dammelo (accetta) (Give it to me - he accepts the exchange). 
Example 2 
Carlo: Guarda! Un serpente! Tieni! Qo, offre a Umberto) (Look! a snake! Take it! - offering it to 
Umberto) 
Umberto: Te lo tieni (You can keep it for yourself) 
Carlo: Tieni! (Take it! ) 
Umberto: TO (Keep it! ) 
Carlo: Tieni! (Take it! ) 
Umberto: No 
Carlo: lo ti arnmazzo! (I'll kill you) 
Umberto: Anch'io ti ammazzo! (I'll kill you too! ) 
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Both groups of children are involved in a verbal conflict, but the verbal means 
employed are different in the two cases. In the first case, Romina employs several kinds 
of linguistic forms - including some politeness - to placate the conflict between her two 
friends. In the second case, the conflict is not resolved, but is aggravated by N, erbal 
hostility. Both examples show that words can indeed be used by young children as 
means to perfon-n social actions. Although the ability to resolve social conflict by verbal 
means is an advanced and positive social skill, the ability to express aggressive feelings 
by playful words is not an inferior social skill. By means of language even young 
children can guide a potential fight into play. 
Eisenberg and Garvey (198 1) and Garvey (1984) described the development of 
children's ability in resolving conflicts by means of words. They found that, by the age 
of five, American children have a variety of linguistic strategies which can be adopted in 
managing verbal conflicts among peers. Similar results have been observed for Italian 
children. For example, D'Aniello and Pellegrino (1991) found that 3-year-olds tend to 
develop conflicts involving two children, while 5-year-olds develop conflicts involving 
three children. In addition, 3-year-olds seem unable to manage a verbal solution and they 
often break the interaction by expressing verbal hostility. In contrast, 5-year-olds adopt a 
variety of verbal means to solve peer-conflicts, including jokes and different types of 
requests or directives. 
Another source of evidence comes from Corsaro's work on social rituals among 
pre-schoolers (Corsaro, 1979). By means of partecipant observation of children in their 
natural settings (i. e., kindergartens), Corsaro found that children perform different kinds 
of social actions by means of words. For example, they have special "formulae" to enter 
into play with peers (e. g., "We are friends, right? "), while - apparently - they do not have 
special rituals for leave-taking. 
One might conclude that from an early age human beings are endowed with the 
ability to perform social actions (such as resolving conflicts or entering into play-groups) 
by means of words. The opening conversation shows that it is possible to find examples 
of 5-year-olds using politeness to modify peers' behaviour. 
Not only is politeness present in most adults' everyday speech, it is also 
widespread in most known cultures. Politeness is a somewhat elusive phenomenon 
which perhaps makes itself more remarkable for its absence than for its presence. Let us 
imagine the following scenes. 
in a conversation with a colleague, we are feeling at ease and relaxed, discussing a topic of mutual 
interest, when some irritation slowly creeps into our mind: "Why does this bore only quote his 
published work? " 
At a restaurant, the person at the next table calls for the waiter and says loudly "Hey, waiter, we 
need a second bottle of wine, here! ". 
We are teaching a small group of postgraduates in our office, a student abruptly puts his head 
round the door and says "What about the book you promised to lend me? ". Only our well tempered 
knowledge of adolescent behaviour keeps us placidly smiling. 
The same scenes can be imagined with polite speakers. A nice colleague giving 
credit for our work over his own, a person at a restaurant making himself unnoticeable 
by using ordinary polite words, a student showing some respect for his teacher. Life 
would appear if not better, at least more smooth and pleasant. 
As psychologists, we seem more inclined to study what makes life unpleasant 
(aggression, for example, or psychopathological states) than what has the potential to 
make it more enjoyable. Of course, the study of what can be harrnful for human life is of 
primary importance. Yet why should we neglect the study of our propensity for 
happiness and pleasure? Politeness is intended to make people feel good when we spcak 
to other people. It takes care of people's social comfort. Politeness can be viewed as the 
smile of human good nature making itself visible through words. 
A polite speaker will understand and respect other people's positions in the world 
and also their wishes, he will put his own wishes and position on one side. If his social 
position is prominent, he will not impose it. If his social position is lower than his 
hearer's, he will tinge his discourse with some (not too much) elegant deference. A polite 
speaker will not be a menace to anybody, but will enhance other people's self-esteem and 
self respect. In a few words, the polite speaker will tend to arouse more positive than 
negative emotion. Politeness is pleasurable. "Please" is its prototypic word. 
Politeness is like Vivaldi's music: airy, elegant, most enjoyable, and intelligent. It 
will not solve the great questions of humanity, nor will it shake the foundations of human 
life for a better destiny. No, politeness is a simple phenomenon, devised by human 
wisdom to lighten the road we must walk in each other's company. This is why it is 
universal - although differently expressed in various cultures. 
There are many detractors of politeness. They think that politeness is pure 
formality. Some say that it is bad for young people because it is a form of hypocrisy. I do 
not share this point of view. One should not forget that words are not good or bad in 
themselves. They are are just tools. The actual use of words is the individual's choice. 
Thus, politeness can be used in various ways, good and bad. 
Much formal politeness keeps people apart. In this sense, it is formal and empty. It 
can be used to keep people off, to build defences against others. Even this use of 
politeness is not unreasonable: Why should people not defend themselves if they feel 
threatened or potentially abused in their social rights (privacy, status, etc. )? After all, 
politeness is a very civilized defence. Some people, alas, use politeness to be aggressive 
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and abusing in subtle, twisted ways. They are offensive and, at the same time, keep the 
weapons out of their opponents' hands by adopting much politeness. For example, snobs 
play this trick very efficiently, thus hurting and humiliating people. If we consider onlý- 
this aspect, politeness can indeed be composed only of complacent, formal and "emptý. " 
words. Lack of interest is understandable. 
But this is only one side of the medal. Politeness doeas have a formal, defensivc 
side, which protects people from invasion and can, on occasion, be used harmfully. 
However, politeness has also a caring face, which positively enhances emotional 
comfort. and cannot be twisted too badly. It signals respect, attention, care of the other's 
feelings, wishes and position. This side of politeness is less easy to identify because it is 
less routinized. It can be expressed by concerned questions, jokes, humour, felicitously 
placed comments, interest in the other person. This side of politeness is the most 
pleasurable one. 
It is an error to reduce politeness to its fon-nal side, forgetting the other one. 
Politeness is more than simply good manners. The problem is that manners (including 
their absence) are more "visible" than the constant disposition to take care of other 
people's comfort in social intercourse. Besides, while manners are usually taught 
explicitly to children, attention to other person's needs may be considered less. 
My aim is to show that children can indeed use politeness in its positive potentials. 
The observation of children's behaviour indicates the existence of positive aspects of 
politeness. I would also like to show that a developmental study will find that formal 
politeness is easier than positive politeness - the fon-ner requiring only knowledge of 
social conventions (manners), the latter a far deeper understanding of social intercourse. 
Before progressing with more specific information, it may be of interest to consider 
briefly how people of different countries and centuries viewed politeness. Let us start 
with a contemporary 7-year-old boy: 
Interviewer: "When is it necessary to be polite? " Quando bisogna proprio essere gentili? ). 
Paolo (7-year-old): "It is enough to be kind and to respect the rules of the world" (Basta essere 
gentili e rispettare le regole del mondo) 
The main implication of Paolo's "basta" (translated here as "it is enough") is that 
one should not worry about detecting special occasions in which politeness is necessary. 
If one is kind and respects the rules, politeness is there. For this young philosopher, 
politeness is a mental habit of kindness and respect, scarcely influenced by the external 
necessities. Politeness is a frame of mind. 
Is this little boy right? or rather, is his view the one more generally adopted? to 
answer these questions it may be of interest to start with the classical definition of the 
semantic field of " politeness" presented by the Roget's Thesaurus of English Words anti 
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Phrases (first edition 1852). In the 1982 edition (Lloyd, 1982), Politeness belong, ý to 
three semantic areas: Elegance, Courtesy, and Respect. For example, the semantic area of 
the three names are the following : 
Elegance 
Style, perfection, grace, beauty, refinement, good taste, restraint, distinction, dignity, clarity, 
perspicuity, purity, simplicity, naturalness, simplicitness, naturalness, plainness, classicism, Atticism, 
harmony, euphony, symmetry, rhythm, flow, fluency, felicity, the right word in the right place, 
neatness, polish, finish, well-turned period, orriament, classic, purist. 
Courtesy 
Chivalry, deference, respect, consideration, condescention, humility, graciousness, politeness, civility, 
urbanity, mannerliness, manners, good manners, good behaviour, gentleman line ss, ladylikeness, good 
taste, tactfulness, diplomacy, courtliness, formality, amenity, amiability, kindliness, benevolence, 
gentleness, mildness, good humour, complaisance, affability, suavity, sociability. Courteous act, 
courtesy, civility, favour, kind act, soft answer, leniency, compliment, kind words, congratulation, 
introduction, friendliness, welcome, acknowledgement, recognition, salutation, salute, greetings, 
handclasp, handshake, respects, bow, curtsy, farewell, valediction. 
Respect 
Regard, consideration, esteem, approbation, high standing, honour, favour, repute, attentions, courtesy, 
due respect, deference, humility, obsequiousness, servility, humble service, loyalty, admiration, awe, 
wonder, fear, reverence, worship. Respects, regards, duty, kind regards, greetings, courteous act, red 
carpet, guard of honour, address of welcome, salutation, salaam, bob, bow, curtsy, genuflexion, 
obeisance, reverence, hommage, salute, presenting arms. 
The content of such areas suggest a notion of politeness as a sophisticated form of 
social behaviour, slightly inclined to fon-nalities. This view of politeness strongly recalls 
the Confucian notion of "li". The word "li" indicates "good manners", "rites", 
it ceremonies", "respectful behaviour". In the Confucian philosophy, which vastly 
influenced the civic and political life of China over the centuries, "li" governed social life, 
being the foundation of both stability and human solidarity. "Who does not know the 
rites ("li"), does not have stability", Kung Fu Tsu is said to have declared (Arena, 
1991). This view celebrates the civic virtues of politeness, stemming from the traditional 
wisdom of cultures attracted by stability and elegant ceremonies or, more generally, by 
sophistication in social intercourse. 
In European cultures, this view of politeness might perhaps be traced back to the 
feudal world in which courtesy was the basic social - and even moral - principle of [vople 
living in the courts. The philosophy of courtesy was further developed during the 
Renaissance. For example, Baldassar Castiglione expressed the philosophical notion of 
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politeness as clear, harmonious, and balanced behaviour in his famous "Il cortegiano,,, 
published in 1528 (Castiglione, 1528). The neo-platonic view of ideal harmony amon. 2 
all human passions, between reason and affect, between the individual and society, and 
between man and nature is exemplified by the beautiful, elegant, polite behaviour of the 
11cortegiano". Just after publication, the book was extraordinary successful in the Italian 
courts which, at that time, were the leaders for arts and culture in Europe. During the 
XVIth century, the book was translated into several languages, including Latin and 
English (1561), and its message spread throughout Europe. 
It is fascinating to think that politeness has been considered as a central notion for 
individual and social behaviour both in China 500 years B. C. and at the beginnning of 
modem Europe. The "court" politeness has been a special behaviour, incorporating two 
powerful human aspirations: aspiration towards superior morality in social intercourse 
and aspiration towards elegance and beauty. Roget's "Thesaurus" also stresses the 
aesthetic value of politeness, as related to harmony, elegance, and, by and large, to the 
resolution of conflict. In a sense, the idealization of politeness - or, more simply, a wish 
for politeness - might express the never-ending human aspiration for peace, constantly 
elusive in both the internal and external worlds. 
A second, more modern definition for politeness can be found in the Oxford 
Dictionary of Current English (1980) according to which to be polite is "having, showing 
the possession of, good manners and consideration of other people". In the same 
Dictionary "consideration" is defined as "the act of considering, thinking about" and as 
"thoughtful attention to the wishes, feelings, etc., of others". It is interesting to see that 
the definition of politeness reported by the Oxford Dictionary is similar in structure to the 
young philosopher's definition which opened this section. Two components of politeness 
are identified. On one hand, there are sets of conventional social behaviour ("good 
manners" for the Oxford Dictionaryq "the rules of the world" for the little boy); on the 
other hand, there is an inner psychological disposition to be concerned for others 
consideration of other people" for the Oxford Dictionary, "to be kind" for the boy). 
Two centuries ago, Goethe adopted a similar structure in his definition of politeness: 
"There are no exterior signs of politeness which do not have a deep moral basis. ( ... 
) 
There is a politeness of the heart which is close to love. From it, the more convenient 
politeness of external behaviour derives". Again, we have a distinction between 
conventions and inner dispositions. In addition, Goethe - whose mode of thinking is 
closer to ours than the "court" one - stressed an important point. Politeness may be 
observed as external behaviour, yet it derives from deep inside. This is a "psychological" 
view of politeness, the one which probably best expresses the spirit of our times. 
What is characteristic of a psychological view of politeness? First of all, a 
distinction between internal and external worlds is present. Second, external behaviour is 
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viewed as deriving from internal sources. Third, the internal sources for politeness are 
conceived as both possession of social norms or rules and as positive dispositions 
towards other human beings. In the above examples, such positive disposi6ons may 
range from the more detached Oxonian "consideration for other people", to the graceful 
Italian "kindness", to the more passionate, Romantic "love". 
If we turn from general or literary to scientific definitions of politeness, we must 
note that, unfortunately, not much attention has been devoted to politeness by 
psychologists. Thus, a psychological definition of politeness phenomena is missing. 
Most of the available scientific information on politeness comes from linguists and 
philosophers of language. Yet such literature is more theoretically than empirically based. 
Some empirical evidence on politeness comes from developmental psychologists who 
based their studies upon linguistic theories. The presentation of the literature relevant to 
our issue is thus divided into two parts. The general linguistic theories relevant for the 
understanding of politeness phenomena are presented in this chapter. In the second 
chapter, the developmental literature is presented and discussed. 
Linguists'work on the issue includes three main aspects. The first is the linguistic 
theory of speech acts, which is the general background of any linguistic theory of 
politeness. The second aspect addresses the issue of a linguistic definition of politeness 
phenomena. The third is related to both the previous ones and concerns the question of 
indirectness in speech acts. 
Linguistic means to perform social actions: Speech acts and their 
development 
The issue of social use of language was first investigated by philosophers of 
language in the 1960s (Austin, 1962). In psychology, the topic started to become 
important in the early 1970s, when the conceptual frame of developmental 
psycholinguistics underwent a major shift from the Chomskian theory of transformational 
grammar to the first generative semantic models (Antinucci, Parisi, 1973; Slobin, 1975). 
In the study of child language, it soon become clear that the meaning of any sentence is 
not absolute. On the contrary, the meaning of children's first words (e. g., Halliday, 
1975) is strongly related to the context in which the sentence is uttered. The same 
sentence can have different meanings according to various contexts not only in children's 
language, but also in adults'. For example, the sentence "It is hot today" can be cither a 
casual tum-filling remark, or an attempt to start a conversation or an indirect hint to get 
something to drink - and many other things. Only contextual information can 
fully rcvcal 
the actual meaning of the sentence. 
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The strong relation between action, context, and language has been demonstrated 
by means of developmental research in the work of the Roman group (Bates, Camaioni, 
Volterra, 1975; Bates, Benigni, Bretherton, Carnaioni, 1977). They showed that infants 
can first perform social actions by non-verbal communication (for example, by pointing) 
and only later can they insert words within the frame of their (social) action. The 
conclusion is that "semantics emerges, developmentally and logically from pragmafics, in 
much the same way that syntax has been shown to emerge from semantic knowledge" 
(Bates, 1976b, p. 420). 
The human ability to perform social actions by means of language appears as a 
question which should primarily concern pragmatics. Things, however, are not so 
simple. For example, Levinson (1983) thoroughly discusses several definitions of 
pragmatics. The main problem is that the term includes two different phenomena. On one 
hand, pragmatics is concerned with those aspects of the linguistic structure which depend 
upon context, for example, deixis. On the other, pragmatics is also concerned with the 
principles of language use and comprehension which are not related to the linguistic 
structure per se (Levinson, 1983), such as the socio-linguistic rules of a given social 
group or culture. In other words, the pragmatic aspects of language are given by an 
interaction between specific linguistic structures and principles of language usage. Two 
major types of attempts at disentangling the intricacies of this interaction may be 
identified: a linguistic approach and a competence approach. 
The linguistic approach adopts the view that pragmatics is limited only to the study 
of the relations between language and context which are represented in the grammatical 
structure (Levinson, 1983). Examples are the study of deixis, presuppositions, 
honorifics, etc.. This approach aims at casting light upon the "universals" of the 
pragmatic use of language. The main advantage is that, by narrowing the definition of 
pragmatics down to the linguistic aspects of discourse, a clear distinction can be made 
between pragmatics and sociolinguistics. For example, Leech (1983) distinguished 
between pragmalinguistics and sociopragmatics. In the first case, "the particular 
resources that a given language provides for conveying particular illocutions" (Leech, 
1983, p. 11) are involved. On the other hand, in sociopragmatics the social conditions 
which influence pragmatic performance are taken into account. Sociolinguistics has also 
been defined as the use of language in context by social groups, pragmatics the individual 
use of language in context (Bates, 1976b). 
The main disadvantage of the linguistic approach is that it is really hard to define 
properly what "the context" (or the "social conditions") are. For example, Ochs (1979) 
speaks of context as the social and psychological world in which a speaker operates in a 
given moment. Lyons (1977) defines context as the knowledge of social roles and 
statuses, of spatial and temporal location, of level of fon-nality, of appropriateness of 
style, register and topic. Any attempt at defining context apparently reintroduces 
extralinguistic factors. 
The competence approach is rooted in the principle of appropriateness in langua, _, C 
usage. From this point of view, pragmatics is the study of the speakers' ability to relate 
language to the appropriate contexts (Levinson, 1983). This definition may not appeal 
much to some linguists and philosophers of language because it makes the limit between 
pragmatics and sociolinguistics even fuzzier. However, a competence approach may Ne 
appealing to psychologists who are interested more in the communicative abilities of 
human beings than in abstract definitions. A well-known example of this second 
approach can be found in Hymes's (1971) notion of communicative competence, which 
challenged Chomsky's notion of linguistic competence. 
A competence approach to pragmatics thus shows the potentials for answering our 
first broad question in ways which may be of interest to psychologists. Which kind of 
linguistic means do people use to perform social actions? It may be observed that there 
are utterances which explicitly perform actions in the social world by means of 
"performative" verbs (for example, "promise" or "apologize") (Harris, 1990). In other 
cases, however, social actions are performed without explicit performatives, as in the two 
verbal conflicts reported at the beginning of this chapter. Austin (1962) and Searle (1969) 
proposed that any action performed by means of language could be called a "speech act". 
According to Austin's (1962) theory, three aspects can be distinguished in speech 
acts: locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary. These three components operate 
together, each being involved in virtually every utterance. 
The locutionary component refers to the very words that the speaker employs. 
Locution is strictly related to linguistic aspects such as speech sounds and meanings. It 
involves the phonological, semantic, morphological and syntactical aspects of a given 
language. 
Mocution, though strictly related to locution, is closer to the contextual components 
of speech production. By means of the illocutionary components of language, the speaker 
tries to make explicit his intentions to the hearer. Language has various devices which can 
express different intentions. Performative verbs are good examples of the ways in which 
a speaker can make use of the illocutionary component of language. Verbs such as 
if promise", "ask", "request", flapologize", "tell" and many others not only express the 
speaker's intentions, but can also express the strength of such intentions. For example, 
consider the following statements: I am calling you tomorrow", "I will call you 
tomorrow. I promise", I might call you tomorrow". From the different illocutionary 
strength of such utterances, the addressee can judge the probability of being called 
by the 
speaker the day after. An important characteristic of the illocutionary component is it, ý 
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degree of explicitness. Searle (1975a) distinguished between direct and indirect specch 
acts. In direct speech acts, the speaker's intention is explicitly expressed by the 
propositional meaning of his utterance. For example, "Please close the windoýv" i-s a 
direct speech act in which it is clear that the speaker wants the window closed and directly 
asks for it. In indirect speech acts, the speaker's intention must be inferred because it is 
not directly expressed. As Searle (1975a, p. 60) described it, in indirect speech acts "onc 
illocutionary act is performed indirectly by way of performing another". For example, 
"Don't you feel cold in here? " is an indirect speech act in which the speaker's intention 
(i. e., to have the window closed) is hidden behind a polite interest in the other person's 
comfort. This point will be discussed later. 
Finally, any speech act also has a perlocutionary component, that is, the effect 
which is achieved in the social world by the speaker's verbal behaviour. The 
perlocutionary component is more linked to context than either locution or illocution. It 
should be noted that although Searle (1969) limited his analysis of speech acts only to 
locution and illocution, Austin's original formulation also included the contextual cll'ccts, 
of words as an important component of speech acts. Perlocution is particularly important 
to psychologists, because it describes " when, how and where" words really work. 
One ma or problem in speech act theory is how to group speech acts of diffcrent i 
nature together. As Ballmer and Brennenstuhl (198 1, p. 13) put it: "The classification of 
speech acts, which are basic units of linguistic behaviour, seems to be a necessary 
f precondition for a solid theory of language' . 
The problem of speech act classification has been considered a crucial one since the 
first steps of speech act theory. Austin (1962) proposed classifying performative verbs 
by analysing the meanings reported in a dictionary. He also proposed a preliminary work 
which included five categories and 188 examples. Searle (1975b) proposed five 
categories of performative verbs which were different from those of Austin. Searle's 
ideas have been quite influential among psychologists interested in the development of 
pragmatic skills. His categorization is reported below: 
Representatives (tell people how things are: suggest, insist) 
Directives (try to get them to do things: request, advise) 
Commissives (commit ourselves to doing things: promise, swear) 
Expressives (express our feelings and attitudes: thank, apologize) 
Declarations (bring about changes through our utterance: christen). 
Ballmer and Brennenstuhl (1981) criticized both Austin's and Searle's 
classifications and proposed a new approach to the problem which considered the 
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analysis of lexical, semantic meanings of verbs. Basing their work upon the semantic 
areas expressed by English verbs, Ballmer and Brennenstuhl elaborated a complex and 
systematic classification of speech acts. Their method is not far from Austin's original 
proposal, yet the thoroughness of their work resulted in a far more complete account of 
the range of possibilities to perform social actions by means of words. Ballmer and 
Brennenstuhl's (198 1) database is composed of 4800 speech act verbs. These verbs are 
divided into 600 categories. The categories belong to 24 models, which can in turn be 
grouped into eight model groups. The latter can be summarized into four basic linguistic 
functions which correspond to four types of linguistic behaviour: Expression, Appeal, 
Interaction, and Discourse. 
In order to clarify better the system, the four functions (Expression, Appeal, 
Interaction, Discourse) and their related model groups will be reported with examples of 
categories for each model group, as follows: 
Expression 
Emotion Model (linguistic expressions of emotion) 
Ex.: indicators of emotional states, value judgements, curses, etc. 
Appeal 
Enaction Model (speaker's attempts to get somebody to do something by expressing an 
idea, wish, intention, plan, goal, etc. ) 
Ex.: calling for/offering help, demanding, Commanding, etc. 
Interaction 
Struggle Model (competitive verbal fight) 
Ex.: make claims, reasons for the argument and their consequences, attack, retreat, 
compromise, argue, explain, agree, etc. 
Institutional Model (entering an institution and thereby adopting, following, or violating 
its norms and rules) 
Ex.: allowing, fobidding, promoting, judging, committing, punishing, violating a norm, 
etc. 
Valutation Models (valutations of actions, persons, things, state of affairs, decisions and 
their after-effects) 
Ex.: scolding, correcting, criticizing, praising, accepting, rejecting, etc. 
Discourse 
Discourse Models (organization and type of discourse) 
Ex.: asking for participation, entering discourse, reconciliation of disturbances, intending 
turn-taking, permission to speak, etc. 
Text Models (textual assimilation and processing of reality, producing, receiving, 
manipulating data) 
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Ex.: declaring, reporting, uttering, confirming, informing, teaching, understanding, 
learning, translating, reformulating, commenting, accepting/refusing data, woridering, 
supposing, categorizing, comparing, differentiating, etc. 
Theme Models (process of thematic structuring and its results) 
Ex.: think, include, reorganize, structure, connect, accentuate, weaken, clarify, 
announce, premise, begin, elaborate, perform, etc. 
"Expression is the least hearer oriented and least extroverted function of the four. It 
is an often uncontrolled mirroring of emotional states of human being. Appeal is a 
linguistic function clearly directed towards a hearer. It is, essentially, unidirectional from 
speaker to hearer. The speaker tries to get control over the hearer. Interaction then is the 
linguistic function involving speaker and hearer in mutual verbal actions. The hearer trics 
to get control over the speaker as well, which the speaker may try to avoid. Thus the 
basis for a (verbal) struggle is laid. After a possibly hot quarrel the mutual competition 
may go over into reciprocal cooperation. This is the basis for a better-behaved and more 
rigidly organized verbal interaction between speaker and hearer: The fourth function of 
linguistic behavior, Discourse, can become operative" (Ballmer, Brennenstuhl, 198 1, 
pp. 30-3 1). Very interestingly, the authors claim that the higher linguistic functions 
typically imply the lower ones. "The higher linguistic functions in typical cases imply or 
even (presuppose) the lower ones. That is, being a Discourse imply being (in part) also 
an Interaction, an Appeal, and an Expression, for example. More explicitly this means 
that being a discourse is being (an elaborate form of verbal) Interaction, which means that 
many single mutual Appeals occur, and some kinds, if neutral, Expressions of emotion. " 
(Ballmer, Brennenstuhl, 1981, p. 31). Thus, Discourse can be considered the highest 
linguistic function (or behaviour) because one or more Interactions are usually embedded 
and resolved in it. Interaction appears when Appeals from two (or more) speakers are 
integrated into a dialogical, although competitive, frame. Appeals and Expressions of 
emotion are the micro-components of speech acts. They can be used as such or variously 
combined into linguistic frames which can be more (discourse) or less (interaction) social 
oriented and conventional. In addition, Ballmer and Brennenstuhl found that their four 
main linguistic functions can be divided along two dimensions (private/socially 
entrenched; monological/dialogical). "A noteworthy observation is that the four functions 
can be divided up into two unilateral (Expression, Appeal) and two bilateral or dialogical 
(Interaction, Discourse) functions. The first of every two functions (i. e., Expression, 
Interaction) can be said to be the more original and racy, whereas the second of every two 
functions (i. e., Appeal, Discourse) are the more institutionalized and controlled versions. 
The four functions follow roughly the following cross-classification which has the 
two dimensions of privacy (social entrenching) and discourse character (monologue- 
dialogue): 
1 
PRIVATE SOCIALLY ENTRENCHED 
MONOLOGICAL Expression Appeal 
DIALOGICAL Interaction Discourse" 
(Ballmer, Brennenstuhl, 1981, p. 31). 
The most interesting features of Ballmer and Brennenstuhl's theory are two. The 
first is the strong correspondence between the semantic-based speech categories and the 
social disposition of the speaker. The speaker can just be concentrated upon himself 
(monological) when his speech is primarily private and not concerned with the other 
person's reaction (Expression). The speaker can be plainly oriented towards the other 
person in a social exchange, yet he can be totally unconcerned about the other person's 
feelings or reactions (Appeal). The speaker can be concentrated upon his own aims and 
start a competitive dialogue where he* is well aware of the other person's different aims 
or wishes, but he basically does not care about them (Interaction). Lastly, the speaker can 
start a socially oriented dialogue, in which awareness of the other person's aims, feelings 
and reactions serves the goals of cooperation (Discourse). The second interesting feature 
of this theory is the claim that the higher linguistic functions imply the lower ones. 
In brief, Ballmer and Brennenstuhl's theory stresses two important facts in the field 
of speech acts: 
1. speech acts belong to four different categories which are hierarchically 
organized, as higher linguistic functions imply lower order ones; 
2. each category comprises speech acts which show different degrees of both social 
orientation (monogical-dialogical) and conventionality (private-social entrenched). 
If we turn to the field of human development, it may be observed that the notion 
that higher-order functions imply and organize lower-order ones is not new in 
developmental psychology. On the contrary, it is a point of view which, stemming from 
Darwin's evolutionary theory, has always been typical of an organismic approach to 
human development (see for example, Dixon, Lerner, 1988). In developmental literaturc, 
Halliday's (1973,1975) well known functional analysis of children's speech adopts this 
very point of view. The main issue in Halliday's theory is that children's first words or 
* For reason of graphic presentation and easier reading, the third person singular in this text k always 
rendered simply as "he". No sexual discrimination is intended in any way. 
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utterances have one function, while later utterances generally serve multiple funcfion. s. 
Halliday found that his son's speech could be divided into three phases. In the first (9- Is 
months), the child used simple grammatical structures (one or two words) each aimed at 
achieving one goal. At this stage, six functions could be identified: 
Instrumental, the child expresses a desire for objects or action; 
Regulatory, the child tries to influence other people's behaviour; 
Interactional, the child just aims at interaction; 
Personal, the child expresses his own uniqueness; 
Heuristic, the child explores the world; 
Imaginative, the make-believe function. 
In the second phase (16-35 months), Halliday's son Nigel was able to use the same 
grammatical structure to express more than one aim. At this stage, three main functions 
could be identified: 
Pragmaticc(embedding the earlier Interactional, Instrumental, Regulatory), the child 
tries to act upon others; 
Mathetic (embedding the earlier Personal, Heuristic, and Imaginative functions), 
the child organizes his experience by means of language and, basically, does not requirc 
any response; 
Informative (emerging at about 22 months), the child offers information. 
In the third phase (over 35 months), the above functions are variously combined, 
so that each utterance can serve various purposes, as in adults' speech. Harris (1990, 
p. 57-58) describes the three more advanced Halliday's functions as follows: 
"At this point, any utterance can be described in terms of three related functional 
components. 
1. The ideational function is concerned with the content of what is said and, 
developmentally, can be traced back to earlier mathetic, personal heuristic and imaginative 
functions. 
2. The interpersonal function, which relates to the illocutionary force of an 
utterance, derives from the pragmatic function and its antecedents, the instrumental, 
regulatory and interactional functions. 
3. The textual function is concerned with the creation of coherent and meaningful 
sequences of utterances (or written sentences) within a conversational sequence and 
within a particular setting' . 
In the third phase, each utterance expresses all three functions. It is easy to agree 
with Harris's (1990) opinion that the ideational function corresponds to Searle's (1975a) 
17 
propositional or locutionary component, while the interpersonal function corresponds to 
Searle's illocutionary component. 
In conclusion, Halliday's work shows that, from the beginning, children's 
language has social intentions and functions which are progressively integrated within 
more complex linguistic frames. It is interesting to note that, as in Ballmer and 
Brennenstuhl's linguistic theory, in Halliday's developmental theory the higher-order 
linguistic functions derive from the integration of the lower-order functions. From both 
developmental and general linguistic points of view, discourse is viewed as a complex, 
progressively integrated linguistic frame, in which several functions are coordinated. 
Halliday's analysis, however, was stopped when Nigel, the subject of the longitudinal 
study, was about 3 years old and from this analysis we do not know the course of later 
developments. Besides, it left relatively unexplored the issue of the relative frequency of 
the various types of speech acts in children's speech. 
This last point, however, was the focus of another study. Dore (1977) recorded 
and categorized 2829 speech acts produced by 3-year-old children in spontaneous 
conversations. Dore's study did not address a developmental question directly, but his 
study is interesting because only the illocutionary component of children's speech was 
taken into account. Dore found that 3-year-olds' illocutionary acts can be divided into six 
categories, as follows: 
Requests, solicit information, action or acknowledgement (27.0117c); 
Responses, directly complement preceding utterances (18.5c7c); 
Descriptions, represent observable or verifiable aspects of context (22.3%); 
Statements, express analytic and institutional facts, beliefs, attitudes, emotions, 
reasons, etc. (13.8); 
Conversational devices, regulate contact and conversations (5.8%); 
Performatives, accomplish act by being said (10.8%) (Dore, 1977, pp. 234- 
235). 
The major limitation of this study is that, apparently, each utterance has only one 
function. This is in contrast with Halliday's results for this age group and, in addition, 
poses several problems if one is interested in classifying spontaneous speech acts in 
children older than 3. However, Dore's study does highlight two important facts: First, 
in very young children the most frequent spontaneous illocutionary acts are requests and, 
second, the conventional linguistic devices which rule cooperative discourse are rare in 
young children (5.8%). 
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In conclusion, the literature reported and discussed up to now shows that human 
beings have a variety of verbal means which can be employed to perform social actions 
and that an important aspect of linguistic development is the acquisition of such means. 
Theories of politeness 
Politeness phenomena may be considered as a special class of speech acts. 
Linguistists and anthropologists have made us aware of the fact that forms of linguis6c 
politeness are present in most contemporary languages and cultures. For example, 
perhaps not surprisingly, in contemporary Chinese politeness is still highly valued 
(Shenkar, Ronen, 1987) and so is in Japanese (Hori, 1986). Politeness phenomena have 
been documented for various cultures, such as, for example, the Mayan community 
(Brown, 1980), Oceanic (Ochs, 1988) and Puerto Rican Spanish speaking people 
(Milan, 1976). 
The first person to draw attention to politeness phenomena in language was Robin 
Lakoff (1973) who contrasted Grice's point of view on conversational rules. Grice 
(1975) had proposed that conversations have rules which enable people to understand 
each other better and to prevent misunderstandings. Such conversational postulates - 
which can be summarized by the maxim "Be clear" - have been called "Gricean maxims" 
and include: 
"Quantity: a speaker should be as informative as the situation requires but should 
not provide more information than is necessary. Clearly, this involves making 
sophisticated decisions about what the listener already knows and how much information 
is necessary to fill in the gaps. 
Quality: a speaker should try to say what he or she believes to be true and should 
avoid saying things which are known to be false, or for which he or she lacks evidence. 
Relations: a speaker should try to make a contribution to conversation that is 
relevant to what has gone before. 
Manner: a speaker should seek to organize his contribution so that it is easily 
understandable. This involves avoiding unnecessary obscurity or ambiguity, being brief 
and saying what needs to be said in a sensible order. " (Harris, 1990, p. 59). 
Lakoff proposed that in natural conversations Gricean maxims are integrated by a 
it 
second type of conversational postulates, summarized by the maxim "Be polite . 
According to Lakoff, politeness in conversations can be described by three maxims: 
Don't impose 
Give options 
Make your partner feel good 
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The polite speaker tries to leave as much freedom of action as possible to his 
interlocutor; besides, the polite speaker is bound to pay attention to his addressee's 
emotional reactions (however subtly expressed) so that he can smoothe down unpleasant 
feelings down and increase the other person's comfort. There are several ways by Nvhich 
such aims can be achieved by means of language. For example, speakers can resort to the 
repertoire of polite speech markers given by their culture - as in the way illustrated by 
Romina's conversation reported at the beginning of the first chapter. In addition, all the 
resources of "Discourse" speech acts (Ballmer, Brennenstuhl, 1982) can be suitably 
employed. 
However, Lakoff s maxims do not stand on the same level. The first two require 
the speaker to hold a "weak" position (don't impose) and leave the field free for the other 
one (give options). The third maxim is more general, as it requires the speaker to take 
care of his partner's feelings (make your partner feel good). Sometimes this can be done 
simplyby lowering one's own presence; in other cases, something different is required. 
For example, during an emergency making the other person feel good - that is, safe - may 
require some imposition. In other words, in Lakoff s maxims, the polite speaker seems 
to be concerned by two issues: regulation of reciprocal statuses by lowering his position, 
and regulation of partner's feelings. In this respect, a useful distinction between 
politeness and deference was introduced by Fraser and Nolen (198 1). When behaving 
deferently, the speaker uses the linguistic devices of politeness to signal his recognition 
of his inferior status. Deference increases the other person's status at the speaker's 
expense. Basically, deference underlines vertical social distance. Thus, in certain contexts 
some deference is needed in order to be polite (for example, when speaking to people of 
superior status), while in other contexts it is not appropriate (for example, among close 
friends). The maxims "Don't impose" and "Give options" are oriented towards 
deference, while the third one ("Make your partner feel good") is not necessarily so. 
Brown (1980, p. 114) gave the following definition of politeness, which appears to be 
based mostly upon the third of Lakoff s maxims: "What politeness essentially consists of 
is a special way of treating people, saying and doing things in such a way to take into 
account the other person's feelings". This definition underlines the empathetic, emotional 
aspects of politeness. The polite speaker has a representation of his partner's internal 
world (wishes, thoughts, expectations, etc. ) and tries to say things which will be in 
accordance with his partner mental state or mental world. Labov and Fanshel (1977) 
mentioned this aspect of politeness in their analysis of "therapeutic discourse". The focus 
upon the third maxim suggests a view of politeness as a set of it supportive strategies" in 
the domain of emotive communication (Arndt, Janney, 1985). Probably, it is this the 
it sense" of politeness which Goethe found close to love. 
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Interestingly enough, Lakoff thought that women's speeech is more polite and less 
assertive than men's. She also indicated some linguistic features which are t)-pical of 
feminine language in English, for example, tag questions, qualifiers or compound 
requests. Thus, she raised a question which has been thoroughly - and on occasion 
vehemently - debated in sociolinguistic research: Are women more polite than men? As 
this is not our main focus, it will be sufficient to say that the evidence on this point is not 
straightforward (Zimin, 198 1). For example, Bell (1985) found a consistent relationship 
between politeness and gender which supported Lakoff s view. However, eN, idence on 
person perception showed that, while politeness in speech is a powerful factor in 
affecting how people are perceived (Holtgraves, 1986; Newcombe, Arnkoff, 1979), it 
does not necessarily relate to gender (Baroni, DUrso, 1984). Thus, as the evidence on 
the issue is not conclusive, the problem of verifying whether women are more polite than 
men is still open. 
In the literature we can find further interpretations of politeness, mostly portrayed 
by those who are interested in general, universal rules for politeness usage and, thus, are 
concerned with the appropriateness of such use. The most complete model for politeness 
usage according to an appropriateness approach is that first proposed by Penelope Brown 
and Stephen Levinson in 1978 and then presented in a revised version in the book 
"Politeness: some universals in language usage" published in 1987. We will not go into 
the complexities of Brown and Levinson's linguistic model here, because our interest is 
not of a linguistic nature. It will be sufficient to define the main concepts of their 
theoretical work as relevant to the present psychological inquiry. 
Brown and Levinson think - in accordance with many other people, as mentioned 
above - that politeness is mainly concerned with the feelings of the other person and that 
it is a means to protect or ease them. In order to analyse this point, the Authors take into 
consideration Goffman's (1967) notion of "face". According to Goffman, the social 
being has both a positive and a negative face during social intercourse. The positive face 
is the subject's wish (or "want" in Brown and Levin's terms) that the other person wants 
for him the same things that he wishes for himself, for example, a good life, a positive 
self-image, wealth, health, success, and so forth. We simply note that, apart from the 
very general desiderabilia just exemplified, sharp eyes, powers of observation and subtle 
discernment are required to identify what constitutes the positive face of any given 
individual, as human beings greatly vary in this respect. 
The negative face is perhaps easier to identify. It is everyone's want to be free from 
impositions and to have his own territory respected. Politeness, basically, takes care of 
the feelings which are related to these two aspects of "face". In Brown and Levinson's 
theory, politeness is called upon to act whenever, for any reason, there is a potential Facc 
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Threatening Act (FTA). Examples of non-mitigated, straightforward Face Threatening 
Act against positive face are ironic remarks or criticism because they loA-er the hearer's 
self-image; examples of Face Threatening Act against negative face are requests or 
commands because they are impositions upon the other's free will. We thus havc two 
types of politeness, each aimed at taking care of a set of feelings relating to face: posi6vc 
politeness and negative politeness. Brown and Gilman (1989) found very nice examples 
of both in Shakespeare's Hamlet, King Lear, Macbeth and Othello. 
Here are a their examples of positive politeness (Brown, Gilman, 1989, 
p. 167): 
1. Notice admirable qualities, possessions, etc. 
Desdemona: Alas, trice-gentle Cassio (Oth., III, iv, 122) 
2. Exaggerate sympathy, approval, etc. 
Goneril (to King Lear): Beyond all manner of so much I love you (I, i, 63) 
3. Intensify the interest of the hearer in the speaker's contribution. 
Othello (to the Duke and others): And of the Cannibals that each other eat, 
The Anthropophagi, and men whose heads 
grew beneth their shoulders. (1, iii, 142-144) 
4. Use in-group identity markers in speech. 
Hamlet (to Horatio): Sir, my good friend, I'll change that name with you (1, ii, 163) 
5. Seek agreement in safe topics. 
Edgar (to Edmund): How now, brother Edmund: what serious contemplation are you in? (King 
Lear, I, ii, 149-150) 
6. Avoid possible disagreement by hedging your statement. 
Knight (to King Lear): My lord, I know not what the matter is; but to my judgment... (I, iv, 57- 
58) 
7. Assert common ground. 
King (to Rosencrantz and Guildersten of themselves and Hamlet): I entreat you both 
That, being so young days brought up with him, 
and sith so neighbored to his youth and havior (11, ii, 10- 12) 
8. Joke to put the hearer at ease. 
Mucduff (to a porter): Was it so late, friend, ere you went to bed 
That you do lie so late? (Macbeth, 11, iii, 23-24) 
9. Assert knowledge of the hearer's wants and indicate that you are taking account of 
them. 
Regan (to Oswald of himself and Goneril): I know you are of her bosom (King Lear, IV, N', 26) 
10. Offer, promise. 
Regan (to Oswald): I'll love thee much (King Lear, IV, v, 21) 
1 1) 
11. Be optimistic that the hearer wants what the speaker wants, that the Face Pireatening 
Act is slight. 
Desdemona (to Othello of Cassio): I prethee call him back (III, iii, 5 1) 
12. Use an inclusive fon-n to include both speaker and hearer in the activity. 
Goneril (to Regan): Pray you, let's bit (agree) together (King Lear, I, i, 306) 
13. Give reasons why speaker wants what he or she does so that it will seem reasonable 
to the hearer. 
Regan (to Edmund): Our troops set forth tomorrow: stay with us; 
The ways are dangerous (King Lear, IV, v, 16-17) 
14. Assert reciprocal exchange or tit for tat. 
Macbeth (to Banquo): If you shall clive to my consent... 
It shall make honor for you (II, i, 25-26) 
15. Give something desired: gifts, position, sympathy, understanding, etc. 
Goneril (to Edmund): Decline your head. This kiss, if it durst speak, 
Would stretch thy spirits up into the air. (King Lear, IV, ii, 22-23) 
Here are Brown and Gilman's examples for negative politeness (1989, p. 168): 
1. Be conventionally indirect. 
Banquo (to Macbeth): Worthy Macbeth, we stay upon your leisure (1, iii, 148) 
2. Do not assume willingness to comply. Question, hedge. 
Queen (to Rosencrantz and Guilderstern): If it please you 
To show us so much gentry and good will (Hainlet, 11, ii, 21-22) 
3. Be pessimistic about ability or willingness to comply. Use the subjunctive. 
Osric (to Hamlet): Sweet lord, if your lordship were at leisure, I should impart a thing 
to you from his Majesty (V, ii, 91-92) 
4. Minimize the imposition. 
Edgar (to Albany): Hear me one word. (King Lear, V, i, 39) 
5. Give deference. 
Otheflo (to the Duke and Venetian Senators): Most potent, grave, and reverend signiors 
My very noble and approved good masters (1, iii, 76-77) 
6. Apologize. Admit the impingement, express reluctance, ask forgiveness. 
Ross (to Mucduff): Let not your ears despise my tongue forever, 
Which shall possess them with the heaviest sound 
That ever yet thay heard (Macbeth, IV, iii, 201-203) 
7. Impersonalize the speaker and the hearer. Use passive without agent. 
Knight (to King Lear): your Highness is not entertained with that ceremonious affecbon 
as you were wont (L iv, 58-60) 
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8. State the Face Threatening Act as an instance of the general rule to soften the offence, 
Gloucester (to King Lear): My dear lord, 
You know the fiery quality of the Duke, 
How unremovable and fixed he is 
In his own course (11, iv, 90-93) 
9. Nominalize to distance the actor and add formality. 
King (to Hamlet): But to persever 
In obstinate condolement is a course 
of impious stubborness (1, ii, 92-94) 
10. Go on record as incurring a debt. 
Queen (to rosencrantz and Guilderstem): Your visitation shall receive such thanks 
As fits a king's remembrance. (Hamletý 11, ii, 25-26) 
Politeness, then, can be offered in many different ways and the same utterance can 
contain both positive and negative politeness (I am here accepting Brown and Gilman's 
notion, which is in contrast with the original formulation by Brown and Uvinson, who 
set positive and negative politeness as separated in different speech acts). Politeness has a 
"redressive" value which is aimed at lessening the effects of the Face Threatening Act 
upon the hearer's feelings. Politeness is a "mitigator". An interesting extension of the 
theory is that, while positive politeness can be used freely, negative politeness is 
specificaRy aimed at "redressing" the Face Threatening Act. Negative politeness, 
focussed upon the negative face, is designed to acknowledge the listener's freedom of 
action. In the above examples we find many different strategies by which this aim is 
pursued. Sometimes the speaker stresses the other's free will (ex. 2,3), on other 
occasions the speaker enlarges the social distance (1,5,7,9), and on others the speaker 
will make implicit or explicit reference to the Face Threatening Act itself in an attempt to 
minimize it (4,6,8). Some aspects of negative politeness are embedded in the very 
structure of language, for example, the use of pronouns (personal vs impersonal) or 
auxiliaries or indirect forms. In other words, negative politeness is the conventional 
side of politeness, the most formal one. By contrast, positive politeness is primarily 
aimed at strengthening the link (human bond) between speaker and hearer Q; 4; 7; 9; 11; 
12; 13; 14). In addition, positive politeness aims at creating positive emotion in the hearer 
(1; 2; 8; 10; 15) even at the cost of some restraint from the speaker (4; 5). For these 
reasons, positive politeness is more sympathetic. Its use depends upon both the 
characteristics of the hearer and the speaker's ability to understand what will please him 
most. 
According to Clark and Schunk (1980,1981), politeness in requests works within 
a "cost-benefit" system. On one hand, "the more the literal meaning of a request implies 
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personal benefits for the listener, within reason, the more polite is the request" (Clark, 
Schunk, 1980, P. I 11) . For example, "Can you tell me what time it is? " is more polite 
than "What time is it? ". On the other hand, "the more attentive the responder is to all of the 
requester's meaning, the more polite is the response" (Clark, Schunk, 1980, P. I 11). For 
example, the reply to the first question "Yes, I can. It's twenty to six" is more polite than 
"It's twenty to six". In the cost-benefit theory, more politeness in the request calls for 
more politeness in the response. Brown and Levinson (1987) think that the amount of 
politeness is universally regulated by three factors: Power (vertical social distance, 
status, authority), Distance (horizontal social distance, familiarity, solidarity), and 
Ranked extretnity of the Face Threatening Act (the amount of interference caused by 
the Face Threatening Act upon positive or negative face). There is the assumption that not 
all the Face Threatening Acts will have the same effect on the listener's feelings. For 
example, as for positive face, to tell a friend that his car needs a wash is less threatening 
than to suggest that he needs a wash himself; as for negative face, to be asked to lend a 
book is less threatening than to be asked to lend4house. Of course, as Brown and 
Levinson acknowledge, there are cultural variations in the definition of power (P), 
distance (D) and especially of ranked extremity (R). However, the underlying rule should 
be universal across cultures: The weight (unsafeness, riskiness) of a Face Threatening 
Act is a function of the power of the addressee over the speaker, plus the social distance 
between the two, plus the amount of threat posed by the Face Threatening Act. The 
amount of politeness should vary accordingly. More politeness is needed when 
addressing a person who has power over the speaker than when addressing a person who 
has not. More politeness is needed when the horizontal social distance is great than when 
it is small. More politeness is needed when the speech act is rather threatening than when 
it is of low potential harm for the addressee's face. Brown and Levinson give an abstract 
description of the range of possible strategies in the selection of politeness which are 
related to the various combinations of the above variables. However, it is interesting to 
note that politeness phenomena also involve consideration of the absence of politeness. 
Although there are situations in which it is more likely - or even more convenient - to use 
some politeness, the speaker always has a choice between using politeness or not using it 
at all. In the second case, the Face Threatening Act is carried out without any 
consideration for the hearer's feelings - whatever the perlocutionary effect. 
Indirectness and politeness 
Among linguists some attention has been devoted to the relationships between 
indirectness and politeness (Blum-Kulka, 1987). As it has previously mentioned, the 
first linguist to raise the issue of indirectness has been Searle (1975a). The topic ý, vas 
25 
further pursued by Ervin-Tripp (1976,1977), whose work on American English 
directives has been rather influential for developmental research. Ervin-Tripp analysed a 
corpus of transcripts of adult speech in search of different types of directives. Her 
samples were collected in natural settings, such as offices, hospitals and laboratories. She 
found that adults produced six types of directives, each strictly linked to a typical social 
situation, as follows: 
I. Need statements (I need a match) are primarily directed to subordinates. They 
are routinely understood, do not require a response for compliance, but require an excuse 
for non-compliance. 
2. Imperatives (Give me a match) are directed to subordinates or to familiar 
equals. Like need statements, they are routinely understood, do not require a response for 
compliance, but require an excuse for non-compliance. 
3. Imbedded imperatives (Could you give me a match? ). "Directed most often 
to unfamiliar people, or those differing in rank. In addition, modifications to imperatnIcs 
were available such as please, titles, address terms, postponed tags like OK and colild 
you, and rising terminal pitch. Imbeddings and modifications occurred when a task was 
special, physical distance lay between speaker and hearer, or when the addressee was in 
her own territory .... The ability and willingness of the hearer to help, and whether the act 
has, or will be, performed can be questioned in imbedded imperatives. The most 
common of these occurred typically in our data when compliance was already likely. " 
(Ervin-Tripp, 1977, p. 16). Imbedded imperatives are easily understood. Compliance 
requires an expression of agreement, non-compliance requires an excuse. 
4. Permission directives (May I have a match? ) were rare in the American 
sample and mostly directed to superiors or unfamiliar people. Again, compliance 
requires an expression of agreement, non-compliance an excuse. They are easily 
understood. 
5. Question directives (Have you got a match? ) "These differ from imbedded 
imperatives since the desired act, and often the agent of the act, are omitted, so that the 
resulting form is identical with an information question and misunderstanding is possible. 
The form is most common when the listener might not comply, so the question turns on 
the likely obstacle. When there are standard situations with standard obstacles, the 
question directive becomes a situated conventional directive: (telephone) Is ývbil there?, 
(breakfast room) Is there any coffee left?. When the question omits reference to the 
desired object, it is fully indirect: Did the W-2 forms come? What's that on the floor? 
Comprehension then rests on shared knowledge on what duties the hearer has with 
respect to that time, place, or object. They are cues referring to other knowledge, much 
like hints. " (ibidem, pp. 166-167) Both compliance and non compliance require an 
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inference and an answer. They might not be easily understood. Non compliance is 
possible. 
6. Hints (7he matches are all gone) For hints non compliance is possible. They 
require a reply for both compliance and non compliance. "Hints typically require 
inference. They were employed when the speakers could rely on shared rules in 
structured situations in offices and classrooms, and on shared understanding of habits 
and motives in living groups and families. They were important vehicles for solidarity 
and humor in compatible groups. " (ibidem, p. 167). 
Ervin-Tripp's developmental theory is that children gradually learn to use more and 
more indirect directives in which they do not make reference to the desired object. As in 
Bates's (1976)work which is presented later, the form/content distinction appears to be 
important: ".. the major differences between adults and young children is not diversity of 
structure, not diversity of social features - though the rules may increase in number of 
variables and in complexity with age - but systematic, regular, unmarked requests, which 
do not refer to what the speaker wants. Wide use of tactful deviousness is a late 
accomplishment. " (ibidem, p. 18 8). 
The above categorization rests upon the distinction between the illocutionary 
intention of requesting and the words actually adopted to express it. There are various 
ways in which the speaker can "hide" his intention to direct other people's behaviour. 
The major issue here is the indirectness of the request. Some directives are 
straightforward and others are more involute and require understanding of the social 
circumstances. As in Brown and Levinson's theory of politeness, also in Ervin-Tripp's 
work, status and social distance are powerful factors in determining the level of 
indirectness of a request. Although the above categorization is not especially concerned 
with politeness, one cannot forget that politeness is primarily involved in requests as a 
means to protect the addressee's negative face (want to be free from impositions and/or to 
have one own's territory respected). From this point of view, there are a few 
observations to be made on Ervin-Tripp's theory. 
First, Ervin-Tripp shows that there are indeed ways of requesting which leave 
room for the other person's freedom of will: Question directives and hints. They are 
both 
context-bound and require cognitive effort from the hearer to be understood. They are 
implicit requests. 
Second, there are two categories of directives (i. e., imbedded imperatives and 
permission directives) which, although quite explicit, show peculiar syntactic 
elaborations when compared with direct requests such as need statements or 
imperatives. 
Both imbedded imperatives and question directives are easily recognizable as requests - 
for example, they also have rising intonation. Yet they need special syntactic surface 
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forms. Thus, imbedded imperatives and question directives are explicit, but more indirect 
than imperatives. Not surprisingly, imbedded imperatives and permission directives are 
used to superiors and unfamiliar people. In this case, the hearer's negative face is 
protected by some indirectness expressed by ad hoc syntactic devices. 
Third, while syntactically modified directives such as imbedded impera6ves and 
permission directives are more likely to be addressed to unfamiliar or superior people, 
need statements and imperatives can be addressed to subordinates or familiar people. 
Brown and Levinson's P and D factors seem to be at work here. 
To summarize, three levels of politeness in requests can be identified from Ervin- 
Tripp's categorization: 
1. Explicit and direct requests (need statements and imperatives), which can be 
addressed to subordinates and familiar people. They do not leave much freedom to the 
hearer, and thus are the least polite. 
2. Explicit, but syntacticaHy modified requests (imbedded imperatives and 
permission directives), which are routinely used when differences to the speaker's 
disadvantage in P and D are in question. They are conventionally, syntactic all y- based 
polite requests. 
3. Implicit directives which require effort to be understood as such, owing to the 
fact that they do not have the conventional syntactic structure of a request (question 
directives and especially hints). As far as only negative politeness (i. e., hearer's freedom) 
goes, these are the most polite directives. 
Blum-Kulka (1989) also distinguishes between three types of requests which show 
different degrees of directness, as follows: 
11 1. the most direct, explicit level realized by requests syntactically marked as such, 
for example, imperatives ( ). 
2. the conventionally indirect level: strategies that realize the act by reference to 
contextual preconditions necessary for its performance, as conventionalized in a given 
language. 
3. the non conventional indirect level, i. e., the open-ended group of indirect 
strategies that realize the request either by partial reference to the object or element needed 
for the implementation of the act ot by reliance on contextual clues" (Blum-Kulka, 1989, 
p. 46-47). The first categorization of requests drawn from Ervin-Tripp's work is virtually 
identical to the second categorization proposed by Blum-Kulka on the basis of her cross- 
cultural work. Both stress two dimensions: conventionality and directness. However, 
both treat directness and explicitness as they were the same construct. In contrast, I 
propose that a distinction should be made between directness (indirectness) and 
explicitness (implicitness). The former refers to the degree to which the illocutionary 
force of the speech act of requesting is expressed by the utterance. The latter refers to the 
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degree to which all the components of the desired act are expressed. To be explicit. that iS 
easily understandable, a request must verbally indicate at least both the desired 
object/action and the agent. The distinction is important because it refers to the difficult 
balance between negative politeness and the conversational principles proposed by Gricc 
(1975) summarized in the maxim "Be clear". One should not forget that an excess of 
implicitness is in fact impolite, because it may threaten the hearer's confidence to be able 
to follow a conversation (positive face). Obscure speakers are impolite. Nobody likes to 
misunderstand things and thus be made to feel stupid. Even in requests, negative 
politeness must be balanced against positive politeness. 
To come to our point, only question directives and hints are both implicit and 
indirect requests. Since the desired object and/or agent are not expressed in the linguistic 
structure of the utterance, question directives and hints are the only implicit directi%, cs. 
Question directives and hints are very polite because they leave options to the hearer 
(negative politeness). But, they may be too obscure and become impolite in ten-ns of 
positive politeness. 
Hints are considered as the most polite form of requesting in English. However, 
some caution should be taken in this respect when different languages and cultures are 
concerned. For example, an Italian speaker may be not too worried about "tactt'ul 
deviousness" which may be perceived as coldness of manner. In Italy, an involute and 
very indirect person may be considered well mannered, but such a speaker makes people 
feel bad in their "want" of human contact. In Italy, and possibly the rest of the world, 
where no sympathy (in Humphrey's (1976) sense, see below) is expressed, little true 
politeness exists. It is possible that different cultures put different emphasis either upon 
positive politeness (aimed at reassuring the hearer that he is an interesting person worth 
speaking to) or negative politeness, which signals respect for the hearer's freedom of 
action. For example, it has been shown that the amount of direct as opposed to indirect 
requests greatly vary across cultures, ranging from 9.8% (direct requests) to 82.4% 
(conventional indirect requests) to 7.8% (hints) for Australian English to 39.6% (direct 
requests) to 58.4% (conventional indirect requests) to 2.0% (hints) for Argentinian 
Spanish (Blum-Kulka, 1989). A different stress put upon either negative or positive 
politeness may gave rise to misunderstandings when people of different cultures or 
people with different social orientations interact. To give just a small cross-cultural 
example, in English a commonly used, colloquial way of respecting one own hearer's 
freedom of action is to answer "I don't mind" when a choice is proposed. This is 
awkward for Italians who do not have such an expression. The closest Italian translation 
to I do not mind" is "non mi importaff , which means 
"I don It care". To an Italian ear, "I 
don't mind" sounds as "I simply do not care about what you want", which is clearly a 
Face Threatening Act against positive face, whereas for an English-speaking person, "I 
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don't mind" sounds as "Do as you wish, and I will be happy if you are happy", which 
a nice way of reassuring negative face. Of course, practice may soften such 
misunderstandings. Yet such subtle tunings of language which express diffcrent vie"A's 
about the other person's feelings and, consequently, different ways of taking care of 
them, may create wrong impressions and interfere with the process of mutual 
understanding between people of different cultures. 
Imbedded imperatives and permission directives are explicit requests although 
"softened" or mitigated in their directness by a variety of conventional syntactic devices. 
The illocutionary component of requesting is both weakened in its force and perfectly 
represented in the linguistic structure of both imbedded imperatives and permission 
directives, because the desired act and the agent are explicitly mentioned. Imbedded 
imperatives and permission directives are quite safe as far as politeness is concerned. 
They are clear, yet they indicate acknowledgment of the hearer's freedom of action in a 
culturally-based, routinized way. They are always polite. 
Imperatives are of course both explicit and direct. As such, they do not take any 
special care of the hearer's wish to be free from impositions. Generally speaking, they 
are impolite. Need or wish statements can be considered as belonging to Ballmer and 
Brennenstuhl's "Expression" -a function which is both monological and private. Only 
contextual factors can give need statements the status of requests. Need statements have a 
certain degree of implicitness because the object is obvious, but the agent of the desired 
act is not mentioned. If an adult says "I want (need) X", he does not necessarily mean 
"You must get Xfor me". For example, in conversations one can safely say "I need a 
new car" without being considered a shameless beggar. By contrast, if interpreted by the 
hearer as directives, need statements are certainly direct. Interestingly enough, much 
social blame is put upon need or desire statements when children are concerned. For 
example, there is an Italian proverb which says: 'Uerba "vogho" non cresce nemmeno 
nel giardino del re" (The herb "I want" doea not even grow in the King's garden). Italian 
parents quote this proverb to prompt their children to use more conventional and polite 
forms of requesting than need statements introduced by "I want". In other words, parents 
try to direct their children towards less egocentric (less implicit) and more sociable (less 
direct) forms of requesting. Need statements are possibly the most impolite requests 
because they are both direct and implicit. They do not take care either of the hearer's 
negative face ("want " to be free from impositions) or of his positive face ("want" to be 
spared of cognitive effort). 
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A psychologist's point of view on politeness 
From what has been discussed up to now on the basis of linguistic and socio- 
linguistic research, we are bound to conclude that politeness is a complex phenomenon in 
which language, social norms, and psychological understanding are woven together. 
From the psychological point of view, the question is: Which psychological skills are 
required for mastering politeness? 
To answer this question, Austin's definition of speech acts can be usefully 
employed. As reported in the first chapter, according to Austin any speech act is 
composed of three aspects: Locution, illocution and perlocution. 
Locution. The first skill required to be polite is necessarily a linguistic skill. The 
speaker must have at least a basic repertoire of politeness markers, polite utterances and 
other conversational devices. 
111ocution. Different skills are required for the iflocutionary aspect of the polite 
speech act. The problem faced here by the speaker is how to express his intentions in a 
way which is acceptable for his hearer's feelings. To do so, the speaker must first of all 
be aware that what he is about to say is potentially threatening for the listener's feelings 
(or face); second, he must evaluate correctly the extent of the potential threat (Ranked 
extremity, according to Brown and Levinson's jargon). This point is somewhat tricky, 
because on one side there may well be "universal" although culturally based rankings 
which enable a speaker to evaluate quickly how big the potential damage to the hearer's 
feelings is. On the other side, human beings are famous for the loose predictability of 
their behaviour during social intercourse. Thus, a speaker, comforted by his experience 
and in-group rules, might judge one Face Threatening Act as not very offensive, but the 
same act may be perceived as a capital one by his listener, for some idiosyncratic reason 
(including a bad mood). The extent of the potential threat - it is suggested here - is not 
absolute but is also related to the hearer's perception of it. Thus, R must be evaluated also 
taking into account what is known about the individual characteristics of the listener, as 
far as possible. In a word, evaluation of R includes objective evaluation of cost, cultural 
nonns, and the psychological understanding of one's listener. Lastly, to establish the 
degree of politeness needed to express an intention safely, the speaker must wisely judge 
the type of social context he is in. This can be done by a correct understanding of the 
variables Power, which mostly refers to reciprocal status, and Distance, which mostly 
refers to the degree of familiarity between speaker and addressee. 
To summarize, any illocutionary force expressed politely requires three mental 
operations: awareness of the force of the Face Threatening Act, psychological evaluation 
and understanding of the social context. It should be recalled that an excess of politeness, 
that is, wrong evaluation of the global Weight of the Face Threatening Act (W= P +D + 
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R), is irritating ("Uriah Heep" effect) or may be perceived as a rejection. Both too much 
and too little politeness are impolite. A noteworthy amount of social cognition is thus 
involved in any polite expression which will not hurt or irritate the listener's feelings. 
To balance the degree of politeness against the circumstances of any interaction is to 
face a social problem, as defined by Humphrey (1976). In Humphrey's opinion, any 
social problem is characterized by three conditions. 
First, social problems have a large degree of indeten-ninacy. "Neither of the social 
agents involved in the transaction can be certain of the future behaviour of the other" 
(Humphrey, 1976; pp. 22-23). This point is very important for politeness. The very 
existence of the phenomenon in every language seems to be related to the need to avoid 
aggression. Thus, negative politeness redresses potential threats to territory, while 
positive politeness strengthens social links. By keeping the hearer in a good mood, 
politeness diminishes the probability of aggressive outbursts. Yet human beings remain 
to a large extent unpredictable and much social cognitive effort is needed to suit the level 
of politeness to the particular circumstances in which the interaction occurs. 
Second, the process of solving the social problem has a certain logic. As in a chess 
game "... in social behaviour there is a kind of turn-taking, there are limits on what 
actions are allowable, and at least in some circumstances there are conventional, often 
highly elaborated, sequences of exchange" (Humphrey, 1976; p. 23). This is also evident 
in politeness. As noted above, Brown and Levinson indicate that there are precise sets of 
rules for politeness. The conventional, ritualized side of politeness might be denigrated, 
yet it is an important component of any easy interaction. From this point of view, 
politeness works like the script of a play. The important thing for the speaker is to 
understand which part must be played in a given circumstance. As many parts may be 
played by the same speaker, some effort must be expended to pick up the right role in the 
play quickly . For example, the polite enquiry 
"What's your job? " often is one of the first 
verbal moves between new acquaintances. The answer sets the scene for further dialogue: 
The level of politeness is tuned by the P (status, authority) and D (social distance) levels 
indicated by the response. 
Third, unlike the player in the chess game who just wants to win, the social 
problem-solver is restrained by sympathy. "By sympathy I mean a tendency on the part 
of one social partner to identify himself with the other and so to make the other's goals to 
some extent his own" (Humphrey, 1976; p. 23). Positive politeness performs exactly this 
function. This is why positive politeness has been previously called sympathetic 
politeness. It will be remembered that being polite means to be in Discourse, that is to be 
in a socially entrenched and cooperative dialogue. 
The conclusion is that politeness is not only a civilized social game, but it is alsý) a 
good example of social problem-solving. 
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Perlocution. Lastly, the perlocutionary aspect must also be taken into account in 
this analysis. It deals with the "effects" of any speech act upon the listener. As discussed 
above, there is universal consent among researchers that politeness is designed to protect 
and take care of the feelings of people. Politeness has been invented by human beings 
and transmitted in every culture as a useful tool to serve the aims of cooperation and 
comfort in social intercourse. Politeness aims at smoothing the asperities of social 
intercourse and, especially in its positive aspect, at promoting positive emotional states. 
Ethologists have made us aware of the fact that in the social species there are rituals 
aimed at controlling intra-specific aggression (see for example, Lorenz, 1967). Social 
animals are endowed with such rituals by biological transmission. Possibly politeness, 
which is culturally transmitted by means of language, originally had the same biological 
function: to avoid intra-specific aggression. This aspect is especially evident in negative 
politeness. For example, Harris (1974) did an ingenious experiment in which an 
experimenter cut in line in front of the subject in a queu and observed the subject's 
reactions. She was able to demonstrate that when the experimenter said "Excuse me", 
subjects displayed less aggression than when the experimenter did not. Yet, the potentials 
of polite language have been developed by human beings beyond the necessities of 
individual survival. Politeness has a positive aspect which promotes emotional well- 
being, friendship and, why not? love among people. In other words, politeness does not 
only have the effect of protecting of the self (by soothing the other one); it also promotes 
and strengthens human bonds. The perlocutionary effects of politeness may be of interest 
not only to social psychologists, but also to clinicians interested in the promotion of 
human mental health. Unfortunately, quite often negative politeness, which is 
indoubtedly the most ritualized and can indeed be "empty" (merely self-defensive), has 
been taken as covering all aspects of politeness. 
An analysis, however brief, of the perlocutionary effects of politeness will show 
that politeness is just a tool. It produces effects upon the other person's internal states. It 
can soothe potential threats to territoriality or freedom of action, it can make the people 
feel good by recognition and enhancement of their positive faces. Of course, being such a 
flexible tool, politeness can also be used to make people feel bad. For example, an excess 
of negative politeness causes a formal, cool situation which may be hurtful. Politeness is 
a tool and serves its user's aims. It can be used either instrumentally or 
sympathetically (in Humphrey's sense). In the first case, the speaker's aim is self- 
protection and/or self- achievement. In the second case, the speaker's aim is the creation, 
maintainance or strengthening of the social bond. Thus, politeness is not primarily pro- 
social. It depends upon the speaker's intentions. Politeness simply takes care of the 
feelings relating to face. The perlocutionary effects of politeness can be used to serN, c 
prosocial aims (Labov, Fanshel, 1977). However, the competent speaker can also use the 
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same effects in non-social or even anti-social ways: Politeness may merely be a 
Machiavellian device to pursue one own's aims at the expence of those of others. Perhaps 
the best known and extreme example of Machiavellian politeness is Valentino Borgia's 
behaviour towards his opponents. He used to reassure people of his affection and 
friendship by gifts and nice words, and then-clear the world of them! 
As discussed so far, politeness can be considered as a linguistic "tool" which 
promotes cooperation and emotional comfort. For the psychologist, an interesting point is 
the amount of social understanding required to perform successfully the task of being 
suitably polite in any given social circumstance. An analysis of the psychological 
requirements for politeness focusses attention on the following abilities and 
undertandings: 
1. linguistic repertoire of polite speech acts; 
2. linguistic awareness of the existence of a Face Threatening Act; 
3. understanding of people's individual characteristics; 
4. understanding of social contexts (rules, P, D, R); 
5. knowledge of the social effects of politeness; 
6. "sympathy" or wish to promote emotional comfort in others. 
One way to describe the relative role of all the above components is to analyse what 
happens when a speaker employs politeness. Based upon the literature reported and 
discussed in this chapter, the operations needed to perform a polite speech act may 
require at least four steps. 
STEP 1 
Recognition 
The speaker recognizes a potential Face Threatening Act. The examples are almost 
infinite. Let us review some of them. The speaker wants something from the hearer, he 
understands that this is an imposition upon his hearer's negative face (freedom of will). 
The speaker is talking about his successful work to his boss, he understands that he may 
be threatening his hearer's positive face ("want" to be recognized as superior by his 
subordinates). The speaker is talking enthusiastically about a new acquaintance to an old 
friend, he understands that he may be threatening his hearer's positive face ("want" to be 
considered as good as the others, preferably better than them). The speaker wishes to 
refuse an invitation, he understands that this will hurt his hearer's positive face ("want" to 
be considered a nice person to spend time with), etc.. 
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STEP 2 
Decision 
The speaker decides that he wants to take care of the other person's feelings. At this stage Cý 
the speaker recognizes that there are some goals to be achieved by interaction with the 
other person, instrumental, sympathetic, or both. 
STEP 3 
Strategy selection 
The speaker selects which aspect of the other person's "face" he wants to take care of by 
means of language. The possibilities are three, summarized by the following rules: 
a) take care of your hearer's negative face, stress your respect for your hearer's freedom 
of action; 
b) take care of your hearer's positive face, try to understand what best pleases your 
hearer and express it; 
c) take care of both. 
STEP 4 
Language 
The speaker activates his repertoire of polite language and selects the most appropriate 
words or utterances, following the above instructions. Thus, either negative politeness, 
or positive politeness, or both, will be verbally expressed. 
If the above description is correct, all polite speakers start with a preliminary act of 
social understanding: Recognition. From a cognitive point of view, "recognition" is the 
mental operation needed to match the relevant information stored in long-term memory 
with what is currently happening. Recognition is important because it starts the whole 
process which may end in politeness. If something goes wrong at this stage, the person 
cannot be but impolite. The speaker simply does not recognize that he might hurt the 
other person's feelings and cannot make decisions about how to prevent this. The point is 
particularly important for the developmental psychologist, because several circumstances 
may impair recognition. For example, if no knowledge about Face Threatening Acts is 
stored, no recognition is possible. If the retrieval process is too demanding (e. g., many 
inferences), recognition may be challenged. If the speaker's knowledge about Face 
Threatening Act or people's feelings relating to face is inaccurate or wrong, again no 
recognition is possible. If, last but not least, little attention is paid to people's feelings, no 
recognition of face threatening acts is possible. To summarize, several factors may impair 
the recognition of a Face Threatening Act. Among them, the most important may tx, -: a) 
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lack of experience of that class of social phenomena; b) severe limitations of the cognitive 
system; c) wrong information about people's feelings; d) attention deficits. 
When a Face Threatening Act is recognized, a decision must be taken. The 
alternatives are: a) to carry out the Face Threatening Act badly; b) to soften, mitigate, and 
hopefully undo the impact of the Face Threatening Act upon the hearer's feelings relating 
to face; c) to avoid the Face Threatening Act. Of course, the best solution would be to 
avoid any potential offence ("Silence is golden ...... ), but the circumstances do not always 
allow it. The process of decision making involves the motivational component of human 
behaviour. To discuss this point better, it will be useful to refer to Eisenberg's work on 
the development of pro-social behaviour (Eisenberg, 1986). Although some caveats 
about an interpretation of politeness as pro-social behaviour have already been indicated, 
Nancy Eisenberg's work may be relevant to enlighten our second step (decision). She 
proposed a complex model for pro-social behaviour with three components: initial steps, 
the motivational portion, and the link between intention to assist and pro-social action. 
For Eisenberg, the first step is what she calls "the interpretation of the situation", 
influenced by the child's abilities and dispositions (both influenced by cognitive 
development and socialization) and by the characteristics of the situation itself. It is 
noteworthy that, as in our previous analysis, much attention is devoted to understanding 
the internal circumstances which trigger the behaviour under examination. For our 
purposes, the most interesting part of Eisenberg's model is the central one. She divided 
the motivational factors into three facets. First, motivation can have a primaril-y affectii, e 
source (sympathy). In the case of politeness, for example, the speaker may decide to be 
polite because he is really sorry to bother the other person. Second, motivation depends 
upon an evaluation (predominantly cognitive) of the situation, in terins of both cost- 
benefit and evaluation of the other person's needs. Third, motivation is also related to 
personality factors, such as self-identity with regard to the "trait" of kindness, self-esteem 
and self-focus, and values, needs or preferences. According to the above analysis, the 
decision to be polite can thus be influenced by several motivational factors. The literature 
on politeness reported and discussed above would suggest that the evaluative component 
is very important, but other motivational components cannot be excluded and must be 
indicated. Some attention should be devoted to motivational factors in polite behaviour in 
further research. For example, motivational analysis would shed more light upon the 
instrumental/syrn pathetic use of politeness. Besides, this is an area which might be useful 
in clinical investigations, when internal models of social relations are under examinations. 
Whatever the speaker's motivation to engage in polite verbal behaviour, he must 
select a politeness strategy. At this stage, two routes are possible. The first is the 
simpler one. The speaker decides that he is going to take care of the hearer's negative 
face. From what has been said up to now, it will be remembered that negative politeness 
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is the more routinized and conventional fonn of politeness. For example, mitigations 
("please") and some indirectness are among the first polite devices acquired by young 
children. According to his verbal proficiency, the speaker selects the fight amount of 
negative politeness and expresses it. The second route is a more complex one, since it 
requires a second act of social understanding. The speaker not only recognizes the Face 
Threatening Act, but also tries to deal with it by focussing upon his hearer's 
characteristics. He tries to understand what suits the hearer's positive face better and 
expresses it. A further development of the second route is the integration between 
negative and positive politeness into complex sentences. 
The fourth step is concemed with language, that is, with word access and 
selection. It refers to the speaker's linguistic proficiency. 
To summarize, the mental operations for the polite speaker involve acts of social 
understanding as well as linguistic proficiency, not to mention the motivation to be polite. 
The above analysis concentrates on the mental operations the speaker must undertake to 
cope with his social circumstances. The backbone of politeness in natural interacfion - it 
is proposed here - is not language, but social understanding. The right words (Step 
4) are accessed only if the person is both socially oriented (Steps I and 2) and socially 
competent (Steps I and 3). If we focus our attention only on the social cognition involved 
in politeness, a very simple logic can be identified, as follows: 
0. no act of social understanding, no recognition, impoliteness; 
1. one act of social understanding, recognition, negative politeness; 
2. two acts of social understanding, recognition plus understanding of personal 
characteristics of one own's hearer, positive politeness. 
To progress further 
The literature and abstract analyses which have been presented so far lead our 
attention on three major points. 
The first is that speech acts are not all of the same level of complexity. Politeness 
belongs to Discourse, which is the most complex function for speech acts. Discourse is 
highly complex and thus hierarchically superior for two reasons. The first is that 
Discourse may incorporate other functions (such as appeals or verbal struggles). The 
second is that Discourse is the most socially- oriented and dialogical type of verbal action. 
Thus, a study of the development of politeness is a study of the development of the most 
sophisticated verbal means which require cooperation and social orientation. 
The second point is closely related to the first one. An analysis of the psychological 
skills needed for polite discourse shows that much attention must be devoted to the social 
cognition involved in the process of being suitably polite. A study of the deý'elopment of 
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politeness must take into account the development of the mental operations regarding the 
social circumstances in which polite discourse occurs. 
The third point is that the literature presented so far focussed mostly on linguistic 
aspects and did not add much to our understanding of the socio-cognitive components of 
polite behaviour. Conversely, the same literature offers an interesting account of what 
polite behaviour is, showing that politeness is a twofold phenomenon which can be 
described according to two different points of view. On one hand, politeness signals 
respect for the other person's freedom of action. This is "negative" politeness, which is 
more often expressed by linguistic devices conventionally embedded in the syntactic 
structure of the utterance. From this point of view, the study of indirectness in requests is 
the study of negative politeness. On the other hand, politeness works in a more subtle 
way because it also aims at wishing for people what they wish for themselves. This is 
"positive" politeness, which is expressed by words in a variety of ways and cannot 
always be identified by linguistic markers. Thus, a study of the development of 
politeness should in principle account for the development of both aspects of politeness. 
3S 
CHAPTER 2 
The development of politeness 
To start answering the questions raised at the end of the previous chapter, 
developmental research involving several empirical studies should be undertaken. Any 
developmental research has a few, peculiar characteristics, which were clearly illustrated 
by Bruner several years ago in a paper presented at the meeting of the 18th International 
Congress of Psychology in Moscow (Bruner, 1966; published in 1973). According to 
Bruner, human intellectual growth can be studied either by a non-native (psychometric) or 
a developmental approach. The normative approach views human growth as the growth 
of abilities, an increase in performance. This approach has a long and most fruitful 
tradition in child psychology, and it has been - and still is - of much practical use in 
assessing children's abilities or level of perfon-nance (for a discussion of the 
psychometric approach to the study of human development, see Stemberg 1988; 
also 1990). However, the developmental approach adopts a different, non-non-n ative 
point of view. According to Bruner, four criteria characterize developmental studies. 
First, "any theory of intellectual growth ... must characterize the operations of mind 
in some formal and precise fashion" (Bruner, 1973, p. 314). At the time when Bruner's 
paper was written, most developmental psychologists were under the powerful influence 
of the Piagetian approach to development. Thereis no need to recall how much stress 
Piaget put upon a logical, even mathematical description of mental operations. One may 
agree or not with the original Piagetian thinking, yet Piaget had indeed indicated the main 
route to be followed by developmental psychologists: The creation of formal models of 
the mind from which empirical hypotheses can be drawn and which have the potential, in 
turn, to offer good descriptions of how the mind works. As Kaye (1982) pointed out, 
such models can be divided into two classes: Competence (C) and Process (P) models. 
A C-model is a logical description of the formal characteristics required by a system to 
operate in a given way. A P-model is a flow-chart, step-by-step description of how the 
system operates in real time. A complete account of development should, in principle, 
integrate both types of formal description. A study of the development of politeness, 
then, should be able to propose at least a general model of the mental operations involvcd 
in being (or not being) polite. As this point is a crucial one, it will be specifically 
addressed in detail later. 
The second criterion proposed by Bruner is that "Any theory of intellectual groNvth 
must take account of the natural ways of thought, the ones that seem ordinary or 
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intuitively obvious" (Bruner, 1973, p. 314). Politeness is certainly an eN, eryday ordinary 
phenomenon. What can be considered as more "natural" than saying "please" or "thank 
you" or "how are you? ". These small, ordinary words come so spontaneously in 
conversation and social intercourse that we do not pay any special attention to them. But 
where do these small words come from? how do we know when and how and to whom 
address them? There is indeed a system of rules in polite discourse, and cognitive effort 
must be expended both to learn and remember them. A developmental study on politeness 
has the potential to cast some light on the mental processes involved in one aspect of 
people's everyday social intercourse. 
The third criterion is related to the second one. "Any account of cognitive growth 
(or any form of human growth, perhaps) should take into account the nature of the 
culture in which a human being grows. For, as we have already noted, a culture is, 
among other things, a system of techniques for giving shape and power to human 
capacities. The values, tools, and ways of knowing of a culture equipe their members" 
(Bruner, 1973, p. 315). For a theory of intellectual development, it is important to take 
into account not only the differences across cultures, but also "the many deep universals 
in both human nature and in all cultures" (ibidem). Our object of interest - politeness - is 
particularly apt at fulfilling this third criterion. As has been shown before, politeness is 
both a universal phenomenon and, in addition, is vastly influenced by cultural factors 
which vary in space and time and in the means or tools adopted (linguistic forms). It 
would be of very great interest to have empirical evidence on cultural similarities and 
differences in the process of acquisition of politeness during childhood. According to 
Jahoda's (1986), culture is a powerful factor in determining affective and cognitive 
development and much attention should be devoted to cultural factors. Unfortunately, 
direct comparisons among cultures on the development of politeness are still missing and 
much work should be done to fill this gap. 
The fourth criterion is that "A theory must take into account man's primate ancestry 
and consider the manner in which the evolution of primates and of man impose a pattern 
on his growth" (Bruner, ibidem). This criterion is not easy to fulfill by a psychological 
inquiry. Yet our analysis of politeness puts forward the suggestion that politeness may be 
interpreted as a culturally based means to reduce intra-specific aggression. From this 
point of view, politeness operates much in the same way as biologically inherited rituals 
do among animals, although much ethological. work should be done to sketch the 
evolutionary line which may link rituals of non-social and social species to human 
politeness. 
The main criteria for a developmental theory have now been reported. However, 
there is a final point which Bruner thinks worth adding: 
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"Once we have formulated a view of man's intellectual growth that takes into account the formal 
properties of the products of thought, considers the instrumental nature of thought, responds to cultural 
patterning of intelligence, and places man in an evolutionary context, let us also ask whether u, e have 
contributed to our understanding of how to educate man to the point where he can use his intellectual 
heritage to the full. For if a theory of the growth of mind cannot help in that enterprise, nor contribute to 
the understanding of education, it must surely be at fault. " (Bruner, 1973, p. 316). 
The present work is specifically aimed at describing the development of linguis6c 
politeness. As no general theory about this issue can be found in the literature, attention 
will be focussed mainly upon the description of a possible model for decribing and 
interpreting the growth of politeness. Such a model should be able - in principle - to 
decribe the acquisition of politeness at any age and for every culture. The major aim of 
the present work is thus to propose a model for the development of politeness and to test 
it by means of empirical studies. The main issue addressed here is thus related to what 
Bruner proposed as the first criterion for a developmental study: the formal description of 
the development of the mental operations needed to be polite. This is the first point from 
both theoretical and logical points of view because the empirical studies needed to fulfill 
the further requirements of a developmental theory (i. e., cross-cultural and ethological 
studies) must be oriented by a theoretically based developmental description of the 
phenomenon in question. 
The task of describing the mental operations involved in the development of 
politeness must be split into two related points. First of all, we need an empirically based 
description of the development of politeness. Second, the description of how children 
master politeness at various ages may subsequently offer some ground for a model of the 
underlying mental operations. From the model, in turn, further empirical hypotheses can 
be drawn. Of course, it may well be either that the existing evidence is not sufficient for 
the task of model-building or that no developmental effect can be found as far as 
politeness is concerned. Thus, the aim of the following pages will be to answer two 
related questions. First, how does politeness develop? Second, can we find a formal 
model which has the potential to describe the mental operations involved in such 
development? 
How does linguistic politeness develop? 
To facilitate an answer to the first question, a computer search of the literature vk- as 
carried out. It soon become clear that little has been reported about the development of 
politeness. Most studies refer to the linguistic or social aspects of politeness. Many of 
them have been referred to in the previous chapter. Nothing was found about the 
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development of politeness in adults - an issue which might be discussed in terms of why 
some people are more polite and some are less so, independently of their social 
circumstances. It is an everyday observation that among people of the same social stance 
and gender, some are keen to take care of the other person's feelings while others seem 
rather insensitive to feeling states. The issue, however, is not discussed in the literature 
on politeness. 
To come straight to our point, that is, to discuss how politeness develops, our 
attention will be focussed primarily on the existing literature. Evidence regarding the 
development of politeness can be divided into three major headings. The first concerns 
children's use and metalinguistic knowledge of politeness markers and/or politeness 
formulae. As already mentioned, the evidence on this point is not much. Tbus, more 
information was sought in a field of investigation which is separate from but somewhat 
related to politeness phenomena, namely the development of indirectness in children's 
speech and especially in children's requesting strategies. The relation between 
indirectness and politeness is still under debate among linguists (e. g., Blum-Kulka, 
1987), yet from a developmental point of view it may be of interest to look at children's 
ability to modify their speech to suit conversational purposes. The literature reported 
under the second heading will then discuss some of the most relevant studies on 
children's speech modifications in requesting. The third source of infori-nation may come 
from the study of psychopathological development. Evidence of children with linguistic 
or mental impain-nents may cast further light on the non-nal development of politeness. 
Politeness in children 
The interest of psychologists in children's ability to be polite first emerged during 
the mid-seventies. This is not surprising, since in those years a great deal of attention was 
devoted to developmental pragmatics, and much emphasis was put upon the role of 
pragmatic aspects in language acquisition. In 1976, Elisabeth Bates published a book on 
the acquisition of pragmatics (Bates, 1976a) in which two chapters were concerned with 
the acquisition of polite forms. Bate's work is of special interest for the present study 
because her original research was carried out in Italy with Italian children. Bates reports 
two studies on the development of politeness. The first is longitudinal and involves two 
children from their second to fourth years of life. The main results are that: a) verb 
inflections are mastered late by Italian children, b) from their first words children can 
express imperative intentions. Around the age of two and a half, both Italian children 
started using "please" and reducing the dimension of a request. "This development 
suggests a shift from an efficiency dimension to some kind of politeness dimension" 
(Bates, 1976a, p. 283). The ability to perform indirect commands progressed bet"'cen 
three and four years, but neither child used very indirect hints. 
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From her results, Bates drew a three-stage model which is based upon the form- 
content distinction. In the first stage, "the child decides which aspect of his desire he 
wishes to encode in a given utterance, and the mapping mechanism automatically 
transfon-ns the selected components into their appropriate surface form" (p. 29 1 ). This 
stage is characterized by "wish statements" which may be more or less linguistically 
elaborated. Examples of simple wish statements are the following: "Mine I To me"? I 
" Sugar to me! ", "More! ". Examples of more elaborated wish statements are: "I wan t 
wine, 'cause I am thirsty", I want to try a little bit myself "', I don't want to do this 
one, I don't care". However, the polite expression I would like to... " was never used by 
children. 
In the second stage, the children can use many linguistic means to convey their 
intentions. They separate form (surface syntactic devices) from content although they are 
not able to manipulate simultaneously form and content or be very indirect. In this stage, 
children express their wishes more politely than in the first stage because thcy can present 
their wishes as requests. Examples are the following: "We go car? ", "Will you-all let me 
talk? ", "You give me the bracelets a minute please, Virginia, you, give'em to me"" 
At the third stage, the child is able to mask both form and content to achieve his 
aims. He can express indirect commands, implied threats and promises. An example is 
"Did you see how a sommersault is done? ". 
The model was tested in a further cross-sectional study, involving 60 children 
between the ages of 2; 10 and 6; 2. Three tasks were given to the subjects by means of 
role-playing situations with puppets: Judgments of degree of politeness in requests; 
Reasoning about politeness in requests; Production of "nice" requests. For the first two 
tasks the experimenter had two puppet frogs uttering a request each. Eight couples of 
requests were examined. In each couple one request was more polite than the other one, 
for some dimension. For example, "Dammi un dolce" (give me a candy) vs "Dammi un 
dolce, per favore" (give me a candy, please); "Posso avere un dolce? " (can I have a 
candy? ) vs "Potrei avere un dolce? " (could I have a candy? ). The child's task was to give 
a candy to the frog who spoke in the "nicest" way. In addition, the experimenter asked 
the subject to give reasons for his choice ("Why was this one nicer? ", "Why did he say 
that was better? "). The overall performance in the first task showed that children start to 
choose above chance level according to politeness level of request at the age of four and a 
half or five years. In addition, some kinds of pragmatic judgments are acquired before 
and others later. For example, the presence of "please" is a powerful indicator for 
politeness ("gentilezza") even in very young children, while the use of the conditional is 
so only for 6-year-olds. As for the judgements about politeness in requests, the results 
showed that only 58% of 6-year-olds correctly identified politeness markers. This 
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percentage, however, gradually decreased with decreasing age; for example, only 2117c of 
3-year-olds were able to identify politeness markers. 
The most interesting part of Bates's study relates to children's own requests. The 
experiment was arranged as follows. The child was confronted with a doll representing 
an old lady and told that the lady would give him a candy if he asked her. After the 
child's first request, the experimenter pretended to whisper something to the doll and, 
then said: "Mrs. Rossi said that she will surely give you a candy. But, you know, she's a 
bit old and she likes it when children are VERY very nice. Ask her EVEN MORE 
NICELY ( 11 ancor piU' gentilmente") for the candy". Results showed that older children 
were generally more polite than younger ones; in particular, older children used 
interrogative forms and "please". However, in second requests elicited by the 
experimenter, both younger and older children were significantly more polite than in their 
first, more spontaneous requests. Bates interpreted the above cross- sectional results as 
confirming her three-stage model. Some results of her work were confirmed by further 
research. For example, McCloskey (1986) studied children's knowledge of intonafional 
and linguistic markers of politeness. She examined 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds with a 
methodology similar to that adopted by Bates. Children had to judge which of two 
puppets was "nicer" when requesting food from them. The requests uttered by the 
puppets were manipulated in terms of presence or absence of "please" and type of 
intonational contour (rising or falling). This study found age-related differences in the 
ability to discriminate among requests according to politeness level. Younger children 
were less accurate than older ones. One interesting result was that 4-year-olds rely more 
upon the presence or absence of "please" to judge politeness than on intonational contour, 
while 5-year-olds, like adults, consider intonation more important than the linguistic 
message when intonation and message are in conflict. For example, they consider a 
request with rising intonation but without "please" more polite than a request with 
"please" but with falling intonation. This result is interesting because for young children 
it is not easy to pay much attention to the locutionary aspects of speech. For example, 
Ackerman (1981) studied children's understanding of ambiguous referential 
communication under the hypothesis that young children fail to interpret ambiguous 
communication in referential tasks because they respond to the illocutionary performativc 
force rather than to the locution content of communications.. He found that kindergarten 
children improve their understanding of ambiguous messages when experimental 
circumstances enabled them to respond to the locutionary rather than the performative 
force of communications. Parsons (1981) addressed the problem of the growth of 
politeness beyond the age of four-five. He compared three age groups, 5-, 7- and 9-year- 
olds. Each child took part in one of two experimental conditions: compliant ý's non- 
compliant listener. First the children observed a doll addressing requests in a foreign 
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language to a puppet-listener. Then, the puppet showed either compliant or non- 
compliant behaviour (for example, either "Yes" or "No I "). Subsequently, the child's task 
was to address five requests to the same puppet. Results showed first that politene, "s in 
requests regularly increased beyond the age of five, and second that in all age groups the 
non-compliant listener was addressed more politely. 
An important aspect of politeness is its relation to the social context. James (1978) 
studied 5-year-olds' ability to modify the level of politeness in their requests according to 
social circumstances. She manipulated both listener age and type of request to be 
addressed. In other words, James examined two factors of politeness: P (power) as 
expressed by age of addressee (adult, peer, younger child) and R (cost) as expressed by 
the difference between commanding and asking for a favour. Again, a role-playing 
situation involving dolls was used. The child had to make the speaker doll address three 
other dolls which represented listeners of different ages. Results showed that the effect 
of the listener's age was evident in the command situation - the adult receiving the 
greatest amount of politeness; the peer, next; the younger child the least politeness. 
However, these effects were reduced in the situation of asking for a favour. In this case, 
children were equally polite to all their listeners, independently of their age. A further 
aspect of social intercourse which may influence politeness is people's emotional 
condition. Camras (1984) was able to show by a naturalistic study that in a conflict 
situation children's use of politeness varied with their affective state. In addition, in an 
experimental study, Camras, Pristo and Brown (1985) found that first-grade children 
attribute less polite directives to angry speakers and more polite directives to happy or 
neutral speakers. An interesting study by Nippold, Leonard and Anastopoulos (1982) 
examined children's understanding of polite fon-ns and the relation between these abilities 
and role-taking abilities in 3-, 5-, 7- and 25-year-olds. They found that, in both 
comprehension and production tasks, the development of politeness can be viewed as an 
increasing tendency to master a progressively wider number of different verbal 
expressions of politeness. They also found that the use and understanding of politeness 
in speech was related to an emerging ability to adopt the perspective of another person 
only at the age of three. Instead, the development of politeness beyond this age was 
related only to a form of perspective taking in which knowledge of social roles plays a 
part. 
Some further light on children's understanding of politeness comes from studies 
concerned with children's sensitivity to conversational rules. For example, an 
experimental study by Conti and Carnras (1984) showed that there is a regular increase in 
the ability to understand conversational principles beyond the age of four-five years. The 
above authors presented preschool, first- and third-grade children with stories which 
ended with a verbal statement by one character of the story. This statement eitherviolated 
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a conversational postulate (Grice, 1975), a request condition (Gordon and Lakoff, 197 1) 
or it did not. The child's task was to indicate the "funny or silly" endings. Accuracy 
increased with age: 19% among preschoolers, 83% among first-graders, and 100% 
among third-graders. This type of development was paralleled by development in 
apologies and restitutions. Sell (1987) studied first-, fourth-, and seventh-grade girls' 
repairs in two conditions: Severity of the violation (serious/less serious) and type of 
victim (mother/best friend). It was shown that first-graders used significantly more single 
apologies than older girls, who used restitutions in combination with other apologies. In 
addition, first graders did not take into account the severity of violation (R), while older 
girls did. Sensitivity to one own's listener is shown by young children in natural 
situations. For example, Konefal and Fokes (1984) analysed 5- and 6-year-old children's 
conversational repairs. In spontaneous conversations, sometimes the communication 
between speaker and listeners breaks down because the message is not clear. In this case, 
the speaker usually attempts to reformulate his or her message in order to continue the 
exchange. Konefal and Fokes found that both 5- and 6-year-olds use conversational 
repairs when not understood, but younger children show more idiosyncratic preferences 
for repairs, while older children do not. Pellegrini, Brody and Stoneman (1987) showed 
that the number of violations of Grice's maxims decreases in natural conversations with 
parents from the age of two to that of four. Results similar to these just reported were 
obtained in an interesting study by Miller, Lechner and Rugs (1985) on preschool 
responsiveness to the listener during conversations. Preschool children of various ages 
were video-recorded while an adult speaker was talking to them about his experiences. 
There were two significant differences related to age. First, older children gave more 
non-verbal cues of responsiveness, such as smiling, gazing and nodding, than younger 
ones. Second, older children gave more relevant verbal comments than younger ones. In 
addition, children who were more responsive by non verbal means also tended to engage 
in more responsive verbal behaviour. 
One important aspect of politeness acquisition may be parents' attempts at 
influencing it. We have reason to think that parents both engage their children in 
politeness routines and prompt them to be actively polite. For example, Blank Greif and 
Berko Gleason (1980) found that although children's spontaneous use of "hi", "thank 
you" and "goodbye" is low, they usually comply with their parents' prompts. Berko 
Gleason, Perlmann, and Blank Greif (1984) observed natural interactions at the dinner 
table in middle-class American families with preschool children. They found that 
politeness routines (e. g., "please", "thank you", etc. ) were pervasively used and that the 
majority of parents use routinized prompts for eliciting politeness from their children (for 
example, "What do you say? "; "What's the magic word? "). Pellegrini, Brody and 
Stoneman (1987) reported the interesting fact that in dyadic contexts fathers were more 
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directive than mothers when their children violated conversational postulates, but that in 
triadic situations no difference emerged between fathers and mothers regarding reactions 
to children's violations. A futher interesting piece of evidence comes from the study by 
Bates and Silvern (1977) who controlled for several variables in the use of politeness 
among preschool children. The most important result was that, even at this early age, the 
use of politeness was influenced by both the social class and social adjustment of 
children. In addition, the understanding of polite behaviour by children was related to 
their sensitivity towards adults' expectations. 
To summarize, the above studies show that by the age of four or five children are 
sensitive to several aspects of politeness phenomena, including some understanding of 
the social context (e. g., speaker's and listener's statuses, emotional conditions, 
conversational situations, etc. ). They can also use appropriate speech styles from the 
same age (see also Sachs, Devin, 1976). However, young children's sensitiveness to 
politeness in speech seems to be reduced to the most elementary markers (i. e., intonation 
- which in Italian may be the only marker for the interrogative forrn - and "please"). The 
above literature, however, mostly refers to development up to the age of six years. In 
addition, in the majority of studies, children's perfon-nance was observed under 
experimental conditions, in which children's attention was focussed upon language by 
the situation itself. This fact may have enhanced young children's understanding of 
linguistic phenomena, if compared to what happens in natural social circumstances in 
which the locutionary component of language is only one of many components of the 
social context. The above studies leave at least two areas unexplored (or only slightly 
explored). The first is what happens beyond the age of five/six? Is it really reasonable to 
expect that politeness is fully mastered by this age? The second area refers to the 
spontaneous behaviour of children: when and how are children polite in natural 
circumstances when no pressure is put upon them, and no hint about politeness is offered 
by adults? 
Children and reQuests 
Some further light on the development of linguistic politeness comes from the vast 
literature on the development of requests. As the evidence on this issue is large, only 
studies relevant to our major issue will be discussed here. An examination, however 
brief, of the development of requests focusses attention upon the question of how 
children come to master and to understand the locutionary and illocutionary components 
of the speech act of requesting. 
Ervin-Tripp's (1977) theory, which much owes to Searle's notion of indirectness, 
has inspired much developmental research. For example, Mitchell-Kernan and Kernan 
(1977) observed that from the age of seven children master all the types of requesfing 
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described by Ervin-Tripp (i. e., Need Statements, Imperatives, Imbedded ImperatiVe, ", 
Permission Directives, Question Directives, Hints), adopting them in the appropnate 
social contexts. The main developmental prediction which can be drawn from Ervin- 
Tripp's work is that children's requests progress from directness towards indirectness, as 
the latter requires more sophisticated cognitive control. The evidence on this point, 
however, is not straightforward. For example, Spekman and Roth (1984) examined 3-, 
4, and 5-year-olds' production and comprehension of different directive forms and 
found no overall age related differences. However, they found that the most indirect 
forms (Questions directives and Hints) were complied with and performed less frequently 
than more direct directives. They concluded that this result brings indirect support for the 
notion that indirect forms are acquired later than direct ones. Rappaport-Liebling (1988) 
found that during the elementary years children significantly increase their ability to 
comprehend, produce, and reason about the pragmatic implications of directives. The 
results of the above two studies, taken together, indicate that, th in production and 
comprehension of requests, age-related differences are less consistent during preschool 
years and more consistent during primary school years. To substantiate this hypothesis, 
more evidence may come from studies focussinin directive production. For example, 
Read and Cherry (1978) studied preschool children's production of requests and found 
that although older children relied more on verbal than on non-verbal communication 
(gestures) than younger ones, no age-related difference could be found for verbal 
production of expressions of need and "please". Bock and Hornsby (1981) did not find 
age-related differences in children between the ages of 2; 6 and 6; 6 in an experiment 
which elicited production of requests following instructions to"ask" or "tell". All children 
used more frequently "please" and interrogative fonns under the instruction "ask" and 
less so under the instruction "tell", which elicited more imperatives and less frequent use 
of "please". They concluded that before the age of 7 children are sensitive to differences 
in the illocutionary force of utterances which have the same communicative intention. 
Evidence on this point is also offered in an observational study by Newcombe and 
Zaslow (198 1) who found that children as young as 2 years and a half can produce 
question directives and hints. Although children's intention to express politeness by these 
verbal devices may be questioned (for example, if the adult did not comply, the next 
directive was often less polite), the study does show that the verbal agenda for subtle 
politeness is an early acquisition. Conversely, an experimental study by Dennis, Sugar 
and Whitaker (1982) showed an increase in children's production of tag questions from 6 
to 8 years, but not thereafter. Some syntactic rules for the production of tag questions 
were a later acquisition, suggesting that linguistic skills involving simultaneous 
manipulation of various syntactic features are acquired late in language de-ý,, elopment. 
Similar results were obtained by Wilkinson-Cherry, Wilkinson, Spinelli and Young 
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(1984) in a role playing study with 5- to 8-year-old children. The subjects had to produce 
requests in hypothetical classroom contexts and also to judge the appropriateness of 
requests. Several age-related differences were found. Older children produced more 
indirect requests than younger ones. In addition, older children referred to pragmatic 
violations as a basis for their judgements of inappropriateness of requests, while younger 
children were less likely to do so. The main conclusion of this study was that by the age 
of entering school children do have some pragmatic and metapragmatic knowledge, but it 
increases in the first few years of schooling. Becker (1986) asked 5-, 10-year-olds and 
adults to produce "bossy" or "nice" requests to imaginary peers. She found that all age 
groups differentiated the two types of requests in terms of syntactic or semantic 
indirectness. However, the number of syntactic devices used increased with age. Once 
more, it was shown that preschool children have a basic knowledge of the pragmatic use 
of requests and that this knowledge further develops with increasing age. For example, 
Bernicot and Mahrokian (1989) found that, in role-playing conditions, 7-year-olds are 
more able to reformulate requests after refusals that 6-year-olds. Interestingly enough, 
Wilkinson, Calculator and Dollaghan (1982) found individual differences in requests and 
responses among first-grade children's spontaneous behaviour. Studies on the 
development of verbal persuasive skills which adopted role-playing, experimental 
conditions showed a regular increase in perfon-nance from first- or second-grade to ninth- 
grade children (Clark, Delia, 1976; Pichý, Rubin, Michlin, 1978). However, Jones 
(1985) observed kindergarten, second- and fourth-grade children's spontaneous 
behaviour in a task involving sharing in competitive conditions with either a friend or an 
acquaintance. She did not find age-related differences in persuasive appeals, nor 
differences in appeals to friends or acquaintances. However, refusal to friends were more 
extended than refusals to acquaintances. 
It is difficult, and pehaps incorrect, to summarize evidence coming from studies 
adopting different strategies and methods. Yet, even with a brief review of the above 
results on children's production of requests, one feels that the ability to produce indirect 
requests is an early acquisition which is well-established during preschool years. Further 
developments are mostly concerned with syntactic elaboration on one hand, and 
metapragmatic knowledge on the other. 
Similar results were obtained in studies concerned with children's comprehension 
of requests. For example, Carrell (1981) examined 4- to 7-year-olds and adults and 
found that even young children can understand a wide variety of indirect forms, that there 
is a general developmental pattern of acquisition, and that the relationships between type 
of request and ease of comprehension is very similar for both children and adults. 
Bernicot and Legros (1987) found that although 5- and 6-year-olds understood requests 
better than 3- and 4-year-olds, younger children showed overall good comprehension. 
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By analogy, Bernicot (1991) found that 5-year-olds showed some metapragmatic 
knowledge which increased with age, and that the linguistic form of the request (direct 
request; conventional indirect request; non-conventional indirect request, hint or 
justification) affected the level of metapragmatic judgments. These results are somewhat 
challenged by two earlier studies. The first showed that children between the ages of 17 
and 28 months perfectly understand both direct and very indirect requests for action 
uttered by their mothers during natural play sessions (Shatz, 1978). The second 
compared 3- to 6-year-old children's comprehension of both conventional directives 
(CD), based upon the imperative form, and non conventional indirect directives (NID), 
which omit the desired action and its agent. No age-related difference was found, 
showing appropriate reactions to both conventional and non-conventional directives 
(Elrod, 1983). Again, one might conclude that in certain circumstances even very young 
children can understand indirect requests, yet better metapragmatic understanding and 
syntactic refinements are progressively achieved with increasing age. 
The evidence reported in this section shows that, as far as indirectness in requests 
is concerned, children can produce and understand indirect requests during preschool 
years. Few age-related differences emerge among young children Q to 5 years). More 
developmental differences are observed at later ages, especially when both syntactic 
elaboration and metapragmatic knowledge are involved. The age of 6/7 years seems to be 
the turning point on this issue. The above evidence has one point in common with the 
evidence about politeness: By the age of 5/6 years children have the basic agenda of the 
linguistic devices needed to be both indirect and polite. Unfortunately, the literature on 
the development of indirectness undergoes the same type of criticism put forward for the 
literature on the development of politeness: Most studies are run in experimental, role- 
playing conditions and children's spontaneous behaviour (in this case, production and 
comprehension of requests) has not been widely analysed. In addition, although many 
contextual factors have been analysed in the various studies, not enough stress has been 
put upon children's understanding of the social circumstances of speech. 
PsyApathogical development 
Research on learning disabled children shows that, although they are 
developmentally delayed and show deficits in linguistic competence when compared with 
non-nal children, they can indeed understand the pragmatic implications of speech acts. 
For example, Abbeduto (1984) studied non-learning disabled and learning disabled 
kindergarten children in the production of requests in role-playing situations. He 
manipulated the context in which requests should be produced according to addressee 
age, cause of directive, and purpose of directive. He found that the linguistic means 
adopted were not the same, but that both groups of children followed the samc ruics 
for 
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politeness in requests according to context. Abbeduto, Davies and Furman (1988) 
analyzed non-learning disabled and learning disabled individuals' comprehension of 
question directives. As already mentioned, question directives require contextual 
inference to be understood as directives, otherwise they may be interpreted as questions. 
For example, I have often noticed that when a young child answers the phone and is 
asked the question directive "Is your mummy there? ", the most typical response is "Yes", 
followed by a polite silence. For the competent hearer, a question is judged according to 
the "answer obviousness". If the answer is not obvious to the speaker, the utterance is 
interpreted as a request for information (for example, can you drive? ). Instead, if the 
answer is obvious to the speaker, the utterance is interpreted as a question directive (for 
example, can you drive me back home? ). Abbeduto and his colleagues manipulatcd 
answer obviousness by varying both the context and the linguistic properties of the 
interrogative. Their subjects were children whose mental ages were 5,7, and 9 years, 
matched with retarded individuals with the same mental ages. Interestingly, both children 
of all ages and individuals with developmental delay understood the obviousness rule and 
used the contextual and linguistic cues available. 
These results are similar to those obtained with learning disabled children who do 
not show developmental delay. For example, Dudley-Marling (198 1) studied the ability 
to vary the degree of politeness in requests according to age, status, and familiarity of 
speaker and listener in both normal and leaming-disabled children at three age levels: 8, 
9, and 10 years. He adopted the two tasks which are most commonly used in this field, 
multiple choice and role-playing situation. He did not find any significant differences 
between normal and leaming-disabled children in either task, nor age-related differences. 
All children were able to judge appropriately the amount of politeness needed in the 
various social contexts. Also, learning disabled children could modulate the level of 
politeness across social contexts when producing requests. A study by Donahue (198 1) 
only partially confirmed the above data. She compared learning disabled with normal 
children in the production of requests in role-playing conditions. Again, the ability to 
vary the degree of politeness according to various contexts was confirmed for both 
groups of children. However, learning disabled girls were overall more polite than 
non-nal girls, whereas learning disabled boys produced less appropriate requesting 
strategies than normal boys, although their repertoire for politeness was good. Lastly, 
Simon (1982) observed both learning disabled and normal children's spontaneous 
behaviour. She compared three groups, highly popular nondisabled, less popular 
nondisabled, and learning disabled children, under the hypothesis that highly popular 
children would show a higher level of role-taking in persuasion than the other two 
groups. Politeness in speech was also assessed. The striking results were that beoxcen 
the three groups no differences were found, either in total amount of persuasive strategies 
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adopted, or the percentages of specific persuasive strategies produced, or in politeness 
forms. Highly popular children differed from the other two groups only in that they 
apparently possessed a higher number of persuasive strategies but used them like the 
other children. 
So far, it has been shown that learning disability apparently does not much impa-ir 
children's use and understanding of politeness. It remains to be seen whether linguistic 
deficits have any effect. Once more, the evidence on the issue is little and mostly led by 
the form/content distinction reported above (Printz, 1982). Printz and Ferrier (1983) 
investigated the comprehension, production and judgement of directives in 30 language- 
impaired children between the ages of 3 and 9 years. Three conditions were adopted: 
operating in dyads in role-playing situations; production of requests in a role-playing 
experiment; understanding of requests in experimental role-play. ne results showed that 
language-impaired children predominantly used direct forms, with some progression 
towards more indirect forms only in the oldest subjects. However, in the experiment, it 
was shown that language-impaired children could compensate for the lack of more 
sophisticated linguistic means by more frequent use of the syntactic devices they already 
possessed. In addition, they could discriminate between requests on the basis of 
politeness around the ages between 5 and a half to 6 and a half. Rimac (1986) also 
examined the production and comprehension of politeness in requests among language- 
impaired children. He compared language-impaired children with non-nal children of the 
same age and with younger children with the same linguistic level. The first two groups 
had an age range from 5; 5 to 8; 0 years; the third group had an age range from 3; 2 to 5; 21 
years. Interestingly, the language-impairedsO children perforrned with less politeness 
than non-nal children of the same age, but with more politeness than younger children 
equally proficient in language. 
Although the evidence is not much and one feels the need to have more infon-nation 
on the issue, the main conclusion drawn from psychopathological development is that 
learning disability have little effect on pragmatic understanding and politeness. 
Apparently, even linguistic disability minimally affects children's production and 
comprehension of politeness in requests. These results are intriguing because they show 
that to be polite is different from being intelligent or skilful in language. If children are 
lucky and are given the endowment offered by normal human development, they certainly 
have some advantages as far as politeness is concerned. Yet more disadvantaged children 
can cope all the same. What may this mean? The first response which comes to mind is 
that to be polite is very easy for all human beings. However, one wonders why, 
generally speaking, so little trouble is taken by people to be constantly so. As has alreadý, 
been discussed in Chapter 1, people feel the need to be polite in just a few specific 
circumstances ("universals"). A developmental inquiry should be able to show not onl)- 
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how children learn to be polite in everyday circumstances, but also which are the "deep 
moral" (as Goethe said) and cognitive bases for politeness. 
Questions on the development of politeness 
Drawing together all the results reported and discussed in this chapter, we can 
obtain a developmental description of only some of the psychological requirements for 
politeness reported at the end of the second chapter. 
1. The basic agenda of conventional polite speech acts is achieved during preschool 
years. During primary school children undergo syntactic developments which enrich their 
agenda for linguistic politeness. 
2. From an early age, children know that requests and directives must be 
"mitigated". Metapragmatic awareness is achieved later, around 5 or 6 years of age. 
3. Around the age of 5 years, English speaking children master some basic 
politeness rules rela*d to the social context in experimental, role-playing conditions. 
However, there are a few points which cannot be reliably described on the basis of 
the existing literature. 
a) First, not much is known about children's use of politeness in the everyday, 
natural environment. Experiments indicate that children can use basic, conventional 
politeness from the age of 4/5 years. Yet, why are children polite? In other words, to 
what purpose is politeness used by children to act upon the natural social context? 
b) Second, most literature is concerned with English-speaking children. The second 
question, although scarcely developmental, is an important one: Which are the contextual 
rules of politeness and the verbal means adopted to convey politeness for Italian children 
beyond the age of five? Is contextual politeness usage really "universal" from childhood" 
c) Third, related to the above, there is the problem of how children learn the 
universal rules for politeness usage. Although use of "please" and "thank you" are 
explicitly taught in Western cultures, most rules of politeness are not directly taught, and 
we use them without being well aware of what we are doing. In general, politeness rules 
must be inferred by the encounters with the social environment. The process of mastering 
the rules for politeness requires some cognitive effort. When are children able to make 
cognitive inferences about polite speech? 
d) Fourth, in this work it has been suggested that it would be wise to pay much 
attention to the perlocutionary effects of politeness, as the principal theorists of politene, --, s 
agree on the notion that politeness promotes the emotional comfort of other people 
It make your partner feel good"). This aspect has been little explored in the developmental 
literature. Thus, when do children become aware of the social effects of politeness" 
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e) Fifth, the literature presented and discussed in this chapter mostly focussed upon 
negative politeness and "redressive" language. Apparently, little is known about 
children's understanding and use of positive politeness. When and how do children 
become aware that flexible, positive politeness can be used in social intercourse to ease 
people's feelings, especially when a Face Threatening Act is at stake? 
Other questions could be added to the above ones. Yet these seem to be the most 
relevant, at present. In order to explore the above five areas, it is necessary to translate 
the questions into empirical hypotheses. Following Bruner's suggestion, the process is 
better guided by a formal, logically based model of the development of politeness. The 
following pages are devoted to the description of a developmental model which has the 
potential to orient empirical research. 
5 
CHAPTER 3 
A developmental model 
model for social interaction 
As anticipated at the beginning of the previous chapter, a developmental theory 
should be able to formulate a formal model describing the mental operations involved in 
the phenomenon under observation. The literature on children and politeness told us that 
the turning-point in development may be located around the sixth year of age. Younger 
children may have a basic agenda of polite speech, but cannot be very indirect. Also, they 
show little metapragmatic awareness. So, what makes older, primary school childrcn 
more polite and/or more indirect than younger, preschool ones? Older children may be 
more polite simply because their linguistic repertoire is larger. Yet the evidence so far 
available on linguistically impaired children show that linguistic deficits per se do not 
interfere with the ability to be suitably polite. Thus, the size of people's repertoire may be 
just one part of the whole picture. What else is in there? 
The discussion of politeness phenomena in Chapter 1 showed that much attention 
should be devoted to the acts of social understanding involved in politeness usage in 
natural situations. Thus, both theoretical considerations and empirical evidence apparently 
invite us to focus upon the cognitive components which are responsible for the ability to 
perform polite speech acts. To discuss this point from a developmental point of view, it is 
useful to consider Flavell's theory on social cognition (Flavell, 1985). Flavell proposed 
an interesting model for social cognition, shown as summarized version in Figure 3.1. In 
this model, both social cognition and action are present. 
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Figure 1: Flavell's model 
The dashed arrows represent the acts or products of social cognition, while the 
continuous arrows represent observable social behaviour. So far, most developmental 
studies on politeness have focussed more on polite behaviour than on the mental 
processes involved in it. Flavell's distinction is thus extremely useful. The model has 
further characteristics. First, the dashed arrows "penetrate" into the minds of the people 
involved in the interaction: Acts of social understanding are inferences. Second, an 
interaction is defined by both a) the social actions/inferences carried out by the two (or 
more) participants and b) the social context (represented here as the continuous square 
line drawn around the participants). Third, the interaction is not simply carried out, but 
also involves the presence of self-reflection. The following is how Flavell presents his 
model: 
At least part of what social cognition includes is schernatized in Figure 1. S means the Self and 0 
means another person or group of persons. The dashed arrows represent acts and products of social 
cognition. They mainly include the person's inferences, beliefs or conceptions about the inner 
psychological processes or attributes of human beings, and are therefore represented in Figure 5-1 it. ", 
penetrating into the interior of their targets. The solid arrows represent overt social aus rather than covert 
mental ones, and consequently they cannot "penetrate" their objects in quite this sense. For instance, I 
may be able to infer what is going inside your head if given enough clues (social cognition), but I can 
affectionately pat only the outside of it (social act). The top part of Figure 5-1 shows that the self can 
have all manners of cognition about the self as well as about another person or group of persons. The 
bottom part shows that social cognition can also encompass various relationships and Interactions arnong 
individuals or groups (Damon, 1977; Selman and Byrrie, 1974). It further shows that the self can be one 
of the interacting individuals the self is mentally representing, and that the interactions represented can 
themselves include covert social cognitions (Flavell, 1981b) as well as overt social acts. Thus, I may 
think about myself in isolation, about you in isolation, and also about the social acts and the social 
cognitions each of us may carry out with respect to the other. (Flavell, 1985, p. 120) 
Flavell further specifies this model by proposing three general preconditions for the 
execution of any act of social cognition. The first is Existence, which refers to a person IS 
knowledge that a particular social phenomenon does exist. Flavell suggests that this point 
is not a particularly profound one. Yet this is the begininning of any story and the 
developmental psychologist will see the need to consider it fully. 
The second precondition is Need, which refers to a person's disposition to try an 
act of social cognition. "She might not think to, may not want to, or may not see any 
point to making such an effort" (Flavell, 1985, p. 121). In the case of politeness, this is 
not a simple precondition, but a real matter of choice. Also in Flavell's opinion, 'A'here 
social understanding is concerned, it is better to distinguish among the first understandinLI 
and the wish to progress with further mental operations. A motivational component, in 
fact, is present in any human enterprise, however tiny, irrelevant or common. 
The third precondition is Inference, that is, the ability to carry out the needed aý: t of 
social understanding. As far as politeness is concerned, social inferences are needed to 
match the recognized social context with the appropriate polite lexicon. Further inferences 
are needed if the speaker wants to say something which is particularly fit for his or her 
hearer's positive face. 
Adopting Flavell's point of view, the type of social cognition involved in a polite 
speech act could-described as follows: 
1. Existence: Recognition of a situation requiring an act of politeness. In general, 
the speaker must be able to recognize very quickly that the ongoing situation is one in 
which politeness is conventionally used. For example, the speaker knows that his 
addressee has power over him (P), or that they are not familiar with each other (D), or 
that what he is about to say may hurt his addressee's face (R). In other words, the 
speaker knows of the existence of politeness conventions. 
2. Need: Sensitivity to the other person's feelings and motivation to take care of 
them. 
3. Inference: Mental effort needed to decide the level of politeness more suitable for 
the occurring situation. Inference is needed to select the polite strategy most appropriate 
to social context. The cognitive enterprise for being polite usually goes beyond the 
recognition of the conventional level of politeness needed in a given circumstance. It will 
be remembered that politeness occurs in Discourse, a dialogical social intercourse in 
which both participants talk. The speaker may start with what he thinks is the 
conventionally appropriate level of politeness, but in the course of the dialogue he may 
become aware of the need to change it. In a dialogue, the level of politeness may be 
alternatively raised or lowered, according to circumstance. Besides, the addressee's 
reactions will make the speaker aware of the fact that positive politeness may be 
prefereable to negative politeness - or the reverse, etc.. 
How can a speaker tune politeness to the circumstances? He can do so only by 
making continuous inferences about the other person's state of mind. The sequence 
existence-need-inference needs to keep running throughout any dialogue. It is the 
constant monitoring that underpins effective polite interaction. 
From the above point of view, Flavell's model may be viewed as a general model 
for the cognitive entities (dashed arrows) needed in the acts of communication (solid 
arrows) between human beings. It may easily be applied to politeness. Let us see an 
example. In the following example, only spoken words, actions, and facial expressions- 
are overt behaviour, while covert cognition is described in parentheses. 
Two friends are talking in a pub. 
A says: "Would you give me that newspaper, please" (existence of FTA. conventionatlý- mitigated) B shows a brief expression of surprise and displeasure, gives the newspaper 
(A thinks: "Something is wrong" (inference + existence of a new FTA) 
"I must do something: what can be wrong? " (need) 
"It looks as if something has hurt him" (inference) 
"Did I behave wrongly? " (Self-reflection) 
"He might have thought that I was not interested in what he was saying" (Inference)) 
A says: "Sorry. Thank you. I'll keep it beside me so thAt I won't forget to look at today',, -, exchange 
rate before we leave. ... You were saying? " . 
The final sentence encompasses both conventional and sympathetic politeness. In 
this, as well as in any polite exchange, there is continuous cognitive monitoring which 
has the purpose of allowing the right decisions for the next verbal action, so that the 
social "face" can be protected. The cognitive entities involved are: 
a) attempt at finding a meaning for the ongoing situation, especially for the other 
person's behaviour (R), but also for degree of familiarity (D) and power (P) (existence): 
b) inferences about the other person's mental state (inference about the other), 
c) Self-reflection (inference about the Self in relation to the other). 
In other words, politeness in discourse involves a cognitively recursive situation of 
the kind: "I think of you" (existence), "I think of you thinking of me" (inference), "I 
think of me thinking of you thinking of me" (Self- reflection). 
A developmental model for politeness 
The above analysis of Flavell's model suggests that there are various sources for 
development of politeness in childhood. The first is related to the ability to recognize the 
ongoing social situation as a suitable one for the use of politeness (existence). The 
literature reported in the previous chapter shows that, in general, children seem to be able 
to recognize the existence of the social contexts requiring politeness only from the age of 
5. Although it is a well documented fact that children can make verbal requests from late 
infancy, little politeness is embedded in very young children's speech acts. This means 
that children need a few years to develop the ability to mitigate their requests by means of 
some politeness. However, one must stress the fact that the developmental evidence on 
politeness is mostly based upon children's behaviour in simplified, role-playing 
conditions. Such conditions require little "mind reading" or inferences about the other 
person's internal state because the social situation is clearly displayed by the the role- 
playing situation itself. The role-playing condition requires the ability to match the givCn 
situation with the conventional rules for politeness. Thus, it assesses more children's 
knowledge of socio-linguistic conventions for politeness (existence) than their 
management of politeness as a tool for communication. Flavell's model suggests that 
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two types of acts of social understanding are needed for politeness use in discourse. The 
first is Existence , or recognition of the situation suitable for politeness. The second is 
Inference , or an attempt at understanding the other person's state of mind. A study of the 
development of politeness should - at least in principle - assess both. 
Thus, a second source for development of polite speech acts becomes apparent. It 
is the ability to make inferences about the ongoing social situation, by matching overt 
behaviour (i. e., language, non-verbal communication) with covert mental states (i. e.. 
emotions, thoughts, values, wishes, etc. ). Inferences must be carried out to use 
politeness to redress any possible face threatening act which have might occurred during 
the verbal interaction. Inferences are especially needed if the speaker wants to use 
positive politeness, which involves understanding of the mental world of other people. A 
third source of development for the use of politeness is Self-reflection, an ability which is 
necessary for the recursive thinking needed for any act of social communication. Self- 
reflection may be considered as a special type of inference, in which the subject's mental 
state and/or behaviour is related to the other person's mental state and/or behaviour. 
Among others, examples of polite speech acts in which Self-reflection is needed are 
apologies and repairs (for a developmental cognitive study of repairs see Karmiloff- 
Smith, 1986). 
In conclusion, three types of preconditions are required for politeness- a) linguistic 
competence; b) competence about social conventions for politeness (existence); c) socio- 
cognitive competence for communication, in particular, the ability to make those 
inferences about the self and the other person's state of mind which are needed for polite 
communication (inference). 
The developmental literature has not payed much attention to the inferences needed 
for polite behaviour. This is because, with a few exceptions, people have been more 
interested in children's use of negative and conventional politeness than in their use of 
positive and sympathetic politeness. The same reason may explain why most studies rely 
upon role-playing situations, which present children with the social conventions for 
politeness. A consequence is that not much is known either about children's spontaneous 
use of politeness or the development of mental operations needed for polite behaviour. In 
contrast, the main concern of this work is on the mental operations which characterize the 
recursive thinking needed to "make people feel good". The question now is: Can we 
describe the development of politeness as the development of the ability to make 
inferences about the social situation? 
To answer this question, let us again consider Flavell's model presented in Figure 
1. The model shows how a mature, competent social thinker's mind works during 
communication. He is aware of the situation he is in (existence), he wants to carry on acts 
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of understanding about the Self, the Other, and the situation (need), and he is able to do 
so successfully (inference). His mind provides all the recursive thinking necded to face 
the situation (I think of me, thinking of you, thinking of me in the present 
circumstances). How can a child reach this stage? 
One way of describing the development of the ability to make the inferences needed 
in social communication can be drawn from Ballmer and Brennensthul's theory of specch 
acts. It will be remembered that, in their linguistic theory, lower linguistic functions "'cre 
considered as embedded in higher ones. In particular, Discourse (the highest) involves 
Interactions which, in turn, involve both Appeals and Expressions of emotion. As has 
been shown above, Flavell's model describes all the social thinking needed to perform a 
Discourse, that is, the most advanced function for speech acts (to which politeness 
belongs). It is possible to use the various components of Flavell's model to describc not 
only Discourse, but also Interaction, Expression and Appeal. From this description, it 
will become apparent that the type and amount of social thinking needed for each function 
progressively grows and matures, closely following the hierarchy for speech acts 
proposed by Ballmer and Brennensthul. 
Unlike the original model, here only the speaker's point of view is considcred. 
Figure 2A represents the social situation in Expression of emotion. It shows that the 
speaker scarcely considers the other's presence. 
Figure 2A: Expression 
The speaker just expresses his feeling states. nus, as far as politeness is 
concerned, the speaker does not care about the possibility of a Face Threatening Act. 
Expression of emotion does not involve any consideration about politeness. 
If one adopted a Piagetian point of view, it would be sensible to expect young 
children to be predominantly expressive in their use of language (Plaget, 1923). 
However, the whole bulk of the developmental literature on language and communication 
shows that early language is not exactly so. Only very young babies can be considered as 
purely "expressive". Yet from the second half of the first year of life, babies become 
active and intentional, if not competent, partners in dyadic non-verbal interactions (Ka), c, 
1982). When infants learn to talk, they show communicative intentions (Camaioni, in 
press). Dunn's work also showed that, from their first years of life, children arc 
sensitive and competent partners in social intercourse with the members of their 
familics 
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(Dunn, 1988). In addition, considering development of language, no eýidence is so far 
available to show that young children are more likely to produce need or wish staternents 
than older ones. Thus, expression may be considered as a function which, present at all 
age levels, occurs when the social context is of little importance to the speaker. 
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Figure 2B: Appeal 
Figure 2B describes a speaker talking (speech " act", solid arrow) without any 
further attempt at understanding the other's mind or the situation. In this case, the speaker 
simply "acts" within any social context. In Ballmer and Brennenstuhl's terms this is the 
Appeal function. As regards politeness, this situation can occur at least in three 
circumstances: a) the speaker does not recognize the existence of a Face Threatening Act; 
b) the speaker recognizes the possibility of a Face Threatening Act, but decides to carry it 
out straight away; c) the speaker recognizes the possibility of a Face Threatening Act, but 
does not have an agenda for polite speech available. Thus, apart from motivational 
reasons (need), an Appeal may come either because the speaker does not try or fails the 
needed act of social understanding, or because s/he has no appropriate verbal means. 
Figure 2C adds two further elements to the previous one, as it intends to describe 
Interaction. The added elements are: a) the line encircling the two participants, which 
symbolizes the context and b) the dashed arrow from the speaker to the inside of the 
other. Interaction is made up of three models: Struggle model, Institutional model 
(adopting, following or violating its norms or rules) and Valutation model (valutation of 
actions, persons, etc. ). The line signalling context is added because of the presence of 
Institution, with its norms and rules, while the dashed arrow signalling social inference is 
added because both verbal struggle and valutation require reading the mind of one's 
opponent - or partner. 
Figure 2C: Interaction 
As for politeness, Figure 2C might describe the mental operations needed for 
conventional politeness. The speaker recognizes the case for a potential Face Threatening 
Act, basing upon both understanding of the context (line) and inference about his 
partner's feelings relating to face. Yet, at this stage the speaker is not keen (or able) to 
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carry out all the recursive thinking needed to develop the interaction into a cooperafive 
discourse. Thus, the speaker applies the level of politeness required by the 
circumstances, but he is not very flexible in his use of the full potentials of politeness. He 
will not care (or will not be able to care) about his partner's reactions, which would need 
further inferences to be understood. Thus, positive or sympathetic politeness will 
scarcely be used, as it is based on quick understanding of what most pleases the other's 
positive face at a given moment. Instead, conventional politeness requires less mental 
effort, being conventionally represented into language to mitigate potential offences to 
negative face. Conventional politeness simply requires understanding of the context (to 
suit the amount of politeness nedeed by the P, R, and D factors) and understanding of 
potential hurting of the other person's feelings regarding freedom of action. It does not 
require much flexibility, hence recursive thinking. 
Things are different when all the mental operations needed for Discourse are 
present. Figure 2D again shows Flavell's original model, with three new elements added. 
The Speaker is able (or wishes) to carry out two further social inferences: one relating to 
Self (dashed arrow inside the Self) and the other relating to the ongoing Interaction. In 
parallel, the speaker is carrying out all the thinking and acts needed by the interaction. 
This is a graphical description of the recursive thought: "I think of me, thinking of you 
thinking of me". When compared to the previous models, the most important additions 
are Self-reflection and monitoring of the interaction. 
Figure 2D: Discourse 
The full potentials of politeness are achieved when all the mental operations 
involved in Flavell's original model are present. The speaker is not only able to consider 
the ongoing interaction, that is, to recognize the Face Threatening Act and deal with it by 
appropriate words, but is also capable of self-reflection. Self-reflection is a sophisticated 
form of cognitive perspective-taking. Essentially, it is the ability to consider the Self as it' 
it were another, separate person. Self-reflection is a sort of meta-cognitive Tvi-spective- 
taking. It appears to be essential when the speaker feels the need to attempt the acts of 
62 
social understanding which are required by positive politeness. By means of self- 
reflection, the speaker is able to look at the interaction from an external poInt of vlevý', 
and can thus try to monitor or influence it. Should a potential for a Face T'hreatening Act 
arise, the speaker can use various politeness strategies to monitor the interaction. He ca-n 
make ample (and wise) use of the perlocutionary effects of politeness to resolve the 
potential or actual conflicts in social interaction. He can remember that negati-ve politeness 
grants people's rights while positive politeness symbolically (i. e., by means of 
language) "gives" what people wish. Positive politeness has a powerful perlocutionary 
effect in making people feel good. 
From the above analyses, a developmental sequence for politeness usage can be 
proposed. This sequence starts with children possessing at least the rudiments of polite 
language. The rationale for this choice is that the following hypothetical model tries to fill 
the gaps in the existing developmental literature, which has been devoted more to the 
study of the acquisition of a polite linguistic repertoire than to that of the acquisition of 
the ability to be polite. The development of the ability to be polite might be described as 
follows: 
1. Linguistic repertoire level 
The child has a repertoire of polite speech acts, but scarcely uses it. At this stage, 
the child may be polite in highly facilitating circumstances (i. e., role-playing) or under 
direct instruction (the "what is the magic word? " phase). Little spontaneous use of 
politeness is observed. It is hypothesized here that this type of behaviour has a cognitive 
explanation: The child seldom attempts the acts of social understanding needed for 
politeness or fails them. In particular, the child does not recognize the existence of the 
situation for a polite speech act, no recursive thinking is present. This is the Appeal 
phase. 
2. Knowledge of conventions level 
The child successfully recognizes the need for politeness in spontaneous 
interactions (existence). The child is sensitive to the conventional side of politeness and 
appropriately uses the right amount of negative politeness. Yet few attempts at pleasing 
the hearer's positive face are observed. The child confines himself to conventions. It is 
hypothesized that at this level the child will not carry out many inferences beyond the 
initial one needed to recognize the existence of a Face Threatening Act. Tlius, no 
recursive thinking will be present. This is the Interaction phase, in which knowledge of 
conventions (Institutional Model), inferences about the other one (Valutation Model) and 
instrumental use of laguage (Struggle Model) are present. 
Sympathetic politeness level 
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'Me child is able to manage both negative and positive politeness. The child shows 
self-reflection and understanding of the hearer's mental states, and understands the 
perlocutionary effects of politeness on the hearer's feelings. Both existence and inference 
are present in a recursive way of thinking, thus enabling the child to monitor a discoune 
by means of politeness. This is the Discourse model, in which all the full potentials of 
politeness are displayed in order to make people feel good. 
The model proposed here differs from Bates's three-stage developmental model for 
three main reasons. The first is that, while Bates's model was more concerned with 
children's ability to conceal their intentions, the present model is more interested in 
children's full use of all politeness potentials, that is, in their ability to make people feel 
good. The second difference is that while Bates considered politeness as mostly related to 
language, this model considers politeness as mostly related to social understanding. 
Lastly, the model presented here has the advantage of extending our knowledge of 
children beyond the age of five or six. The main hypotheses of all the studies reported in 
the second part of this work are derived from the above analysis. 
Plan of empirical studies 
In order to test the above model, one should be able to show that: 
1. as regards polite speech acts, children of different ages behave differently in the 
same natural social circumstance; 
2. there is growth in Pý ability to make inferences about politeness; 
3. conventions for politeness usage are achieved earlier than sympathetic use of 
pohteness; 
It will be remembered that the analysis of the literature in Chapter 2 identified the a 
few unexplored areas which were found worthy of further investigation. 
First of all, it has been shown that the literature on the development of politeness 
mostly focussed upon negative politeness and "redressive" language. Apparently, little is 
known about children's understanding and use of positive politeness. Thus, more work 
should be devoted to understanding when and how children learn to use positive, non- 
conventional politeness. According to the above analysis, it is proposed that more than 
linguistic proficiency is necessary to be suitably polite in a given social context. The main 
background hypothesis of this work is that more social understanding is necessary for 
positive than for negative politeness, because the former must be suited to the specific 
social circumstances while the latter is more conventional and general. If this NA, cre true, 
we should be able to demonstrate that it is possible to find a systematic developmental 
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gap between negative politeness (occurring first) and positive politeness (occurring 
later). Thus, all the studies reported here are especially interested in children's uSC of 
positive, sympathetic politeness. The main question is: When do children master posim-e 
politeness? This question is addressed in six studies adopting different methods: 
naturalistic observation, experimental observation, role-playing experiment, attribution- 
task experiment, interview. 
Second, lamentations have been repeatedly made that not much is known about 
children's use of politeness in their everyday, natural environment. As discussed abovc, 
politeness is a socio-linguistic tool used to protect people's feelings when the 
circumstances might harm them. The full use of politeness potentials requires cognitivc 
inferences about the hearer's mental states. The role-playing experiments reported in 
Chapter 2 told us that children can use some basic, conventional politeness in requests 
from the age of 3 or 4. Yet it is expected here that young children might not be fully 
aware of the perlocutionary effects of politeness. If the analysis of Flavell's model is 
correct, there should be a developmental gap between possessing a polite repertoire in 
long-term memory and being able to use it appropriately in natural contexts. Thus, one 
important question in the present work is: What is children's spontaneous use of 
politeness? Our main developmental, cognitive-based hypothesis predicts that children 
use politeness in natural circumstances later than the age of 3 or 4. To discuss this point, 
three studies were carried out. The first investigated the spontaneous verbal strategies 
adopted by children at three age levels (4,6, and 8 years) in persuading their mothers to 
buy them a toy. The children and their mothers were observed in a store, and their 
conversations unobtrusively recorded. The aim of this first, observational study was to 
collect spontaneous use of politeness in requests, according to different age levels, and 
was designed to describe the general frame of development. A second study presented 
children at the same age levels with the same social circumstance (i. e., persuading mum 
to buy a toy) in a role-playing experiment. A comparison of children's behaviour in the 
two situations will shed more light on the differences between children's use of 
politeness in natural or in role-playing circumstances. A third study introduced some 
experimental control on observation of spontaneous behaviour. In particular, 
it examined 
how children use politeness in dealing with the different perlocutionary effects of their 
requests. In this study, the experimenter's behaviour stressed children's 
Face 
Threatening Acts in various ways. Children's spontaneous verbal behaviour occurring in 
these circumstances was observed. It was expected that the results of these three studies 
will confirm the main hypothesis and shed some light on the natural growth of politeness 
in childhood. 
Third, the above model on the development of politeness stressed the importance of 
the ability to make inferences about the social circumstances 
involved in polite speech 
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acts. Thus, an important question is: When are children capable of making inferences 
about politeness? An experiment investigated 5-, 7-, and 9-year-old children's abilitý, to 
make inferences about the social context appropriate to respectively polite and impolite 
directives. A second study replicated the experiment with 5- and 8-year-old British 
children. The main hypothesis was related to the above presented model; in particular, a 
developmental gap in the process of inference making about politeness was expected. 
Fourth, a final study was designed to bring together many of the questions addressed (or 
raised) in the above studies by means a general question: What do children knovv abolit 
politeness and its social effects? In this study, children of three age levels (5,7, and 9 
years) were interviewed about several aspects of politeness. The main hypothesis was 
that, in children's representation of politeness, three developmental levels, mirroring the 
above presented formal model, could be identified. In addition, evidence for recursive 
thinking, including Self-reflection, was expected to be found only in older children. 
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PART 11 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
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CHAPTER 4 
Children's use of politeness in natural contexts 
The aim of this chapter is to bring empirical evidence to describe the ways in which 
politeness is used by children in their everyday lives. This description will give reasons 
for accepting or to rejecting the main developmental hypothesis presented and discussed 
above. For this aim, children's requests to adults will be examined - the rationale for this 
choice being that, since more politeness is due to persons of superior status than to equals 
(factor P), children are probably more polite to adults than to peers. As will be detailed 
later, each study will address a set of specific questions, all deriving from the above 
theoretical discussion on the development of politeness. A further aim of the present 
chapter is to present three possible methods by which children's use of politeness can be 
studied and to discuss their relative merits and limitations. In brief, the materials 
presented and discussed in Chapter 5 have the potential of "setting the scene" for further 
study in two ways. First, the results of the study should be able to verify the main 
developmental hypothesis. Second, the discussion of such results should pose new 
problems or, more simply, reveal new ways of looking at old ones. 
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Study 1 
Children's directives to familiar adults: Naturalistic observation 
Design and hypothesis 
The main aim of this study is to describe children's spontaneous use of speech acts 
in an everyday life situation. In particular, the main question of this study is whether a 
developmental sequence can be found in spontaneous use of language when the child 
intends to influence other people's behaviour. The child's ability to "get things done by 
language" (Bruner, 1983) is under focus here. 
For this aim, children and their relatives were observed in the toy department of a 
big store. All subjects were totally unaware that an observer with a hidden tape-recorder 
was close to them. Children's spontaneous verbal behaviour aimed at persuading an adult 
relative to buy them a desired object was fully recorded and later transcribed. When the 
conversation was over, the observer talked to the adult, explaining what had been done 
and the purposes of the study, and asking for his or her degree of kindred to the child. 
Permission to use the recorded conversation and the child's age was requested on that 
occasion. People were generally amused and interested, all of them granting pen-nission 
to use the "candid" recorded materials for research purposes. 
Children's spontaneous verbal behaviour was analysed according to two different 
levels of analysis. The first level took into account the developmental sequence proposed 
in the previous chapter, which described a general model for the development of mental 
actions needed for increasingly complex verbal communication: Expression, Appeal, 
Interaction, Discourse. The first hypothesis of this study is that Interaction and especially 
Discourse are managed only by older children. To test this hypothesis the whole child- 
adult exchange was taken into account. The rationale for this choice was that both 
Interaction and Discourse reflect the speaker's ability to deal with the other person's 
reactions, as described by Figures 2C and 2D reported in Chapter 3. In particular, in 
Interaction the speaker carries on a more or less ritualized (or conventional) verbal 
struggle. By contrast, in Discourse the speaker's principal aim is cooperation, which 
implies respect for the other person's point of view, feelings, wishes, etc.. 
The second level of analysis is mostly concerned with Italian children's verbal 
means adopted to express politeness. The main question was whether the analysis of 
speech acts proposed by Ervin-Tripp for American-English, which has been applied also 
to different cultures (Bemicot, Marokhian, 1989; Blum-Kulka, 1989), applies also for 
Italian children. For that aim, only the first utterance addressed by the child to the adult 
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was taken into account. It was expected that older children would use more politeness in 
their requests than younger ones. 
The design of this study was very simple, like the method adopted. The 
independent variable was subjects' age, divided into three age levels (4-, 6-, and 8-year- 
olds). The dependent variable of the first analysis was children's style of verbal 
requesting strategy. As anticipated, it was expected that lower-order functions would 
appear earlier than higher-order ones: Expression, Appeal, Interaction, Discourse. The 
dependent variable of the second analysis was the level of politeness in children's first 
requests to the adult. 
This opening study has three major characteristics. First, the hypothesized 
developmental sequence is theoretically based. Second, in contrast with most of the 
existing evidence, the present study is concerned with development of speech acts 
beyond the first five years of life. Third, it observed children's verbal behaviour under 
naturalistic conditions, although some control was introduced in the situation: all children 
were observed in the same place and two important factors of politeness (P and D) were 
fixed. In particular, only children addressing a familiar (D) adult (P) were observed. This 
was an initial assumption. Unfortunately, it was not possible to control type of stimuli 
(toy), nor adults' reactions to children's requests. 
Method 
Subjects and Procedure 
Subjectswere 88 children belongirig to three age groups: 31 four-year-olds (mean 
age 4.6, range 2.9 to 5.11), 29 six-year-olds (mean age 6.8, range 6.0 to 7.8), and 28 
eight-year-olds (mean age 8.4, range 8.0 to 9.6). The first age group consisted of 17 
girls and 15 boys, the second of 15 girls and 14 boys, the third of 14 girls and 14 boys. 
The children were observed in the toy department of a large store located in a 
middle-class area of Ravenna (Italy). All children were with a close relative. In particular, 
58 children interacted with their mothers, 18 with their fathers, I with both, 9 with their 
grandmothers, and 2 with their grandfathers. It is important to note here that the toy area 
in the store had to be crossed in order to reach the supermarket. Thus, the adults almost 
never took the children to the toy department with the definite purpose of buying them a 
toy. In two cases, the parent intended to buy a toy for the child. These two protocols 
were omitted from further analysis. As reported above, verbal exchanges were tape- 
recorded and pennission to use the materials was requested from subjects' relafives. 
After 
recording each exchange, the observer noted the child's name and age, relationship to the 
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adult, and the desired object, when this was not clear from the content of the child's, 
speech. 
Results 
Analysis of conversations 
Scoring procedure 
The 88 conversations were transcribed and their contents analysed. The content 
categories were four. 
Expression, the child simply expresses his or her appreciation for a toy; he does not 
explicitly address the adult. 
Appeal, the child tries to get direct control over the adult; he does not take into account the 
adult's reactions; speech acts are simple and unidirectional. 
Interaction, the child tries to get control over the adult, but he takes into account the 
adult's objections; the exchange is mostly competitive; the child "bargains". 
Discourse, the child tries to overcome the potential conflict and to orient the exchange 
towards cooperation; the child is sensitive to the adult's objections and tries to put himsell' 
from his hearer's point of view. 
Each conversation was analysed as a whole, including both children's verbal 
behaviour and adults' replies. Only once did the relative fulfil the child's wish without 
resisting it. Only in a few cases (6), did the child get the desired object. 
The first problem was that children displayed more than one linguistic function. In 
particular, Appeals could turn into Interactions or Discourse under the influence of the 
adult's reply. It was decided to score the conversations under the most advanced verbal 
behaviour displayed by the child. Examples are reported below. 
A second problem concerned Expressions, since it was not possible to find pure 
examples for this category . The type of social situation probably prevented children 
from 
private, monological expressions. Children always introduced the expression of their 
feelings or wishes by the imperative "Guarda! " (Look! ) , which is a speech act aimed at 
drawing the hearer's attention to a common object of interest. "Guarda" is an Appeal. It 
was thus decided to score all conversations starting with "Guarda" (Look) under the most 
advanced verbal behaviour, that is Appeal. A third problem was to find unambiguous 
features distinguishing Interaction from Discourse. This problem was hard to solve 
because the child's response might have been influenced by the adult's type of rep]y or 
rejection. It must be stressed that only in one case did the adult fulfil the child's request at 
once. in the vast majority of cases, adults resisted children's requests. This 
being the 
case, the responsibility of finding cooperative behaviour (Discourse) mostly 
fell on the 
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children. The distinguishing feature for Discourse was thus the children's explicit 
attempts at accepting the adult's point of view. Examples are reported below. However, 
the question "does the adult's style in rejecting the child's request influence the child's 
reaction? " remained unanswered in this study because the number of verbal means 
employed by the adults to say "no" was too high to be implemented. Ple ques6on will be 
addressed in a further experiment. 
The conversations were analysed by two independent judges. The overall inter-rater 
agreement was 85.8%. Category inclusions of dubious cases were resolved by 
discussion with a third person. Examples for each category are reported below: 
Appeal (inter-rater agreement 88.3%) 
Marco (4,7): "Guarda mamma! " (Look, mum! ). 
Mother does not respond. 
Giovanna (6,4): "Guarda mamma, che belle le Barbie. La voglio" (Look, mum, 
what beautiful Barbies. I want one) 
Madre "Dai, andiamo" (Come on, let's go). 
The child and his father are looking at toy cars. 
Arturo (7; 6): "Guarda babbo che belle queste" (Look, dad, aren't these lovely). 
Father: "Dai, va la, la compriamo per l'uovo di Pasqua" (Come on, we will buy it 
for Easter). 
Child: "No, adesso" (No, now). 
Luca (6; 0): "Mamma guarda questi Lego! a me mi piacerebbe averlo! " (Mum, look 
at these Legos! I'd like to have one! ). 
Mother: "Ma questo costa tanto" (But this one is too expensive). 
Child: "Ma io devo averli tutti i Lego" (But I must have all the kinds of Legos'). 
Interaction (Inter-rater agreement 83.7%) 
Enrico (9; 2): "Mamma, mi servono dei quaderni a quadretti" (Mum, I need some 
exercise book). 
Mother: "Dai, Enrico, che abbiamo fretta" (Come on, Enrico, we are in a hurry). 
Child: "Ma mamma, li ho quasi finiti" (But, mum, I've almost used them up). 
Mother: "Va b6, allora prendine uno, uno solo eh? " (All right then, buy one, but 
only just one eh? ). 
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Child: "Sli, prendo uno di questi grossi" (Yes, I'll buy one of these big ones. then). 
Fabrizio (9,2): "Mi prendi il costume? " (Will you buy a swimsuit for me? ) 
Mother: "Ma ce Fhai gia" (But you've already got one) 
Fabrizio: "Non mi va mica piu bene quello dell'anno scorso" (, ne one I wore last 
year does't fit me any more) 
Mother starts to examine the swimsuits and buys one. 
Marta (8,6): "Allora mi prendi la maschera? " (Will you buy me a diving mask? ) 
Mother: TerchV ce Fhai gia" (Why? you have one already) 
Marta: "Ma con la mia non respiro" (But I can't breathe with it) 
Discourse (Inter-rater agreement 85.5%) 
Child and mother are looking at dolls. 
Angela (8; 2): "Questa quanto costa? un sacco di soldi, eh? " (How much does this 
one cost? a lot, eh? ). 
Mother: "Eh sli, questa e proprio un'esagerazione" (Eh, yes. this one really costs too 
much). 
Child: " E questa? " (And this one? ). 
Mother: "Anche" (That one too). 
Andrea (9,6): "Mamma aspetta. Hai 500 lire? " (Mum, wait. Do you have 500 lire") 
Mother. "Si" (yes) 
Andrea: Terchý, guarda, sono indeciso tra questo che costa 3000, questo che costa 
4000 e questo 4500 (Because, look, I can't decide between this one which costs 
3000, this one which costs 4000, and this one which costs 4500). 
Apparently the boy has only 4000 lire. The conversation now revolves around the 
most expensive toy, for which a contribution from mother is required. 
Mother: "Non Favevi gia questo tu? " (Haven't you got one of these already? ) 
Andrea: "No" 
Mother: 1 (yes) 
Andrea: "No" 
Mother: "Ah gia, era quello piU grande" (Ah yes, the one you had was big( ger) 
Andrea: "Se no, prendo questo e questo, cosa dici? " (Otherwise, I'll take this one 
and this one too, what do you think? ) 
The boy is offering to buy two identical, less expensive toys for 4000 lire 
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Mother: "Vuoi prendeme due uguali cos'l? " (Do you want both of them the same"') 
Andrea: "No, non lo so cosa volevo prendere ... a me piaceva questo" (No, I don't 
know which one I wanted to take ... 
I liked this one) 
The boy indicates the most expensive toy again 
Mother: "E allora prendilo, sei tu che devi decidere, deve piacere a te. Dai andiarno" 
(Well then, take it. You are the one who must decide, you are the one who must 
like it. Come on, let's go). 
Each conversation was assigned to one, mutually exclusive category. Results are reported 
in Table 1.1. The Chi-square test applied to the data confirmed a significant age-related 
difference ( X2 = 32.43,4df, p<. 00 1). Figure 1.1 reports the percentages of Appeals, 
Interactions and Discourses at the three age levels. 
Figure 1.1: 
Percentages of Appeals, Interactions, Discourse at three age levels 
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TABLE 1.1 
Three linguistic functions at 4,6 and 8 years 
Functions 4-yr-olds -yr-olds 8-yr-7; IdS Appeal 21 _ 10 10 
Interaction 9 15 4 
Discourse 11 4 14 
TOTAL 
ý 
l 31 29 1 28 
These results confirm the developmental hypothesis derived from the analysis of 
Flavell's model. As can be seen in Figure 1.1, the Appeal function predominates in the 
youngest age group, Discourse in the oldest group. Interaction consistently appears in all 
age groups, but more frequently among 6-year-olds. The above distribution is highly 
significant. Thus, the naturalistic observations indicate that there is a development in 
children's spontaneous use of illocution, corresponding to three different levels. At the 
first level, socially entrenched but monological functions predominate. Children try to 
influence their hearers by means of direct appeals. At the second level, children's speech 
is more dialogical but still self-centered (private). They engage themselves and their 
partners in verbal struggles or competitions. Such functions are still present at the third 
level, but children can also adopt the dialogical, socially entrenched dimensions which are 
typical of Discourse. Children typically accept their hearers'* point of view, often 
anticipating it. 
Analysis of first requests 
While whole child-parent conversations are influenced by the adults' reaction, 
children's opening requests are not necessarily so. For this reason, it was of interest to 
verify whether age influenced politeness in children's unbiased verbal behaviour in the 
above circumstances. Children's first utterances were thus analysed in order to give a 
description of their spontaneous use of politeness in requests to a familiar adult in 
everyday circumstances. First Ervin-Tripp's (1976) categorization of Amefican-English 
directives was considered. It will be remembered that Ervin-Tripp found six types of 
directives: need statements, imperatives, imbedded imperatives, permission directives, 
question directives, and hints (see Chapter 3). The present corpus of data was thus 
examined to search for the above six types of requests. Examples for three categories 
were easily identified: need statements ("Mum, I need some exercise books"), 
imperatives ("Come on, mum, buy me this toy-car! ") and imbedded imperatives ("Would 
you buy me some tennis balls? "). However, no permissions or question directil"cs %Vc[V 
found. In addition, children exhibited verbal behaviours which were not mentioned by 
Ervin-Tripp. One frequent behaviour was drawing mother's attention to the desired object 
without further comment (Look, mum'). Although it was not easy to classify the function 
of this behaviour, since it showed little syntactical elaboration, it was considered similar 
to the gesture of indication, a sort of verbal "proto-imperative". A second, some"x, hat 
surprising, verbal behaviour consisted in praising the value and desirability of the object. 
The children did not maketbeir wish to have the object explicit, confining themselves to 
comments on its desirability (e. g. "Look what a beautiful Barbie! "). It is interesting to 
note that this type of strategy is very similar to the kinds of persuasion strategies adopted 
by TV or press advertisements. For example, on some occasions children remarked on 
the rarity of the desired object (e. g., "They never sell such small toy cars! ") or, in 
contrast, stated that everybody had one - both effective persuasion strategies, as 
advertising people well know. This verbal behaviour may be close to hints, yet we cannot 
exclude that it was just a sophisticated form of indication. Due to this ambiguity, such 
utterances were collected into a separate category ("advertisements"). In contrast, closcr 
to hints was the behaviour of asking about the price of the object as a first move. In this 
case, the requestive illocution is present but masked by a second speech act. 
A further problem was posed by imbedded imperatives, among which two types of 
utterances were found. The first were plain utterances with simple interrogative fonns 
(e. g., "Mum, buy me that toy-monster? "). It must be remembered that, unlike English, 
the Italian interrogative form needs no syntactical modification: rising intonation is 
sufficient. Although such utterances are not imperatives, they are very direct - the 
imperative intention being only slightly "embedded" in the syntactical form. In contrast, 
the second type of imbedded imperatives identified here showed more syntactical 
modifications than the first one, including auxiliary verbs and politeness formulae (e. g., 
"I would like to have this, mum, please"). Due to differences in syntactical complexity, 
the above two types of imbedded imperative scarcely appear to belong to the same 
category. So, two categories were adopted in these cases. The first contained children's 
direct requests, in which the only modification was the interrogative form/intonation; the 
second all syntactically modified requests. Hints were also included here, because this 
category was considered as the most polite one. Although idiosyncratic factors due to 
specific context might have influenced children's requesting behaviour, it must be noted 
that Ervin-Tripp's categorization did not fully apply to the range of spontaneous requests 
produced by children. This result alone would suggest caution in adopting without 
modification categories of linguistic behaviour identified for different 
languages and 
cultures. 
To summarize, children's first requests were categorized into six mutually 
exc usivg categories, as follows: 
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Indication: the child brings the adult's attention to an object, without any further 
comment. For example: "Guarda! " (Look! ), pointing to an object; "Guarda, mamma 
(Look, mum! ); "Guarda le palline! " (Look at the little balls! ). 
Imperative: for example, Anna (7,3): "Mamma, veh (= Vedi, guarda), 
compriarno un astuccio! " (Look, mum, let's buy a pen-case! ). 
Advertisement: the child tries to increase the value of the desired object by 
praising it. For example: pointing at toy cars Arturo (7,6) said "Guarda babbo che belle 
queste! " (Look, dad, aren't these lovely! ). Michele (7,0): "Mamma, aspetta. Guarda 
(indicando dei mostri) ce 1i hanno tutti! " (Mum, wait. Look ... (pointing to some 
monsters) Everybody's got them! ); Silvia (9,3) touches a small puppet: "Guarda, 
mamma, cosi piccoli non li vendono mai" (Look, mum, they never sell such small ones). 
Need statement: the child expresses his need for the object. For example: 
"Mamma, mi servono i quaderni a quadretti" (Mum, I need some exerci se- books). 
Interrogative: the child fon-nulates a plain, direct request. From a syntactic point 
of view such requests only have the interrogative form and do not incorporate any other 
linguistic device which may convey politeness. For example, approaching a doll's pram, 
Alessandra (2,9) said: "Mamma, mi compri questa? " (Mum, you buy this for me? ). 
Polite request, when the child incorporates some politeness (politeness markers, 
syntactical elaboration, hints) in the request. For example: Marco (10,0) said "Guarda le 
racchette! oh, per favore, ti prego, ti prego, me le prendi? " (Look at the tennis rackets' 
Oh, please, please mum, will you buy them for me? ). The rest of the interaction is also of 
interest. Mother: "Le vuoi? " (Do you want them? ). Marco: "Siii " (Yeees! ). Mother: 
"Allora prendile" (Well, take them then). Marco: "Oh, grazie!! " (oh, thank you'). Picking 
a toy-car Franco (6,2) said: "Mamma, ti devo dire una cosa. Io vorrei questo" (Mum, I 
must tell you something. I would like to have this). Some children are really very 
indirect. For example: Laura (8,6): "Nonna, guarda i libri. Non ne cercavi uno? " 
(Granny, look at the books. Weren't you looking for one? ). In this request the fact that 
the book would have been for the girl remains unsaid, but the rest of the verbal exchange 
soon clarifies the point. Addressing his father and referring to a toy, Corrado (8,0) said: 
"Quanto costa? eh? quanti soldi ci vogliono? " (How much does this cost? Eh? How much 
money is needed? ). 
Two independent judges categorized all subjects' first requests, that is, children's 
first utterances. Overall agreement between judges was 96%. (Indication 9817c, 
Imperative 100%, Advertizement 88%, Need statement 93c7c, Interrogative I(X)17(, Polite 
request 95%). Table 1.2 reports the results. The differences in age distribution is 
significant ( X2 = 19.52, lOdf, p<05). 
77 
TABLE 1.2 
Categories of spontaneous requests at three age levels 
CATEGORIES 4-yr-olds 6-yr-olds 8-vr-olds 
Indication 
. 
18 9 5 
Imperative 3 5 1 
Advertisement 1 4 3 
Need Statement 4 5 5 
Interrogative 3 2 8 
Polite Request 2 4 6 
TOTAL 31 29 28 
As expected, indications substantially decrease with increasing age. Imperatives 
are more frequent among 6-year-olds. Advertisements are more frequent in older than in 
younger children. Need statements do not change with age. Interrogative forms 
substantially increase among older children. Polite requests proportionally increase with 
age, as expected. Figure 1.2 shows the percentages of polite requests at the three age 
levels. 
Figure 1.2 
Percentages of polite requests at three age levels 
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The following figures show children's verbal behaviour separately at each age 
level. 
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Figure 1.2a: 
Percentages of categories of requests in 4-yr-olds 
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Figure 1.2a shows that, in the vast majority of cases, the youngest children use 
indications and that they scarcely use the other categories of response. This result 
confirms our hypothesis that Indications, however verbally expressed, are a primitive 
form of requesting, close to gestual indication. It remains to be seen whether young 
children adopt this form of requesting even with unfamiliar adults. 
Instead, the results reported in Figure 1.2b show that 6-year-olds adopt a variety of 
verbal means to express their request intentions. Indications still predominate, but all the 
categories of requesting are present at about the same level, including some polite 
requests. 
Lastly, the results reported in Figure 1.2c show that 8-year-olds behave differently 
from younger children. In this age group, standard forms of requesting are the most 
frequently employed. In particular, both interrogatives and polite requests are the most 
used. 
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Figure 1.2b: 
Percentages of spontaneous requests in 6-yr-olds 
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Figure 1.2c: 
Percentages of spontaneous requests in 8-yr-olds 
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Overall, the above results show that age affects the way in which children address 
requests to familiar adults. Older children mostly use the elaborate verbal means offered 
by their culture, while younger children content themselves with pure verbal indication. 
In addition, a variety of verbal means seem to be managed by Italian children 
starting at the age of six. In this respect, it is interesting to note that a few children (8 out 
of 88,9.1 %) used techniques which are normally used as advertising strategies in TV or 
in the press. 
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Discussion 
The main result of this study is that the developmental sequence presented by the 
formal model proposed in Chapter 3 has been confirmed by the naturalistic obsen, aLion of 
children's spontaneous behaviour in the everyday environment. 
The second result is that politeness in requests increases as a function of age. Some 
caution must be taken with this result, because polite requests cover - at most - 201T of 
children's spontaneous verbal bahaviour and those only among older children. 
Apparently, although older children can manage politeness better than younger ones, they 
do not use it constantly. 
An unexpected result of this observational study was that Italian children use 
request strategies which are not similar to those found in English-speaking ones. In 
particular, 4-year-old children rely enormously on pure verbal indication - which is a 
primitive, very impolite strategy of requesting. This behaviour is not reported in the 
literature. In addition, one strategy which has never been documented in the literature on 
English-speaking children was found. A few children (9.1 % overall) used advertising 
strategies to persuade their relatives to buy them a toy. Although the phenomenon does 
not concern our main issue, it is noteworthy because it may be related to the extent to 
which Italian children watch TV and their subsequent learning of "how to get things done 
by language". Generally speaking, Italian children were found to be quite impolite to their 
relatives. It remains to be further investigated whether this phenomenon is due to 
children's lack of linguistic competence or to other factors, for example, the high degree 
of familiarity between child and adult (factor D). 
The above results give rise to a number of questions, among which the following 
four appear to be the most important ones. The first three questions are related to 
children's verbal behaviour in role-playing conditions, extensively used in previous 
studies. First, if the same social context (i. e., a child asking his mother for a toy in a 
store) is presented to children in a role-playing condition, will children show a level of 
politeness in requests comparable with the one exhibited in natural circumstances (that is, 
little politeness)? Second, will the increase in politeness level according to age found in 
an everyday context also be found in role-playing conditions? Third, will children show 
the same variety of verbal means shown in everyday context also in role-playing 
conditions? To address these questions, a role-playing study was designed (Study 2: 
Children's directives to familiar adults: Role-playing condition). It will be reported 
immediately after the present study, since the design is the same. 
The fourth question is related to children's use of politeness in everyday life 
situations: How will the adults' reply to the child's first request influence the child's 
subsequent verbal behaviour? This question was addressed in a further study in which W 
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children's spontaneous behaviour was observed under naturalis6c conditions but adUIL-S' 
replies were experimentally manipulated. (Study 3: Children's requesting and re- 
requesting in natural interactions). 
In conclusion, the results of Study I gave support to the general model for the 
development of cognitive skills needed for communication reported in Chapter 3 and 
indicated that more politeness can be found at the Discourse level. From this basis, the 
three-stage model for the development of politeness acquires more strength, as it is 
derived from the above theoretical analysis. It was hypothesized that the development of 
politeness can be described as follows: linguistic repertoire, conventional politeness, and 
sympathetic politeness levels. All the following studies will take into account this 
hypothesis for the development of politeness. They are aimed at producing different 
sources of evidence to test the hypothesis. 
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Study 2 
Children's directives to familiar adults: Role-playing condition 
Design and hypothesis 
This study presented children with the same social problem observed in the 
naturalistic study: children were now presented with drawings and asked to say vvhat, 
according to them, the main character (a child) would have said to persuade his or her 
mum to buy a toy. Subjects were also asked what the main character could do if mum 
refused to comply. 
Again, the design of the study was very simple. The independent variable was the 
subjects'age, divided into the same three age levels (4-, 6-, and 8-year-olds) as in Study 
1. The main dependent variable was children's level of politeness in requests. The second 
dependent variable was the type of reported verbal strategies to deal with refusal to 
comply from the adult. 
The general aim of the present study is to verify whether a role-playing situation 
can be used as a reliable indicator of children's actual behaviour in their everyday lives. 
This study was designed to answer the first three questions raised by the discussion of 
the results of Study 1. It will remembered that the first question was : Will children show 
the same level of politeness in requests in both natural and role-playing circumstances'? 
This is an important question because much of what we know about the development of 
politeness has been derived from role-playing studies. However, differences in children's 
use of politeness between the two situations - spontaneous vs experimentally induced 
behaviour - were expected. The reasons for this expectation are two. The first is that any 
role-playing condition will facilitate the task of producing requests suitable to the context. 
Role-playing conditions both draw all the child's attention to linguistic perfon-nance and 
presents only the essential infon-nation (usually by drawings or toy-actors). This is vastly 
different from what non-nally happens in the circumstances of everyday life. The second 
reason is that, from a child's point of view, the role-playing condition may involve 
pleasing an unfamiliar adult in a task resembling a school task. If the child has some 
vague notion of the social use of politeness, the situation itself seems to suggest an 
increase in politeness in this context. The presence of an unfamiliar adult (i. e., the 
experimenter) adds weight to the factor D (social distance) which in turn will focus more 
attention on politeness. 
This study aims at answering two further questions. The first is developmental; that 
is, will older children also be more polite than younger ones in role-playing conditions" 
Referring to the evidence reported in Chapter 2, one would indeed expect this to be so. 
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The second question is more concerned with linguistic aspects; that is, what linguistic 
means will children use in role-playing conditions? It is not possible to make predictions 
for this question, as no evidence is available for Italian children for a similar problem. It 
will be remembered that in Bates's work (Bates, 1976), children were asked to he polite. 
Method 
Subjects 
Fifty-seven children were interviewed. They were divided into three age groups: 4- 
year-olds (mean age, 4; 0; range 3; 6 to 4; 5), 6-year-olds (mean age, 6; 6; range 6; 0 to 
6; 10); and 8-year-olds (mean age, 8; 2; range 7; 10 to 8; 9). In the first group there were 16 
children (11 males and 6 females), in the second group 20 children (12 males and 8 
females) in the third group 20 children (14 males and 6 females). The children either 
attended the kindergarden or primary school which were both located next to the store 
where the naturalistic observations of Study I have been carried out. 
Material and procedure 
Two pictures were employed, one for boys and one for girls. In both pictures a 
mother with, respectively, a boy or a girl was shown near a rack of toys in a shop. In the 
first vignette, a big model car was in evidence, in the second a Barbie doll. Two gender- 
oriented toys were adopted, as previous research had indicated that Italian children 
(especially boys) prefer toys which are appropriate for their gender by the age of 5/6 
years. The experimenter said to the subject: "Look, in this drawing there is a mother with 
her boy (girl) in a store for shopping. They pass through the toy department and the boy 
notices this beautiful car (the girls notices this beautiful Barbie). S/he would so much like 
to have it. What will he say to his (her) mother to persuade her to buy it for him (her)"". 
After the child's response, he was asked: "If mum says 'No', what will the boy (girl) 
say? ". The interviews were tape recorded and then transcribed. 
Results 
Production of requests 
if L- In the first analysis the requests produced by children were classi ed accordino to 
the same categories adopted in Study 1: i. e., Indication, Imperative, Advertisement, Need 
Statement, Interrogative, and Pohte Requests. Two independent jud ges evaluated L- 
children's requests. Their agreement was very high (9817c). Only in one case a child s'aid 
"He shows the car to his mum", which was categorized as "Indication". Table 2.1 
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reports that in this corpus of data it was possible to find only Imperatives (e. g., 
"compramela", "buy it for me"), Interrogative forms (e. g., "mi compri la 
macchina? ", "Buy me the car? "), and Polite requests, which incorporated both 
interrogative form and one or more linguistic markers of politeness (e. g., "NII compri la 
macchinina, per piacere? ", "Will you buy me that toy car, please? "). No hints were 
found, politeness being expressed only by the following linguistic means: Use offease, 
for example, "Buy me that toy-car, please? " (13 subjects on 56,23,2 1 %); Aiixiliarv 
verb, for example, "Can you buy me that Barbie doll? " (23 on 56,41,07%); Conditional, 
for example, "Would you buy me the Barbie? " (5 on 56,8.93%). In one case (1.78%), a 
8-year-old boy added ajustification to his request, "Can you buy me that toy-car" I like 
it 
TABLE 2.1 
Categories of requests in role-playing condition 
CATEGORIES 4-yr-olds 6-yr-olds 8-yr-olds 
Indication 1 0 0 
Imperative 2 2 0 
Advertisement 0 0 0 
Need Statement 0 0 0 
Interrogative 5 9 3 
Polite Request 8 9 17 
TOTAL 16 20 20 
The data reported in Table 2.1 were grouped into three categories: Imperative 
(which also included one child who said, "He shows the car to his mum"), Interrogative 
and Polite Request. The Chi-square test was applied to the data reported in Table 2.2 and 
showed a significant difference across ages ( X2= 9.57,4df, p<. 05). 
TABLE 2.2 
Categories of requests at 4,6 and 8 years 
Category 4-yr-olds 6-yr-olds 8-yr-olds 
Imperative 3 2 0 
Interrogative 5 9 3 
Polite Request 8 9 17 
TOTAL 
[ 
16 20 20 
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In addition, if Imperatives and Interrogatives are grouped together as Impolite 
Requests to contrast requests expressing politeness (Polite Requests), the age effect 
increases ()C2 = 7.79, p<. 025). Figure 2.1 reports the percentages of Polite vs non polite 
requests at the three age levels. 
Figure 2.1: 
Polite and impolite requests in role-playing at three age levels 
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The above data show two main results. The first is that, generally speaking, younger 
children are significantly less polite than older ones. The second is that about 50% of 
both 4- and 6-year-olds can be polite in role-playing conditions. Also, the vast majority 
of 8-year-olds are polite. Thus, on one hand, the fact was confirmed that politeness in 
requests increases with age; on the other, that very young children can indeed be polite 
under facilitating circumstances. Figure 2.2 compares the percentages of polite children in 
natural (Study 1) and role-playing (Study 2) conditions. The differences are striking. 
First, as expected, in the role-playing condition children are vastly more polite than in 
natural situations. Second, in natural conditions the growth of politeness is more apparent 
between the ages of 4 and 6, while in role playing conditions it is more apparent between 
the ages of 6 and 8. 
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Figure 2.2: 
Percentages of polite requests in natural vs role-playing conditions 
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A second analysis was carried out on subjects' responses to the question, "If mum 
says 'No', what will the boy (girl) say? ". Subjects' responses were classified into five 
mutually exclusive categories: 
No response: subject says I don't know" or keeps silent. 
Cry: subject says that the main characted. will cry (e. g., Tiange" he cries). 
Obedience: the subject tells that the character will accept the adult's decision without 
protesting it; for example, Wanno via" (They go away) or "Non lo compera" (She 
doesn't buy it). 
Insistence: subject says that the character will insist in his or her request, for example 
by saying "Dai, mamma" (Oh, mum... ). 
Polite insistence: again subject says that the character will insist in his or her request, 
but saying "Per piacere"; for example, "Per piacere, mamma" (please, mum). 
Two independent judges categorized children's responses, their agreement being over 
93%. Table 2.3 reports the results. 
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TABLE 2.3 
Reported reactions to mother's refusal to comply 
Eeported 
reaction 4-yr-olds 6-yr-olds 8 yr-olds 
I don't know 4 6 5 
Cry 4 5 4 
Obedience 4 6 2 
Insistence 3 3 5 
"Please" 1 0 4 
TOTAL 16 20 20 
Surprisingly, the Chi-square test did not reveal any significant differences bet"wn 
ages. After having observed children's spontaneous behaviour in naturalistic conditions, 
it is difficult to believe that no age-related difference can be found in the verbal means 
adopted for dealing with a refusal. Thus, this lack may simply mirror children's lack of 
motivation in role-playing conditions. 
Discussion 
The major result of this study is that children behave differently in role-playing and 
in natural conditions. The results reported in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 show that, in role- 
playing situations, children of all age levels use standard, explicit ways of requesting. 
The results reported in Figure 2.1 also show that children are quite polite at all age levels, 
and maximally so at 8 years of age. Instead, in naturalistic situations children show a 
greater variety of linguistic means than in role-playing conditions (see for example, 
Figures 1.2 to 1.2c). Also, they are not very polite, as may be observed in Figure 2.2. 
If it is not stretching these results too much, one could observe that in natural 
situations the child's social problem (as defined by Humphrey, 1976) is to have things 
done by language (for example, getting a toy). By contrast, in the role-playing situation 
the child's real social problem is to persuade the experimenter that he is doing well. To a 
child's eye, the social task may be how to formulate the request which will best please the 
adult. This interpretation is sustained by three facts. First, although not prompted to be 
polite, children of any age are overall much more polite in role-playing conditions than in 
natural situations. Second, children use only eXplicit, standard requests in role-playing 
conditions, but a greater variety of linguistic means in natural situations. 'Illird, in role- 
playing conditions only 15 children out of 57 (26.3%) try a second request after a 
refusal, while the vast majority of children in natural situations do so. In conclusion, it 
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may be said that role-playing conditions focus the child's attention on the linguistic 
devices of politeness in requests. If one is interested in children's locutionary competence 
for politeness, role-playing conditions represent a good method. If one is interested in 
children's performance in real life, results obtained by role-playing conditions are less 
valid. 
However, an important objection may be put forward to the above interpreta6on. It 
cannot be excluded that the children in Study 2 were more polite than in Study I because 
the social context was different. While in Study 1 children had to deal with a very familiar 
adult, in Study 2 they had to deal with a very unfamiliar one (the experimenter) - the latter 
being a social context asking for more politeness than the former. A third study was thus 
designed to remove the ambiguity from the problem. 
In conclusion, Study 2 was designed to show that the development of linguistic 
competence for politeness is not identical to that of the ability to make use of politeness in 
spontaneous conversations. Comparison between the results of Study 2 and Study I 
revealed a developmental gap between the ability to produce polite requests in role- 
playing and everyday life situations respectively. This evidence supports the three-stage 
developmental model for politeness. In particular, it shows that it is possible to find a 
developmental level in which children possess a linguistic repertoire for politeness but do 
not use it spontaneously. The "linguistic repertoire level" must thus be separated from 
further developments. Such developments will be better investigated in the following 
Study 3. 
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Study 3 
Children's directives to an unfamiliar adult, experimental observation 
Design and hypotheses 
The present study was designed to answer a few questions raised by the previous 
results. First, it was observed that, while in spontaneous interaction with familiar adults 
children are not very polite, in role-playing situations - in contrast - they are consistently 
polite. It cannot be excluded that the factor degree of familiarity with adults may have 
influenced the observed differences in level of politeness of children's requests. In the 
present study, children were asked to address requests to an unfamiliar adult in 
naturalistic conditions. If, again, children were quite impolite, the previous differences in 
politeness found between the results of Study I and 2 may plausibly be attributed to 
differences in children's behaviour in respectively natural and role-playing conditions. On 
the contrary, if in the present study children were polite to an unfamiliar adult, there may 
be reasons for believing that children's use of politeness is greatly influenced by the 
degree of familiarity with the adult (factor D). 
Second, in Study I it was not possible to cross-compare type of adults' reactions 
and type of children's re-requesting strategies because of the great variety of the adults' 
verbal behaviour. On that occasion, the whole child-parent interaction was categorized, 
based upon the child's predominant strategy. Study 3 was designed for the purpose of 
studying the effects of the type of adult's reactions to the level of politeness in children's 
re-requesting strategies. In particular, as will be better detailed in the Method section, 
children had to deal with two different types of "resistance" to their requests: silence from 
the adult and motivated refusal. The questions are: Will children raise the level of 
politeness after the adult's refusal to comply? Will children react differently to different 
types of resistance to comply with their requests? Which strategy of politeness will they 
use, negative or positive? How will age affect children's behaviour? 
In this study three age leve]Swere compared, namely 5-, 7- and 9-year-olds. The 
design of this study involved two factors: Age and Type of Resistance to the child's first 
request. The dependent variable was the level of linguistic politeness. In addition, first 
requests and requests after resistances were compared. Age-related differences in 
children's level of politeness after resistances were expected to be found. 
In particular, our developmental model for politeness predicts that: a) 5-year-olds 
will not make use of politeness to solve communicative difficulties; b) 7-year-olds ", III 
mostly use conventional, negative politeness; and c) only 9-year-olds will show some 
ability to use the positive, sympathetic aspects of politeness to restore a cooperative 
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discourse between the experimenter and themselves. It was also expected that the tý'pe of 
resistance would influence children's subsequent verbal behaviour. In particular, silence 
should elicit conventional politeness because it stresses social distance and has no 
politeness, while motivated refusal should elicit sympathetic politeness because it embeds 
some positive politeness in the Face Threatening Act. The rationale for this expectation 
comes from the "cost-benefit" theory of politeness presented in Chapter 1. Clark and 
Schunk (1980) observed that the degree of politeness in the responses was related to the 
degree of politeness in the requests. For example, a polite request elicitates a polite 
response while an impolite request elicitates an impolite response. Transposing these 
observations to the present case, silence after the child's first request indicates that 
something was wrong in communication. The child may think that his request was not 
appropriate and consequently try to "redress" the offence by more negative, conventional 
politeness. In contrast, a motivated refusal to comply expresses some positive politeness, 
thus asking for some positive politeness in the replay. 
Method 
Subjects 
Three age groups were formed: (a) 18 children of mean age 5; 1 (range 4; 8 to 5; 9)-, 
(b) 20 children of mean age 7; 1 (range 6; 0 to 7; 10); (c) 20 children of mean age 9; 3 
(range 8; 7 to 9; 10). Half the subjects in each age group were male, the other half female. 
All the children lived in the same area of Padua, a large town in northern Italy. Children 
attended two adjacent schools (kindergarten, primary school) and belonged to middle- 
class families. 
Materials and procedure 
Materials were two plastic pegboards, and a bag containing pegs of four colours. 
The subject was asked to sit at a table in a quiet room of his or her own school. The 
experimenter sat opposite. After a short conversation intended to put the child at ease, the 
experimenter introduced the materials and asked if the child wanted to use the pegs to 
make a figure on the pegboard. If the answer was affirmative, the experimenter said she 
would make a figure on her own pegboard at the same time, adding, "I'll keep the pegs- 
when you want one, ask me. " The experimenter's status was thus higher than the child's 
because of both age and control of the pegs. At this point, the experimenter began to 
concentrate on her peg figure but was prepared to respond to the child's requests. When 
the subject appeared to have become familiar with the situation and the spirit of the game, 
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two "resistances" were introduced. Their purpose was to signal to the child that his 
request may have been interpreted as a threat to the interlocutor in some NA'ay (in sense 
used by Brown & Levinson, 1978). In the case of "deaf ear" resistances, the 
experimenter simply behaved as if she had not heard the child's request. If the child made 
the request again, as a way of checking whether he had been heard correctly, the 
experimenter continued the same behaviour. Further requests were normally satisfied. 
In the second case, the experimenter did not satisfy the request but supplied some 
motivation such as, "I can't give you a red peg, because I'm using the red ones. " The 
motivation was rather arbitrary, since the child knew very well that there were plenty of 
pegs. This kind of resistance was called "motivated refusal", as the force of the Face 
Threatening Act was mitigated by some positive politeness Oustification). Each type of 
feedback was aimed at eliciting a new request. Thus, subjects were not asked directly by 
the experimenter to increase the level of politeness of their requests, as Bates's (1976a) 
subjects were. In fact, children were presented only indirectly with the need to change 
their previous requests and had to make social inferences about how best to do so from 
contextual information. 
Verbal expressions were recorded. Three samples of request were considered: the 
first request by the subject and the first re-requests after each of the two resistances. As 
regards "deaf ear" resistances, the first re-requests, that were the exact repetition of the 
unfulfilled request were not taken into account, since these may be considered cases in 
which children wished to ascertain whether they had been heard. The order of resistances 
was counterbalanced across subjects. 
Results 
The experimental design included three comparisons among data: between first 
requests and requests after the first resistance (within subject), among age-level groups 
for requests after "motivated refusal" (between subject), and among age-level groups for 
requests after "deaf ear" resistances (between subjects). 
First request 
First, subjects' first requests were classified into two categories: (1) Impolite 
requests, that is indications ("Un giallo", "A yellow one") and imperatives ("Dammi un 
giallo" "Give me a yellow one"); and (2) Polite requests, which had at least one 
element of linguistic politeness, for example, interrogative fon-n, conditional verb, 
it please", etc. ("Mi dai un blu, per piacere? " "Give me a blue one, please? "). Requests 
were rated by two independent judges who knew neither the sex nor the age of the 
subjects. Agreement between judges was 94.8%. Disagreements were resolved by 
discussion. 
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The data reported in Table 3.1 show that children's first requests were 
predominantly impolite at all age levels. It will be remembered that for each child one 
request was examined, thus each child could be either polite or impolite. 
TABLE 3.1 
Levels of politeness in first requests 
en, o Ee 7m Politeness level 5-year-olds 7-year-olds 9-Lear-olds 
Polite children 2 4 5 
Impolite children 16 16 15 
Total 18 20 20 
Requests after resistances 
Repetitions of first requests aimed at cheking whether the adult had heard them 
were not considered. Re-requests made after resistances were classified into five 
categories: 
Silence: Subjects did not know how to deal with the situation and kept silent. 
Maintenance: Subjects either formulated the request in the same way or 
reinforced it by raising their voice or adding new imperative words. For example, 
"Rosso" (red). Resistance. "Uno rosso voglio" (I want a red one). 
Reduction of request: Subject lowered their voices or only modified the content 
of their requests, that is, asked for a peg of a different colour while maintaining the same 
surface linguistic structure. For example, "Dammi un chiodino verde" (Give me a green 
peg). Resistance. "Darnmi un chiodino blu" (Give me a blue peg). 
Conventional politeness: Subjects modified the surface linguistic structure of 
their previous requests but maintained the same content. Mitigators were inserted in the 
form of courtesy formulas: Il giallo" (The yellow one). Resistance. 11 giallo per 
piacere" (The yellow one, please). Or mitigators could appear with the introduction of an 
interrogative form, for example, "Uno rosso" (A red one). Resistance. "Me ne dai uno 
rosso? " (Will you give me a red one? ). Or they could include a conditional, for example, 
"Uno verde" (A green one). Resistance. "Uno verde vorrei" (I would like a green one). 
In any case, children used conventional, deferential politeness. 
Sympathetic politeness: Subjects produced requests that, although not 
necessarily deferential, took into account the interlocutor's behaviour and also assured 
her that her refusal to satisfy their requests had not caused any problems. For example, 
the children did not change the content of their previous requests but tried to maintain a 
good interaction by various verbal means. Here are two examples: 
Resistance. 
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Child: "Qual'ý quello che ti serve che non mi ricordo? " (Which one do you need, I don't 
remember? ). 
Child"Un altro blu" (Another blue one). 
Resistence. 
"Allora basta ... un altro me ne serve e basta" (That's enough then; I just want one more, 
that's all). 
In this category requests in which the children modified the content of previous 
requests but also tried to reassure their addressee were also included. For example, 
Child: "Darnmi un chiodino verde" (Give me a green peg). 
Resistance. 
Child: "Ah be', non importa, dammi un chiodino blu" (Oh well, it doesn't matter, give 
me a blue one). 
In the above examples, the expressions of politeness are not conventional, but 
qualify themselves for the attention to the other person's will and feelings. In this case, 
politeness is sympathetic. 
The last two were considered to be the only categories of linguistic politeness. In 
contrast, maintainance was considered typically impolite. Silence and reductions showed 
that subjects were aware of some obstacle in the interaction but were unable to cope with 
it by polite linguistic means. For this reason they were considered impolite. Thus, 
categories 1,2, and 3 were impoliteness categories, while categories 4 and 5 were 
politeness ones. 
Requests after resistances were rated by two independent judges with the same 
procedure used for rating subjects' first requests. Agreement between judges for requests 
after "deaf ear" resistances was 84.3%; for requests after motivated refusal it was 82.71-7(. 
Disagreements were resolved by discussion. 
Table 3.2 reports the distribution of polite and impolite subjects at each age level 
after the first resistance. Again, for each child one request was examined, so that each 
child could be either polite or impolite. 
TABLE 3.2 
Levels of politeness after first resistance 
Politeness level 5-year-olds 7-year-olds 9-year-olds 
Polite children 3 
1 
13 16 
Impolite children 
I 
15 7 4 
Total 1 18 1 20 1 20 
The MacNemar Test for dependent samples was applied to the results for first vs 
request after resistance for each age level. The results show that 5-year-olds almost never 
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increased politeness level after resistances (MacNemar non significant). Figure 3.1 
reports the percentages of polite and impolite requests before and after the adult's 
resistance for 5-year-olds. 
Figure 3.1: 
Percentage of polite and impolite 5-year-olds 
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By contrast, 7-year-olds did increase the level of politeness after resistance (first 
request compared to requests after resistances for two politeness categories: McNemar 
Statistic = 7.11, p<01). Figure 3.2 reports the percentages of polite and impolite 
requests before and after the adult's resistance for 7-year-olds. 
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Figure 3.2: 
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Nine-year-olds also increased politeness (first request compared to requests after 
resistances for two politeness categories: McNemar Statistic = 7.36, p<. 01). Figure 3.3 
reports the percentages of polite and impolite requests before and after the adult's 
resistance for 9-year-olds. These results show that it is only from the age of 7 that 
children can use the polite register to overcome interaction difficulties when the 
interlocutor raises the cost of request accomplishment. 
Figure 3.3: 
Percentages of polite and impolite 9-year-olds 
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The results up to now described will be reported dividing children's reactions into 
respectively "motivated refusal" and "deaf ear" resistances. In the following tables the 
groups are slightly smaller than those in Table 3.1, because six subjects were not able to 
continue the interaction after the first resistance, producing reactions of silence and 
embarrassment. The results reported in Table 3.3 illustrate children's ability to react 
verbally to motivated refusals at different age levels. 
TABLE 3.3 
Re-requesting after motivated refusal 
Subjects 5-yr-olds 7-yr-olds 9-yr-olds 
Polite 3 10 16 
Im olite 1 12 1 8 3 
TOTAL 
1 15 1 18 19 
1 
There is a significant difference among age groups in the use of politeness after 
motivated refusal (three age groups compared for two politeness categories: X2 = 14.00, 
2df, p<001). In general, there were hardly any polite requests in the 5-year-old group; 
they began to appear in 7-year-olds and became predominant in 9-year-olds. 
Table 3.4 reports the results after "deaf ear" resistance. 
TABLE 3.4 
Re-requesting after "deaf ear" resistance 
Subjects 5-yr-olds 7-yr-olds 9-yr-olds 
Polite 9 9 
Im 0. Impolite 11 10 11 
TOTAL 12 19 20 
There was also a significant difference among the three age groups in the number of 
polite requests after "deaf ear" resistance (three age groups compared for two politeness 
categories: X2 = 6.22,2df, p<. 05). Here too, although 5-year-olds did not increase their 
politeness, 7-year-olds did Nine-year-olds behaved like 7-year-olds. The results reported 
in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 confirm the general analysis reported in Table 3.2, showing that 
the type of resistance has no effect on age in level of politeness 
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Comparison of children's reactions to the two resistances 
In each age group, polite and impolite requests after the two resistances were also 
compared. Data are reported in Tables 3.5 to 3.7. In these the behaviour of all subjects is 
reported and, of course, the samples for "motivated refusal" and "deaf ear" are not 
independent. Statistical analyses were not carried out on the data presented in the Tables. 
In order to have two independent samples, each age group was subdivided into subjJects 
who had received a "motivated refusal" first and those who had received a "deaf ear" 
resistance first. The reduction in the number of subjects made Fisher's exact probabilitN, 
test preferable to the chi-square test. The rejection region for these analyses was alpha= 
. 05. 
TABLE 3.5 
Five-year-olds' reactions to different resistances 
Subjects Motivated refusal "Deaf ear" 
Polite 3 1 
Impolite 12 11 
TOTAL 15 12 
TABLE 3.6 
Seven-year-olds' reactions to different resistances 
fe Subjects Motivated refusal "Deaf ear" 
Polite 10 9 
Impoli 8 10 
TOTAL 18 19 
TABLE 3.7 
Nine-year-olds' reactions to different resistances 
Subjects Motivated refusal "Deaf ear" 
I 
Polite 14 9 
Impolite 5 11 
TOTAL 19 20 
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Results show that 5-year-olds hardly ever used politeness, so that no significant 
difference in their behaviour was found. Seven-year-olds also did not show different 
reactions when the experimenter's resistance changed, but they used politeness in about 
50% of their requests. Also for 7-year-olds, no statistically significant difference %, as 
found. In contrast, 9-year-olds were significantly more polite after a motivated refusal 
than after a "deaf ear" resistance (two resistances for two politeness categories: Fisher's 
exact probability test: p<. 05). 
The data were subjected to post-hoc analysis to see if the types of polite 
(Conventional and Sympathetic) and impolite (Maintainace and Reduction) requests 
varied with the different types of resistance ("motivated refusal" and "deaf ear"). The two 
politeness categories (Conventional and Sympathetic) appeared to be used in different 
ways according to type of resistance. Nine-year-olds tended to use Conventional 
politeness if no answer was given to their first request and Sympathetic politeness when 
faced with a motivated refusal (Conventional and Sympathetic politeness for two 
resistances: Fisher's exact probability test: p<. 01). Alhough less strongly, 7-year-olds 
were oriented in the same way. Yet 5-year-olds hardly ever used polite requests but 
tended to maintain the same request after "deaf ear" resistance, only modifying it after 
motivated refusal ("Maintenance" and "Reduction" categories for two resistances: 
Fisher's exact probability test: p<. 025). The following figures (Figs. 3.4 to 3.6) show 
the percentages of subjects falling into each category after the two resistances. 
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Figure 3.5: 
7-year-olds' verbal strategies after two resistances 
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Figure 3.6 
9-year-olds' verbal strategies after two resistances 
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The questions raised in the design section can be answered on the basis of the 
present results. First, it was again observed that children's first requests to adults are 
quite impolite at any age level in natural conditions. In general, children are rather 
impolite to both familiar and unfamiliar adults. '17hus, it may be concluded that it is the 
role-playing situation which enhances the level of politeness of children's requests. 
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Second, it has been shown here that children do raise the level of politeness after 
the adult's resistance, although this effect can be observed only from the age of 7 
onwards. Five-year-olds are apparently not able to use politeness to deal with difficulties 
in the interaction. It will be remembered that there is general consensus among 
developmental psychologists that by the age of 5 years children master the basic linguistic 
skills for politeness. The results obtained in Study 2 also confirm this view: 50% of 4- 
year-olds produced polite requests in role-playing conditions without being prompted to 
do so. Yet in natural situations neither 4- nor 5-year-olds use politeness to circumvent 
difficulties - as observed in both Studies 1 and 3. These results confirm the hypothesis 
proposed in Chapter 3 that to be suitably polite is a social as well linguistic skill and that 
development in the former is delayed with respect to the latter. 
Third, the results of the present study show that children are very sensitive to the 
type of resistance introduced by the adult at any age level. Five-year-olds tend to maintain 
their request when the adult keeps silent, but reduce them when faced with a mom, ated 
refusal. Seven-year-olds tend to reduce their requests after any kind of resistance on the 
adult's part. Yet they also offer some sympathetic politeness after a motivated refusal, but 
are more conventionally polite in the presence of a silent adult. Nine-year-olds both 
reduce their requests and are conventionally polite after a "deaf ear" resistance, but most 
of them are sympathetically polite after a motivated refusal. 
The results of this study bring further evidence in support of the above 
developmental model which predicted that development would progress from possess of 
a polite repertoire accompanied by poor use of it, to predominant use of conventional 
politeness, to use of both conventional and sympathetic politeness. 
In addition, the present results may add some information about politeness itself. It 
has been observed here that conventional politeness is mostly used when the addressee is 
impolite and stresses social distance. Faced with this situation, younger children just 
insist (a phenomenon also observed in Study 1), while older children reduce the strenght 
of the Face Threatening Act either in content (reduction) or by some conventional 
politeness. Children's use of conventional politeness is clearly aimed at the addressee's 
negative face. Children behave as if the addressee had signalled a need for more 
deference. From these developmental results, one might suggest that the genesis of 
conventional politeness is rooted in aggression. Faced with slightly aggressive behaviour 
(breaking the interaction by silence), older children try to "placate" their addressee with 
it mitigated" words. Conversely, sympathetic politeness appears to be rooted in the wish 
to keep the social link between speaker and addressee untouched. Even the youngest 
children reduce their requests after a motivated refusal, showing that they can make some 
inferences on the situation at hand when the adult gives polite refusals to comply. Oldest 
children respond to the implicit offer contained in the motivated refusal with xords 
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eXplicitly aimed at reinforcing the social link (see examples above). One might conclude 
that, generally speaking, sympathetic politeness may signal social approach, while 
conventional politeness denotes withdrawal. A further observation is that e,,, en slightly 
aggressive behaviour in the adult's communication stops the process of mind-reading in 
the youngest children and produces conventional and formal reactions in older ones. In 
contrast, even slightly polite behaviour in the adult's communication helps the proces's of 
inferential thinking about the situation at all age levels. The growth of social cognition 
enables the child to select the most appropriate words to enhance the Discourse level of 
the exchange. 
General Discussion 
The results of the first three studies may be summarized in two main points. 
First, Study I gave support to the model of development of social understanding 
derived from Flavell's model. In addition, Study 3 supported the hypothesis of the 
development of politeness derived from that model. It may be concluded that the 
development of politeness as expressed in children's spontaneous behaviour in 
naturalistic circumstances follows at least three steps. During the first, the youngest 
children (aged 4 and 5) do not use politeness, either for persuasion purposes or for 
dealing with difficulties in the interaction. A second step is achieved by 6- and 7-year- 
olds, who indeed use politeness in its most conventional aspects. At this age, they 
incorporate some linguistic markers of politeness in their speech that function as 
it mitigators" and stress deference (negative politeness). The second step is also 
characterized by the ability to modify ongoing verbal behaviour to fit the demands of the 
interaction better. Yet children appear to be mostly concerned with their own point of 
view. The third step is achieved by the age of 8 or 9, when children use sympathetic 
aspects of politeness to deal with interaction difficulties. At this stage, children appear to 
be sensitive to the need to keep a good interaction by monitoring it with some sympathetic 
politeness. Thus, they both pay verbal homage to the other person's wishes or needs and 
minimize offence from their interlocutor, strengthening social links. Language is flexible 
and less routinized. In brief, naturalistic observations support the main developmental 
hypothesis, showing that politeness grows both quantitatively and qualitatively as a 
function of age. 
A second set of results is related to the differences observed between children's use 
of politeness in natural versus role-playing circumstances - the latter greatly enhancing the 
level of politeness in children's requests. One would like to conclude that a difference 
between polite competence (role-playing condition) and polite performance (everyday 
life) might have been observed here, the role-playing condition facilitating the task of 
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being suitably polite. The result is interesting for planning further research because it 
indicates that role-playing conditions allow children's linguistic competence about 
politeness to be investigated reliably. A number of questions may thus be ex rimentally pe 
addressed in this way. Role-playing conditions appear to be a controlled and economic 
way of pursuing such an investigation - although it must not be forgotten that children's 
behaviour in natural conditions may be substantially less polite. A further observation 
about role-playing experiments is that responding to vignettes facilitates the child's 
recognition of the demand characteristics of the exchange. Thus, he is prompted to reflect 
on the hypothesized exchange and this in turn leads to awareness of the social demands 
signalling the need to employ politeness. In rea*fe situations, the child is a participant. 
Younger children seem less able (or motivated to) take on their hearers' perspective and 
thus recognize the need to engage the polite register. The child might be too engrossed in 
the action to reflect upon it. In other words, in role-playing conditions it may be the 
situation itself which presents the child with all the monitoring and self-reflection which 
must be autonomously carried out in re4ife circumstances. 
In conclusion, the results of the studies presented in this chapter have the potential 
for setting the scene for further study. Comparison of children's behaviour in naturalistic 
(Studies I and 3) versus role-playing (Study 2) circumstances has shown that the task of 
being polite requires more social understanding than linguistic proficiency. The former is 
a later acquisition with respect to the latter. It has been demonstrated that only by the age 
of 6 and 7 years can children be polite in different circumstances. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Development of social cognition and politeness 
The aim of the present chapter is to find empirical evidence on the cognitive aspects 
of the development of politeness. The studies presented here are guided by the results of 
the studies presented in Chapter4. Three main findings became apparent from analysis of 
children's verbal behaviour in naturalistic everyday contexts. The first is that 4/5-year- 
olds do not use politeness spontaneously - although they possess an repertoire for polite 
speech acts which can be elicited in role-playing conditions. The second is that children 
start to use politeness spontaneously around the age of 6/7, but they rWW# confine 
themselves mostly to conventional politeness. 'Me third is that 8/9-year-olds can insert 
politeness in cooperative Discourse. Sympathetic politeness can be observed mostly at 
this age. Thus, several age-related developmental differences were observed in children's 
spontaneous polite behaviour. The major question addressed in the present chapter is: 
Can such developmental differences be interpreted according to parallel developments in 
social cognition? 
To answer this question, let us turn back briefly to the discussion of Flavell's 
model presented in Chapter3. It will be remembered that one main cognitive pre- 
condition for social cognition in communication is ability to carry out all the inferences 
needed for monitoring the ongoing communication. It was then proposed that children 
should first become able to carry out Inference regarding their partner's state of mind 
(Figure 2C) and that only later should they be able to carry out full recursive thinking, 
involving Self-reflection (Figure 2D). Some support for the above distinction may be 
inferred by the development from Appeal to Interaction to Discourse observed in Study 1, 
as well as by the developmental gap between use of conventional politeness and 
sympathetic politeness to deal with difficulties in communication observed in Study 3. 
However, the above evidence is related to children's overt behaviour and does not 
directly address theircovert mental operations. It may be said that the above studies offer 
evidence for the solid arrows in Flavell's model, but they do not do so for the dashed 
arrows. Thus, the studies presented in this chapter will address a few questions mostly 
related to the covert mental operations graphically represented in the model. 
The first is: When are children able to make inferences and to use recursive thinking 
in polite communication? The second question takes into account a further pre-condition 
for successful social thinking: Existence, which refers to the speaker's knowledge of the 
existence of the class of social phenomena which are involved in the ongoing 
exchange. Thus, the second question is: What is the content of children's 
knowledgc 
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about politeness (existence)? and, third, how does it develop? Three studies were carried 
out to answer these questions. The first two bring evidence regarding the development of 
the inferential processes involved in polite communication. The third, and final, study 
describes the development of children's representation of politeness, in contents as "-cll 
as in organization. 
Study 4 
Inferences about politeness 
Design and hypothesis 
Two related studies are now presented - both dealing with children's ability to make 
inferences about politeness. The results of the studies presented so far indicate that in 
natural situations children make use of the full potentials of politeness only at the age of 
nine, although their linguistic competence on politeness is achieved much earlier. It is 
suggested here that a possible explanation for such a developmental gap may be found in 
the ability to make inferences about the social context involved in communication. Thus, 
an experimental situation was designed presenting a task which can be solved only by 
recursive thinking on communication. The experimental situation involved a main 
character (a child or an adult) uttering one polite and one impolite directive (one for each 
presentation). The subject's task was to determine the addressee of the directive by 
choosing between two possible addressees, a child and an adult respectively . For 
example, "An adult enters a room in which an adult and a child are sitting on a sofa 
watching television. He says "Move over". Who is the addressee? " .A second example: 
"A boy enters a room in which an adult and a child are sitting on a sofa watching 
television. He says, "Would you move over, please? ". Who is the addressee? ". Three 
types of abilities are needed to solve this kind of task. 
1. First, the subject must be able to distinguish the level of linguistic politeness 
(linguistic competence). 
2. Second, the subject must be aware of the social conventions for politeness; in 
this case, the Power rule predicts that the polite utterance is addressed to the person of 
superior status and the impolite utterance is addressed to the person of inferior status 
(knowledge of social conventions). 
3. Third, the subject must be able to carry out recursive thinking (socio-cognitive 
competence for communication). 
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For example, if the speaking character is Character S and the recipient of the 
directive is Character A, the subject must think of Character S thinking of Character A, 
thinking of Character S. This reasoning must be carried out for all characters who maý, be 
listening to Character S. To clarify this point better, let us look at the above examples. 
Example I 
An adult (Character S) enters a room in which an adult (Character Ai) and a child 
(Character A2) are sitting on a sofa watching television. He says, "Move ox., cr". Who is 
the addressee? 
To make his choice, the subject must be able to carry out the foRowing recursive 
thoughts: "Character S (adult) thinks that Character Ai (adult) expects some politeness 
from a person of the same status (Character S) it ; "Character S (adult) thinks that 
Character A2 (child) will not expect much politeness from a person of superior status 
(Character S)". The subject's final inference is that "Character S is impolite, so he is 
addressing the child". 
Exwnple 2 
A boy enters a room in which an adult and a child are sit on a sofa watchin(-, 
television. He says "Would you move over, please? ". Who is the addressee'! 
To make his choice, the subject must be able to carry out the following recursivc 
thoughts: "Character S (boy) thinks that Character Ai (adult) expects politeness from a 
person of inferior status (Character S)"; "Character S (boy) thinks that Character A2 
(child) will not expect much politeness from a person of the same status (Character S)". 
The subject's final inference is that "Character S is polite, thus he is addressing the 
adult". 
The results of Study I showed that Discourse is achieved only at the age of 8. The 
results of Study 3 showed that only 9-year-olds are able to use sympathetic politeness to 
repair difficulties in the interaction caused by the other person's behaviour. It has 
previously been hypothesized that such types of overt behaviour in communication can be 
carried out only when the full range of recursive thoughts represented in the final stage of 
Flavell's model (Figure 2D) is present. Thus, it is expected here that only 9-year-old 
children can to carry out all the thinking needed to solve the "sofa" task. One might object 
that this task may be solved by a simple non recursive rule such as "Adults must be polite 
to adults, he is polite (impolite), therefore he is (not) speaking to adult". Literature in 
Chapter 2 and previous studies of Italian children (Axia, 1991; Axia et al., 1989) showed 
that children know the socio-linguistic conventions for status at the age of 6/7 years and 
even before. If the above objection were true, children should be able to solve our task as 
soon as they have the knowledge of conventions appropriate for this situation (P rules), 
that is at the age of 7. In contrast, if recursive thinking is needed to solve the task, they 
should be able to solve the task only at the age of 9. If so, some evidence will hc 
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provided supporting that the full range of mental operations needed for polite usage is 
achieved only at the age of 8/9 years. 
Study 4 was carried out with 5-, 7-, and 9-year-old Italian children. It was 
replicated in Great Britain with 5- and 8-year-old children (Study 5). 
Method 
Subjects 
Subjects were 64 children divided into three age groups: (a) 25 subjects of mean 
age 5; 4 (range 4; 4 to 5; 10); (b) 20 of mean age 7; 0 (range 6; 2 to 8; 0); (c) 19 of mean age 
9; 6 (range 9; 0 to 10; 0). Group (a) had 13 males and 12 females, groups (b) and (c) had 
10 males and 10 females each. All children belonged to middle-class families, liN'cd in 
Padova, and were normally proficient in language, as assessed by their teachers. 
Material and Procedure 
The materials included one picture showing an adult and a child sitting on a two- 
place sofa in front of a television. One of two other pictures showing an adult and a child 
respectively, could be inserted into the principal scene. All characters were male. 
Subjects were presented with one scene and asked to say what it represented. This 
was done in order to make sure that they had correctly understood the roles of the 
participants (adult-child) and the purpose (watching TV). At this point one of two other 
characters (adult or child) was inserted and, through the experimenter's voice, spoke one 
of the following sentences: "Spostati! " (Move over! ) or "Vorresti spostarti per favore? " 
("Would you move over, please? " The first request contained no linguistic element of 
politeness, while the second had four elements of politeness (interrogative, auxiliary 
verb, conditional tense, please). The two requests had the same content and intention, but 
different politeness levels. The four experimental conditions were 1. adult uttering 
impolite request, 2. adult uttering polite request, 3. child uttering impolite request, 4. 
child uttering polite request. Every subject was presented with one character uttering one 
request. Immediately following the request, the experimenter, pointing to the character 
who had spoken, asked: "Who is he speaking to? ". Each subject was asked to indicate 
the addressee (adult or child) in one of the above conditions. 
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Results 
The full design of the experiment involves three independed variables (Age, Lcvcl 
of politeness of the request, Status of the Speaker) and one dependent measure (Status of 
the Addressee). Because the aim of this experiment was to check children's ability in 
making inferences on linguistic politeness as influenced by addressee's status, results 
were scored according to this variable only - Status of the speaker was not taken into 
account. Each subject produced only one response, thus Fisher's exact probability test 
was used for each age group. The rejection region for these analyses was a= . 05. The 
results are presented in Table 4.1. 
TABLE 4.1 
Number of subjects attributing polite or impolite requests respectively to 
adult or child 
REQUEST IQ ADDRESSEE 5-yr-olds 7-yr-olds 9-yr-olds* 
P( Polite Adult 8 6 8 
Im Im Impolite 
r 
Adult 7 4 3 
P olite ( Child 4 4 2 
Impolite Child 6 6 7 
TOTAL TOTAL 25 20 20 
* p<05 (Fisher exact probability test) 
No difference was observed in the attribution of polite and impolite requests at the 
ages of 5 and 7. The first significant difference occurred at the age of 9. At this age the 
polite sentence tended to be spoken to adults and the impolite one to children (polite 
requests compared to impolite requests for two addressees' statuses: Fisher exact 
probability test, p< . 05). To clarify the results presented 
in Table 4.1, if the same task 6 Pý'-) U had given to 20 adults one would expect the following distribution: Polite request: Adult 
10, Child 0; Impolite request: Adult 0, Child 10. 
The results are graphically presented in Figures 4.1,4.2,4.3. It can be observed 
that 5-year-olds tend to think that both polite and impolite requests must be mostly 
addressed to the adult; 7-year-olds attribute requests in the right direction but still at a 
chance level; while only 9-year-olds consistently think that the polite request must be 
addressed to the adult and the impolite requests to the child. 
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The above results show that only 9-year-olds significantly discriminated between 
the four experimental conditions, but that 5-year-olds attributed most requests as 
addressed to the adult, independently of their politeness level. Apparently, children of 
this age level consider the adult a better recipient of a request than a child. They might 
have applied the simple rule which they probably use for themselves: "If you want 
anything, ask an adult for it". Better comprehension of the task is shown by 7-year-olds, 
whose responses are in the expected direction but still do not reach significance. Only 9- 
year-olds clearly attributed the polite request as addressed to the adult, and the impolite 
request as addressed to the child. 
These results support the hypothesis that the age of nine is critical for full mastery of 
politeness phenomena. In particular, they show that the ability to carry out recursive 
thinking about polite communication is achieved at this age level by most subjects, thus 
confirming our hypothesis on the development of socio-cognitive competence for 
communication. 
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Study 5 
Inferences about politeness: A replica with British children 
Study 4 was replicated with a sample of British children, adopting the same 
materials and procedure. The rationale for this study was to check for the cross-cultural 
stability of children's understanding of the social conventions of politeness. To our 
knowledge, this is the first study to adopt the same method to study the development of 
linguistic politeness in two different cultures. If the results of the study with British 
children go in the same direction as those obtained with Italian ones, two things will be 
confirmed. The first is that the P rule of politeness is shared by children of two different 
cultures and languages. The second, and more important, is that recursive thinking about 
polite communication is a developmental acquisition which is not really culturally bound. 
In addition, the results will indicate whether this strategy of research can be pursued or 
whether the differences between cultural determinants of language are too strong to 
enable direct comparisons in the field of children's understanding of politeness. 
Method 
Subjects were 42 British children, divided into two age groups. The first was 
composed of 24 children aged 5 (mean age, 5; 2, range 3; 8 to 5; 6). The second group was 
composed of 18 children aged 8 (mean age, 8; 6, range 7; 10 to 9; 2). Each group was 
composed of an equal number of boys and girls. The children came from Guildford, 
belonged to middle-class families and did not have any linguistic problems. 
The material and procedure closely followed those used for the Italian sample. 
Results 
The same type of analysis adopted in Study 4 were carried Out- Data are reported in 
Table 4.2.. The Fisher Exact Probability Test revealed that only 8-year-olds correctly 
identified the recipient of respectively polite and impolite requests (p<05), while 5-year- 
olds'responses were distributed at random. 
TABLE 4.2 
Number of subjects attributing polite or impolite requests to adult or child 
REQUEST ADDRESSEE 5--yr-olds 8-vr-olds* 
Polite Adult 6 6 
Impolite Adult 6 2 
Polite Child 6 3, 
Impolite 
L 
Child 6 7 
TOTAL TGrAL 24 18 
* p<. 05 (Fisher exact probability test) 
Discussion 
The results of Study 4 indicated that it is only at the age of 9 that children can carry 
out all the recursive thinking needed to attribute requests according to level of politencs, " 
and social circumstances. The results of Study 5 showed that, for British children too, a 
developmental gap in this ability can be found between the ages of 5 and 8, thus 
confirming a general culture-free trend of development. The latter conclusion is not 
strong because the age levels did not completely overlap in the British and Italian 
samples, due to difficulties in having the same native English-speaking experimenter for 
all the British subjects. 
A further objection for the above studies could be made about the nature of the task be, 
proposed here. It might observed that only 9-year-olds can solve the task, not because of 
the amount of inferences needed but because the conventional rules for the use of 
politeness in a social context are mastered only at the age of 9. If this were true, we 
would only have observed that children's knowledge of politeness rules for status 
develops around the age of 8/9 years. As no other measure was taken for the subjects of 
Studies 4 and 5, it is not possible to reject this interpretation on the basis of the above 
results only. However, several sources of converging evidence in the literature indicate 
that children know the conventions of politeness for status of participants around the age 
of 6. Why, then, does knowledge of the conventions involved in the "sofa" task appear 
here with such a developmental delay in comparison with the existing evidence" Pie 
reason is that our task involves both knowledge of conventions and the ability to make 
social inferences. The results presented in this chapter bear more upon developmental 
differences in the ability of making the inferences needed for recursive social thinking Z- 
than upon knowledge of conventions. The experimental evidence reported here supports 
the view that the ability to make inferences about polite communication is acquired in late 
II? 
childhood, around the age of 8/9. It is noteworthy that it is only at this age level that 
children use discourse strategies (Study 1) and sympathetic politeness (Study 3) in 
natural interactions with adults. 
In conclusion, the results of all the studies presented so far indicate that age 
significantly affects the amount of politeness verbally expressed by children. Three 
important facts were empirically observed. First, it has been shown that 4- and 5-year- 
olds do not use polite speech acts in spontaneous situations, although they show 
possession of polite speech markers which can be elicited in facilitating circumstances 
such as role-playing conditions. Second, by the age of 6/7 , children spontaneously use 
some conventional politeness. Lastly, evidence was found showing that sympathetic 
politeness appears in children's spontaneous speech acts only by the age of 8/9. Thus, 
the three-stage developmental sequence (linguistic repertoire; knowledge of conventions, 
sympathetic politeness levels) proposed at the end of Chapter 3 has been confinned as I-ar 
as children's overt spontaneous behaviour is concemed. The same sequence was 
graphically presented in Figures 2B, 2C, and 2D of Chapter 3. However, these figures 
represent both overt social behaviour (solid arrows) and covert mental operations about 
the social situation (dashed arrows). So far, little has been shown about covert cognition 
regarding politeness. If we turn our attention to the complete model presented in Figure 
2D, it ise easily seen that up to now we have information only regarding the recursive 
thinking represented by the dashed arrow entering the continuous line encircling the 
reciprocal inferences between Speaker and Other. Studies 4 and 5 showed that the ability 
to carry out the recursive thinking needed for polite communication appears at the age of 
8/9. Thus, at least two further parts of Flavell's model are not yet investigated. We still 
need to describe the content of children's knowledge of conventions for polite speech 
acts, graphically represented by the area defined by the continuous line which encircles 
both Speaker and Other. In other words, the development of children's knowledge about 
conventions for polite communication must be described. The second part of the model 
which needs more attention is Self-reflection, graphically represented by the Speaker 
making Inferences about the interaction between Self and the Other as well as thinking 
about himself (dashed arrow starting from and entering the Speaker). The next study is 
specifically devoted to these two issues. 
11 
Study 6 
Children's understanding of politeness 
Design and hypotheses 
The aim of Study 6 is to bring empirical evidence supporting two aspects of dEý 
Flavell's model which have not yet been investigated: a) the development of children's 
knowledge about conventions for polite communication; b) the growth of Self-reflection. 
As for the development of knowledge about politeness, it has been said that any act 
of social communication starts with recognition of the situation as suitable for politeness 
(existence). Recognition has previously been defined as the ability to match the ongoing 
social situation with the social information stored in long-terrn memory. It is only 
knowledge about politeness stored in long-term memory which can inform the child 
about the type of social situation he is in. So far, children's representation of politeness 
phenomena and how it changes over time has not been investigated. The developmental 
analysis of Flavell's model presented in Chapter 3 predicts that children show some 
appreciable knowledge about politeness at the Interaction level (Figure 2C), that is - 
based upon the results of Studies I and 3- around the age of 7. As for the development 
of Self-reflection, the developmental analysis of Flavell's model presented in Chapter 3 
predicts that children show Self-reflection at the Discourse level. The results al ready 
presented in this chapter showed that the whole range of mental inferences needed for 
Discourse are achieved at the age of 8/9. Thus, children are expected to show some 
ability of Self-reflection about politeness only at the age of 9. 
In order to test the above hypotheses, 5-, 7- and 9-year-olds were interviewed about 
politeness. The interview covered four areas of information. The first focussed on the 
definition of politeness (what), the second on the rules of politeness usage (when), the 
third on involvement of self in polite communication (Self), and the fourth on the 
perlocutionary effects of politeness (feelings). It was expected that the age-related 
differences described above in both content and general organization of children's 
representation of politeness would be found. Children's responses were thus analysed in 
two ways. First, all responses to each question of the interview were content- analysed 
according to subjects' age. Second, the factorial structure of the whole amount of content 
categories found in the first analysis was investigated in relation to age (correspondence 
analysis). 
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Method 
Subjects 
Subjects were 60 Italian children living in Padova. They were divided into three agc 
groups composed of 20 subjects each (10 boys and 10 girls): 5-year-olds (mean age, 5.4, 
range 4.5 - 5.10), 7-year-olds (mean age, 7.4, range 6.11 - 7.11), and 9-year-olds (mean 
age, 9.4, range 9-9.11). All children came from middle-class families and had normal 
linguistic ability, as reported by their teachers. 
Material 
The interview was composed of 17 questions. Their linguistic formulation was 
refined by informal conversations with children other than the subjects until it was 
considered that all the questions were perfectly understandable for young Italian children. 
The interview covered four areas: definition of politeness (1,2,3,8), need for politeness 
usage (5,6,16), politeness and difficult interactions (10,12,14,15), and people's 
feelings and politeness (4,9,11,13,17). The text of the interview is reported below: 
1. Sai cosa vuol dire essere cortesi? (Do you know what being polite means? ) 
2. Dimmi delle volte in cui tu sei cortese (Give me examples of when you are polite) 
3. E (dimmi) delle volte in cui gli altri sono cortesi con te (And (give me) times when others are polite 
to you 
4. Come ti sei sentito quando gli altri sono stati cortesi con te? 
How did you feel when others were polite to you? 
5. Ci si puo dimenticare di essere cortesi? (Can one forget to be polite? ) 
6. Quando bisogna proprio essere cortesi? (When is it really necessary to be polite? ) 
7. Ci sono modi diversi di essere cortesi? (Are there different ways of being polite? ) 
8. Ci sono parole speciali per essere cortesi? (Are there special words for being polite? ) 
9. Come si sente una persona quando tu. sei cortese con lei? (How does a person feel when you are polite 
to him? ) 
10. Se tu sei cortese con qualcuno e ancora questa persona non vuole fare quello che vuoi tu, cosa s1 PU6 
fare? (What can you do if you are polite to someone and this person still does not want to do what you 
want him to do? ) 
11. Come ti sei sentito quando, qualcuno 6 stato scortese con te? (How did you feel when someone was 
impolite to you? ) 
12. Come puoi capire se sei stato scortese con qualcuno? (How can you know if you have been unpolite 
to someone? ) 
13. Come si sarA sentita questa persona quando sei stato scortese con lei'? (How did that person 
feel when 
you were impolite to him? ) 
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14. Si puo riparare alla propria scortesia e come si fa? (Can you repair your impoliteness and how") 
15. Cosa si pu6 fare con la gente che ý scortese? (What can you do with impolite people? ) 
16. Ci sono deHe volte in cui si puo essere scortesi? (Are there occasions when one can be impolite") 
17. Quando uno 6 scortese come si sente dentro, cosa. prova? (When one is impolite, what does he feel") 
Procedure 
The order of the questions was changed on occasion, when the child's response 
gave easy access to one of the planned questions. Prompts were also used if necessary in 
order to help children to clarify their thoughts (for example, "and then ... 7, "why? ", 
etc. ). When no reply was given to a question, the experimenter repeated the question 
once more, inserting it later in the interview. 
The children were individually interviewed in a quiet room of their schools by a 
trained experimenter. Interviews were tape-recorded and then transcribed. 
Results 
Scoring system 
Categorization of responses was developed in three steps. 
1. Preliminary categories. The full range of responses to each question given by 9 
children, 3 of each age group, was extracted. Responses were categorized into 108 
mutually exclusive categories. 
2. Final categories. The preliminary categories were applied to about 30% of 
interviews (20 subjects). In the process, many categories were grouped or changed and a 
total of 67 mutually exclusive categories remained. They covered all responses produced 
by subjects to the 17 questions. For each question, all possible responses could 
fall into 
one of four mutually exclusive categories (16 questions x4 categories = 
64 categories). 
Only question n. 14 had three mutually exclusive categories of response 
(3 categories plus 
64 categories = 67 categories). Some questions had the same categories of response 
(for 
example, 1,2,3,8). In most cases each question had categories which were 
different from 
those of the other questions. Categories with examples drawn 
from the interviews are 
reported below. 
3. Scoring. This categorization was applied to the 60 interviews by two 
I independent judges. Overall mean inter-rater agreement was 92.8%. 
Inter-rater agreement 
for each question is reported below. Responses whose content could 
belong to morc than 
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one category were categorized under the most advanced category (examples are reported 
below). In brief, each response could fall only into one category, the possible range of 
subjects falling into the same category for every question being 0 to 20 for each age 
group. Silence even after the question had been repeated in the course of the interview 
was categorized as "Don't know" 
Two types of analyses were carried out on the data. The first compared the 
responses of the three age groups on each of the 17 questions, and aimed at giving a 
detailed description of the content of children's knowledge about politeness at three age 
levels. The second analysed the factorial structure of all the responses given by subjects, 
and aimed at describing the general organization of representation of politeness and at 
verifying whether it is affected by age. 
Content of children's knowledge about politeness 
Analyses of responses to each question 
As the data were scored on a nominal basis, X2 tests were applied to subjects' 
responses to each question for the three age groups. For each question the following 
results are reported: a). inter-rater agreement; b) mutually exclusive categories of 
response; c) examples for each category of response; d) a Table with the nominal 
distribution of responses in the categories for each age level; e) X2 statistics. In the end, a 
brief comment draws together the main results for each of the four areas of the interview. 
Definition of politeness 
This section reports children's responses to the five questions which bear upon a 
conceptual definition of politeness. Two questions require the child to define what 
politeness is (Do you know what to be polite means? Are there different ways of being 
polite? ). Two questions ask children to give examples of polite behaviour (Give me 
examples of when you are polite; Give me times when others are polite to you). One 
question is related to polite language (Are there special words for being polite? ). 
Responses to the question: "Do you know what being polite means? " 
(Agreement, 98%) were categorized into the following categories: 
No definition, 
e. g. "non lo so" (Don't know). 
Being kind or good in general, 
e. g. It essere gentili, essere buoni" (being kind, being good), "vuol dire essere 
gentili con gli altri, volergh bene" (it means being kind to others and lovin (, 
them); 
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Saying polite things or avoiding rude language; 
e. g., , essere cortesi vuol dire che io a te non ti rispondo male, ti dico clao, 
come stai? non ti senti bene? o ti senti bene?, hai voglia di giocare con me? " 
(being polite means that I don't answer back rudely, I say to you "Hallo, ho", 
are you? don't you feel well? or do you feel well? do you want to play with 
me? ), 
Acting pro-sociaRy, 
e. g. "essere gentili, aiutare una persona in difficoltY (being kind, helping a 
person in trouble). 
Data are reported in Table 6.1 In this as well as in all the following tables, the first 
number is the percentage of subjects whose response fell into that category, while the 
second number (in parenthesis) is the absolute number of subjects. T'lley show an age- 
related significant difference for the definition of politeness ( X2 = 13.49,6 df, p<. 05). 
TABLE 6.1 
Do you know what to be polite means? 
Percentap-es of resi)onse at three aize levels (number of subieCtS Der cell in Darenthesis) 
Categories 5-year-olds 7-year-olds 9-year-olds 
Don't know 35(7) 10(2) () (o) 
Being kind or good 30(6) 408) 35(7) 
Saying pohte things 5(l) o(o) 15 (3) 
Pro-social action 30(6) 50(10) 
__ 
50(10) 
TOTAL 100 (20) 100 (20) 
r 
100(20) 
In particular, 5-year-olds have more difficulty in defining politeness than older 
children. The definition of politeness is related to kindness in all age groups and, 
especially for 7- and 9-year-olds, it is related to pro-social behaviour. 
Responses to the question "Give me examples of when you are polite" 
were categorized into the following categories (Agreement, 96%): 
No examples, 
Being kind or good in general, 
e. g., "delle volte faccio il bravo e non faccio arrabbiare la mamma" 
(sometimes I am good, and I don't make mum angry) 
Saying polite things or avoiding rude words, 
e. g., "quando uno ti chiede una cosa non devi essere scortese e dire 'non ho 
tempo"' (when someone asks you for something you must not be impolite 
and say I have no time") 
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Acting pro-socially 
e. g., "quando aiuto i miei amici" (when I help my friends), "quando awto i 
miei genitori oppure aiuto delle persone in autobus, gli lascio il posto perchý 
sono piU' vecchie di me e allora hanno meno forze per stare in piedi" (when I 
help my parents or someone in the bus, I give up my seat because they are 
older than me and so they are less able to stand for a long time) 
The data reported in Table 6.2 show that the examples of children's own politcness 
are mostly pro-social actions at each age level. The X2 did not reveal any significant 
difference for age. 
TABLE 6.2 
Tell me examples of when you are polite 
Percentaizes of resDonse at three a2e levels (number of subiectS Der cell in Darenthesis) 
Categories 5-year-olds 7-year-olds 9-vear-olds 
Do nWt Ikun 
E 
ow 15(3) 15(3) 50) Being kind or good 15(3) 5(l) () (o) 
Saying polite things 15(3) 0(0) 5(l) 
Pro-social action 55(11) 
- 
80(16) 90(1 I 
TDTAL 100 (20) 
r 
100(20) 100(20) 
1 
Responses to the question "And (give me) times when others are polite to 
youll were categorized into the foHowing categories (Agreement, 90%): 
No examples, "Don't know" 
Being kind or good in general, 
e. g., it quando certe volte le persone mi vedono con la faccia bella" (when 
sometimes people see me looking nice) 
Saying polite things or avoiding rude language, 
e. g., it quando per esempio uno dice: "per piacere, mi puoi fare questa cosa? 
(when, for example, someone says: "Can you do this for me, please? ") 
Acting pro-socially, 
e. g., "quando magari mi faccio male, chiamano la maestra" (if I hurt myself, 
they call my teacher) 
Data are reported in Table 6.3. 
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TABLE 6.3 
Tell me times when other people are polite to you 
Percenta2es of reSDonse at three aLye levf-I. q (niimbi-. r c)f ciih;, -t-te ;,, 
Categories 5-year-olds 7-year-olds 9-year-olds 
Don't kkinow 
E 
49(9) 30(6) o(o) 
Bein kkind or good 5(l) o(o) o(o) 
Sa in Saying polite things 
Pro-social action 
10(2) 
40(8) 
o(o) 
70(14) 
5(l) 
90(1 
TOTAL 100 (20) 
1 --100 
(20) 100 (" 0) 
The statistical analysis showed a significant age-related difference in offering 
examples of other people's politeness (X2= 16.25,6 df, p<025). In particular, 5-year- 
olds offered fewer examples than 7- or 9-year-olds. Again, the majority of examples are, 
pro-social actions. 
Responses to the question: "Are there different ways of being polite? " 
(Agreement, 98%) 
"Non lo so" (Don't know), 
Being kind or good in general, 
e. g, "essere ubbidienti, buoni e essere gentili con gli altri" (being obedient, 
good and kind to others), 
Saying polite things or avoiding rude language, 
e. g., llsono quelli la di dire a una persona "ciao, come stai? grazie"... e dopo 
si puo dire "prego" (they (i. e. "ways") are those that say "hallo, how are 
you? thank you" ... and after you can say 
"It's nothing") 
Acting pro-socially. 
it % e. g., si, aiutando le persone malate" (yes, by helping ill people), "si, dare un 
conforto se per caso e successo qualcosa" (yes, by offering consolation if 
something upsetting happens), "sli, per esempio negli antichi tempi alzare la 
sedia a una signora" (yes, for example, in the old days by bringing up a chair 
for a lady). 
The data reported in Table 6.4 show that most 5-year-olds cannot describe different 
ways of being polite, while about half the 7- and 9-year-olds can. This age-related 
difference, however, is not significant. 
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TABLE 6.4 
Are there different ways of being polite? 
Percentap, es of resnonse at three ape levels (number of subiects ner cell in narenthe. -, is. ) 
Categories 5-year-olds 7-year-olds 9-year-olds 
Don't know 
E. 
79(15) 55(11) 40(8) 
Being kind or good 0(0) 0(0) 50) 
Saying polite things 5(l) 5(l) 5(l) 
Pro-social action 20(4) 40 (8) 50(10 
TOTAL 100(20) 
- 100(20) 100(20) 
The responses to the question: "Are there special words to be polite? " 
were categorized into the following categories (Agreement, 100%) 
No definition, 
e. g. "Don't know"; 
Avoiding rude words; 
e. g., "Non dire parolacce" (not saying bad words) 
Politeness formulae; 
e. g., "grazie" (thank you), "prego- (my pleasure), "scusi" (sorry) 
Non-conventional, sympathetic speech acts. 
e. g., "come stai? " (how are you? ), "Vuoi un biscotto? " (do you want a 
biscuit? ), "vuoi che ti aiuti? " (can I help you? ) 
The data reported in Table 6.5 do not show age-related differences in the ability to 
identify "special words" to convey politeness. About half the children of all ages cannot 
identify such words. Nine-year-olds mention speech acts expressing sympathetic 
politeness more consistently than the other two groups. 
TABLE 6.5 
Are there special words for being polite? 
-++Uý r)f uihii-vt. -, ner cell inmrenthesis) rv'n'UnLarn"'a 'L-IL C416 
-- 
Categories 
---- 
-olds 5-yea 
-1 
7-year-olds 9-year-olds 
Don't know 
. 
65(13) 55(11) 45(9) 
Avoiding bad words 10(2) 0(0) 
10(2) 
Politeness formulae 15(3) 30(6) 
10(2) 
d 
Sympathetic speech acts 10(2) 15(3) 
) 35 (7 ITOTAL 
MMMMMý 
100(20) 2()) 100 (20) RX) (20) 
WMMMWMý W--ýMoý 
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Table 6.5. a reports the mean of mentioned "special words" over number of subjects 
for each age level. The "politeness formulae" category includes: "per piacere" (please). 
"grazie" (thank you), 11 prego" (my pleasure / you're welcome), " scusa" (sorry), 
"permesso" (do you mind... ), "arrivederci "(see you later), and "va bene" (all right). The 
"sympathetic speech acts it category includes: "come sono andate levacarize? " (how did 
you enjoy your holidays? ), "vuoi che ti dia un biscotto? " (would you like a biscuit"), "ti 
voglio bene" (I love you), "sei un grande amico" (you're a great friend), "come staf! " 
(how are you? ), "ti sei fatto male? " (did you hurt yourself9), "vuole che Faiuti? " (may I 
help you? ), etc.. Seven-year-olds mention more formulae than sympathetic speech acts, 
while 9-year-olds mention both kinds of linguistic formulations to the same extent. 
TABLE 6.5. a 
Means of conventional and non conventional polite speech acts reported 
by children of three age levels 
Type of polite speech act 5-year-olds 7year-olds 9-year-olds 
Conventional (formulae) 
. 
04 
_ 
. 65 
_ 
. 45 
Non-conventional (sympathetic) . 15 . 
30 . 55 
In conclusion, the definition of politeness is related to kindness for all age groups, 
and, especially for 7- and 9-year-olds, it is related to pro-social behaviour. The majority 
of examples of politeness are pro-social actions. In general, only a few children are aware 
of polite language, but most children represent politeness as a set of kind actions. Five- 
year-olds are hardly able to define politeness and are less able to offer examples of other 
people's politeness compared with 7- and 9-year-olds. About half the children of all ages 
cannot identify special words to convey politeness. Nine-year-olds mention sympathetic 
polite speech acts more consistently than the other two groups. These results show that 
the turning-point for the conceptual definition of politeness comes around the age of 7. 
Thus, these results support the hypothesis that knowledge of politeness develops at the 
Interaction level (Figure 2C), at the age of about 7. 
0 Conventions for po iteness usage 
In this section children's answers to three questions (When is it necessary to be 
polite? Can one forget to be polite? Are there occasions on which one can be impolite? 
) 
are reported . The 
first question is broad. The second refers only to speaker's intemal, 
psychological states while the third refers to all circumstances which may 
justify 
impoliteness. The aim of these questions was to investigate what kind of strictness was 
attributed by children to politeness rules and whether age-related differences could 
be 
I -) -) 
found in the representation of politeness as a set of social conventions. The three 
questions bear upon the "Need" or motivational aspect of Flavell's model on social 
cognition. 
The responses to the question: "When is it necessary to be polite? " were 
categorized into the Wowing categories (Agreement, 92%) 
Don't know 
To comply with rules 
e. g., "perch6 uno 6 cortese, sli, per6 quando bisogna.. uno ci sta anche male 
quando bisogna per forza, perchý uno ý cortese sempre pero' se tu gli dici 
'guarda che oggi devi essere cortese' aHora lui ci sta male e non ý cortese " 
(because one is polite, yes, but when it is needed ... you feel bad when you're 
made to, because one is always polite, but if you say'Look, you must be 
polite to-day I, then you feel bad and are impolite), "basta essere gentili e 
rispettare le regole del mondo" (you simply have to be kind and respect the 
rules of the world) 
To help someone 
e. g., "aiutando" (helping) 
To share a good interaction, to reciprocate 
e. g., "per esempio, uno di giorno ý di buon umore e ci sono dei bambini che 
richiedono delle cortesie e allora lui e' cortese, ma ci sono dei giorni che non si 
6 proprio di buon umore... " (for example, there are days in which you are in 
good mood and there are children who ask for favours and then you are 
polite, but there are other days when you are not exactly in a good mood... 
"perche se lui mi invita a casa sua a mangiare qualche dolce per il suo 
compleanno, io lo devo pur invitare a casa mia e fargli mangiare dei dolci" 
(because, if he invites me to his home to his birthday-cake, I must invite him 
back to my home and give him cake) 
The results are reported in Table 6.6. 
TABLE 6.6 
When is it necessary to be polite? 
P, -r, -,, -nt-acFi--z nf ri--. nnn-, i-. nt three am- If-vel. s. (number of subiects, per cell 
in parenthesis) 
Categories 
ki D Don't know on't u 
5-year-olds 
50(10) 
7-year-olds 
50( 10) 
9-year-olds 
5000) 
p 
To comply with norms 25(5) 20(4) 
20(4) 
T To hel o help someone in need 5(l) 5(l) 
10(2) 
v To ha e To have a good interaction 20(4) 25(5) 
20(4) 
TDTAL 100 (20) 100(20) 100(20) 
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The X2 did not show any age-related difference for this question.. Half the 
children of all ages were not able to answer this question. It is noteworthy that about 
20% of children of all ages mentioned the necessity of politeness as a means to create a 
good interaction. 
Responses to the question: "Can one forget to be polite? " were categorized 
into the foRowing categories (Agreement, 77%) 
Don't know 
Never 
e. g., "no" 
For psychological reasons 
e. g., "perch6 magari qualcuno gli ha fatto dei dispetti e un giomo quella 
persona ... anche se gli ha chiesto scusa ... e chissa, magari gli chiede qualcosa 
e di fargli un piacere, cosi non glielo fa perchý si vendica" (because someone 
might have teased him and one day ... even if he said he was sorry... and, who 
knows, he might ask him for something and to do him a favour and he 
it refuses because he is taking revenge), sli, se uno ti ý antipatico" (yes, if you 
don't like someone) 
In quarrels, in play 
e. g., "si, una volta con dei miei amici ero un po'arrabbiato perchý ero 
cascato e mi ero sporcato di fango e allora dopo mi hanno chiesto una 
gomma, mi pare sli, e io non gliel'ho data perche ero arrabbiato" (yes, once I 
was angry to some friends of mine because I had fallen down and got dirty 
with mud and then later they asked me for an eraser, and I refused because I 
was angry with them) 
The data are reported in Table 6.7. 
TABLE 6.7 
Can one forget to be polite? 
Px-r, -, -ntna,, -c nf rpennmP. nt thn-. e. a vre. If-ve. l.,, (mimher of subieCtS Der cell in varenthesis) 
Categories 5-year-olds 7-year-olds 9-year-olds 
FDoWt 
know 45(9) 10(2) 10(2) 
Never 10(2) 40(8) 0(()) 
For psychological reasons 30(6) 20(4) 35 (7) 
In uarrells, in play 15(3) 30(6) - 
5501) 
TOTAL 100(20) 100 (2 0) 100(20) 
The reuslts, show a significant age-related difference on children's opinions about 
forgetting to be polite Q2 = 23.66,6 df, p<. 001). The youngest children either do not 
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know when politeness can be forgotten or mention psychological reasons, such as angor 
or distraction. Remarkably enough, 40% of 7-year-olds think that politeness can ne,,, er he 
forgotten. As a group, 9-year-olds are well aware that politeness can indeed be forgotten. 
mostly in quarrels or during play. 
Responses to the question: "Are there occasions when one can be 
impolite? " were categorized into the following categories (Agreement, 96%) 
Don't know 
Never 
e. g., 11noll, 11credo di no" (I don't think so) 
To reciprocate impoliteness 
e. g., "se magari uno ti ha fatto un dispetto grande grande" (if someone 
annoys you very much) 
In quarrels, in play 
e. g., "vuoi dire in cortile quando si gioca? " (do you mean in the yard when 
we play? ) 
The data are reported in Table 6.8. 
TABLE 6.8 
Are there occasions in which one can be impolite? 
Percentaizes of resnonse, at three a2e levels (number of subiectS Der cell in Darenthesis) 
0 Categories 5-year-olds 7-year-olds 9-year-olds 
Don't know 65(13) 65(13) 50(10) 
Never 15 (3) 10(2) 15 (3) 
To reciprocate impoliteness 5(l) 20(4) 15(3) 
In uarrells, in play 15(3) 5(l) 20(4) L 
Toý TOTAL 100(20) 100(20) 100(20) 
The statistical analysis did not show any age-related differences. The majority of 
5- and 7-year-olds and 50% of 9-year-olds cannot identify occasions on which 
impoliteness is justified. A few think that impoliteness is never justified, others mention 
play, quarrels or an impolite partner as occasions which justify impoliteness. 
In general, about half the children of each age level were not aware of occasions on 
which it is really necessary to be polite or, conversely, of ones on which impoliteness is 
allowed. Thus, children's knowledge about the strictness of politeness rules is not 
extensive. These results may help to understand why children are not very polite in 
natural situations. Possibly, the "need" for politeness is not fully understood by many 
children. There are age-related differences concerning the possibility of forgetting 
politeness. Only 9-year-olds have a realistic attitude to this issue and recogni7e that 
politeness can be overlooked during quarrels or for psychological reasons such as 
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distraction or anger. This is an example of successful Self-reflecdon. It is noteworthy 
that, as expected, it appears at the age of nine. 
Politeness in action 
This section reports responses to four questions: How can You know if you havc 
been impolite? How can one repair impoliteness? What can you do if you are polite to 
someone and this person still does not want to do what you wish? What can you do with 
impolite people?. All the questions present various difficulties of social interaction related 
to politeness. The task was to represent ways in which the problem can be solved by 
means of verbal action. The first two questions bear upon the child's ability for Self- 
reflection, the second two questions the child's ability to monitor the interaction. It will 
be noted that both abilities are represented by the full version of Flavell's model for 
discourse (Figure 2D). It is expected that both abilities are more frequent among 9-year- 
olds. 
Responses to the question: "How can you know if you have been 
impolite? " were categorized into the following categories (Agreement, 9517r) 
Don't know 
From adults 
e. g., "lo dice la mamma" (mother says so) 
From the other's behaviour 
e. g., "Dall'espressione che fa la faccia dell'altro" (from the expression on thc 
other's face), "che quella persona non viene piu' da te" (that person does not 
come to see you any more) 
From self-reflection 
e. g., "Se sono arrabbiato. " (if I feel angry), "dal mio modo di parlare" (from 
my way of speaking) 
The data are reported in Table 6.9. 
TABLE 6.9 
How can you know if you have been impolite? 
-%f nt thnw- nc,, - lpvp]Q (mimher nf ,, nhiects ner cell in r)arenthesis) 
Categories 
Don't know 
From adults 
5-year olds 
55(11) 
5(l) 
7-year-olds 
35(7) 
5 (1) 
9-year-olds 
0(0) 
0(0) 
From the other's behaviour 25(5) 45(9) 45(9) 
From self-reflection 5(3) 15(3) 
55 (1 L 
TOT) IWDTAL 100(20) 100(20) (X) (" 0) 
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The results show a significant age-related difference in the ability to identi(y one's 
own impoliteness (Xn , 
2= 20.25,6 df, p<. 005). All 9-year-olds think that they ca 
understand if they have been impolite to someone. They indicate two sources of 
information, i. e., the other person's behaviour, and self-reflection about their internal 
emotional states, for example, angry feelings. When they are able to identify their 
impoliteness, 7-year-olds mostly rely on the other person's behaviour. More than half the 
5-year-olds are at a loss to identify their own impoliteness. As expected, Self-reflection 
consistently appear at the age of 9. 
Responses to the question: "How can you repair your impoliteness? " were 
categorized into the following categories (Agreement, 90%) 
Don't know 
Being kinder 
e. g., "Facendola felice e facendo anche qualcosa del bene" (making her 
happy and also doing something good) 
Talking about it, apologizing 
e. g., "chiedendo scusa e aiutarlo" (saying 'I am sorry' and helping him), 
ff parlandone" (talking about it), "fermandola e chiedendo scusa" (stopping her 
and saying 'sorry'), "andando a chiedergli scusa ea fare pace" (going and 
saying 'sorry' and making it up) 
The data are reported in Table 6.10. 
TABLE 6.10 
How can you repair your impoliteness? 
Percentnes of resi)onse at three aize levels (number of subiectsDer cell inDarenthesis) 
Categories 5-ye r-olds 7-year-olds 9-year-olds 
Don't know 50(10) 35(7) 0(0) 
Being kinder 5Q) 15(3) 30(6) 
Talking, apologizing 45(9) 35(7) 70(14) 
TOTAL 100(20) 100(20) 100(20) 
The results indicate that there is a significant age-related difference in children's 
knowledge about how to repair impoliteness ( X2= 14.78,4 df, p<O 1). All 9-year-olds 
report strategies to repair impoliteness, while 50% of 5-year-olds and 35(7(- of 7-year-olds 
cannot do this. In addition, only 9-year-olds consistently report that there are linguistic 
means of repairing impoliteness (apologies) and that a good strategy is to talk about the 
problem. 
Responses to the question: "What can you do if You are polite to 
someone and this person still doesn't want to do what you want him to 
do? " were categorized into the following categories (Agreement, 90%) 
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I don't know 
Abandoning the interaction, asking for adults' help 
e. g., "dipende, perch6 se io glielo chiedo tante volte e lui non lo fa, allora non 
sono piU' cortese con lui" (it depends, because if I ask him many times and he 
refuses, then I stop being polite to him), "andare a dire alla maestra" (go and 
tell the teacher) 
Insisting, increasing politeness 
e. g., "lasciarlo stare o insistere "quale funziona di piV" - "insistere" (leave u. 
him alone or insist - which one works better? - insisting), "facendogli capire 
che questa persona la voglio aiutare per farla calmare e poi facendogh vedere 
che sono suo amico" (letting him know that I want to help him to calm down 
and showing him that I am a friend) 
Talking about the problem 
e. g., "potrei fargh capire che lui deve essere gentile con me non solo io con 
lui" (I could make him understand that he must be polite to me too, not only I 
to him) 
The data are reported in Table 6.11. 
TABLE 6.11 
What can you do if you are polite to someone and this person still doesn't 
want to do what you want him to do? 
Percentaizes of resi)onse at three a2e levels (number of subjects r)er cell in iwenthesis) 
0 Categories 5-year-olds 7-year-olds 9-year-olds 
Don't know 20(4) 40(8) 15 (3) 
Abandoning, asking for help 35(7) 25(5) 35(7) 
Insisting 30(6) 25(5) 20(4) 
Tng about the problem 15(3) 10(2) 30(6) L 
TD TTUOTAL 100(20) 100(20) 
bý 
100(20) 
I 
The results did not show any age-related differences. About half the children of 
all ages reported strategies to persuade people when politeness fails, insisting or talking 
about the problem. The latter strategy is more frequent in 9-year-olds. Half the children in 
all age groups cannot indicate effective, personal strategies. 
Responses to the question: "What can you do with impolite people? " were 
categorized into the foRowing categories (Agreement, 93%) 
Don't know 
Abandoning, asking for adults'help 
it I g), e. g., non si puo far niente" (You can't do anythin "cerchi di non stargli 
tanto addosso" (try not to be around him too much) 
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Being more polite 
e. g., "Potresti continuare a fargli favori facendogli capire che li devono fare 
anche loro" (you could go on doing them favours, making them to 
understand that they should do the same) 
Talking about about the problem 
e. g., "aiutarla ad essere cortese, insegnandogli i modi giusti" (helping them to 
be polite by teaching them the right manners) 
The data are reported in Table 6.12 
TABLE 6.12 
What can you do with impolite people? 
Percenta2es of reSDonse at three aw levels (number of suhiects ner cell in narenthe. m. -O 
Categories 
F 
5-year-olds 7-year-olds 9-vear-olds 
Don't know 45(9) 60(12) 20(4) 
Abandoning the interaction 10(2) 15 (3) 10(2) 
Being more polite 15(3) 0(0) 5(l) 
Talking about the problem 30(6) 25 (5) 
- 
65(13) I 
TOTAL 
- r 
100 (20) 100(20) 
T 
100(20) 
1 
The results indicate a trend towards an age effect in the reported ability to deal 
with impolite people: X2 = 12.45,6 df, near p=. 05 (12-59). If the first two categories are 
grouped (failure: "Don't know", "Abandoning the interaction") and confronted with the 
second two (attempts: "Being more polite", "Talking about the problem") the statistics 
reach significance: X2 = 8.17,2 df, p<025. The interactive strategy "Talking about the 
problem" seems to be typical of 9-year-olds. More than 50% of both 5- and 7-year-olds 
do not report effective strategies to deal with impolite people. These results confirm that 
the knowledge needed to monitor a difficult interaction by means of language is achieved 
by the age of nine. 
In general, age-related differences consistently appear when children are asked to 
think of politeness and impoliteness within social interactions. Significant age-related 
differences were found in both questions requiring some Self-reflection. In particular, 9- 
year-olds think that they can understand if they had been impolite from the other person'..,,, 
behaviour or from their own emotional state. Seven-year-olds mostly rely on the other 
person's behaviour, while more than half the 5-year-olds have no means of 
understanding if they have been impolite. About half of the 5- and 7-year-olds 
have 
difficulties in repairing their impoliteness, while 9-year-olds consistently report that there 
are linguistic means of doing so. These results offer more evidence on the 
developmental 
model discussed so far. In particular, they indicate that Self-reflection 
(and consequent 
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verbal action) is frequently represented in children's minds as a good strategy only by 
the age of 9. 
Most 7-year-olds cannot report strategies to deal with impolite people, v. 'hile 9- 
year-olds report that the best way of dealing with impolite people is talking about the 
problem. No age differences were found in the task of convincing people when 
politeness fails, which was difficult for about half the subjects in all three age groups. 
The differences in the two questions about monitoring the interaction may be due to 
different degrees of difficulty of the two social situations presented. While the question 
"What can you do with impolite people? " focuses the child's attention on the Other 
persont s behaviour, the question "What can you do if you are polite to someone and th's 
person still does not want to do what you want him to do? " focuses the attention on both 
Speaker and Other. Thus, the task presented by the first question can be represented in 
Figure 2D as the Self trying an act of social understanding which penetrates into the area 
in which Speaker and Other are both acting and thinking. The task presented by the 
second question can be represented in Figure 2D as the Self both thinking about himself 
and trying an act of social understanding which penetrates the area in which Speaker and 
Other are both acting and thinking. Also, it is not surprising that children of all ages had 
some difficulty with a task which involves a sort of "second level" recursive thinking: I 
must think of me (representation) thinking of me thinking of you thinking of me". 
Politeness and feelings 
In this final section, children's responses to five questions are reported. All the 
questions are related to people's feelings at politeness and impoliteness. Children's 
understanding of the perlocutionary effects of politeness upon both other people's 
feelings and the Self are investigated. The questions are: "How did you feel when others 
were polite to you? " , "How 
did you feel when others were impolite to you? ", " How 
does a person feel when you are polite to him? it 9" How 
does a person feel when you are 
impolite to him? ". Children's responses to all the questions were categorized into four 
mutually exclusive categories: Don't know; simple labelling of emotional state of the 
target person; elaborated labelling of the emotional state of the target person; reference to 
both participants and focus upon the relationship between speaker and addressee. There 
was a final question about the feelings of impolite people: "When one is impolite, what 
does he feel inside? ". Responses to this question were categorized differently from 
responses to the previous questions. 
Responses to the question: "How did you feel when others were polite to 
you? " were categorized into the following categories (Agreement, 
86%-) 
Don't know 
Simple labelling 
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e. g., "normale" (ordinary), "mi sento felice" (I feel happy) 
Elaborated labelling 
e. g., "dentro di me provo fantasia" (I feel fantasy inside) 
Focus upon the relationship 
e. g., "Sento un senso di amicizia, sento che mi vogliono bene" (I have a 
feeling of friendship, I feel that they love me), "sento che vogliono stare con 
me" (I feel they want to be with me) 
The data are reported in Table 6.13. 
TABLE 6.13 
How did you feel when others were polite to you? 
Percentap, es of resnonse at three a2e levels (number of subiects Der cell in Darenthesis) 
Categories 
F 
5-year-olds 7-year-olds 9-year-olds 
Don't know 30(6) 10(2) 10(2) 
Simple labelling 60(12) 50(10) 15 (3) 
Elaborated labelling o(o) 5(l) 15 (3) 
Focus upon the relationship 10(2) 35 (7) 60(12) 
TOTAL 100(20) 
1 100(20) I(X) (20) 
The results show a significant age-related difference in reporting one's own 
feelings in response to politeness from other people ( X2= 19.20,6 df, p<. 005). Most 
children of all ages can identify their own feelings in this context. However, while 5- and 
7-year-olds simply label their feelings, the majority of 9-year-olds focus their report on 
the whole interaction, also involving consideration of their partner's feelings. 
Rsponses to the question: "How did you feel when someone was impolite 
to you? " were categorized into the following categories (Agreement, 93%) 
Don't know 
Simple labelling 
e. g., "male" (bad) 
Elaborated labelling 
e. g., "Mi sono sentito buttato, la come uno straccio" (I felt as if I had been 
thrown down in a comer like a rag) 
Focus upon the relationship 
e. g., it mi sono sentita anch'io un po'colpevole, perche magari non gh ho 
fatto un favore" (I felt a bit guilty, because I might have not done him a 
favour) 
The data are reported in Table 6.14. 
13 1 
TABLE 6.14 
How did you feel when others were impolite to You? 
Percentap-es of rest)onse at three aue levels (numher of. puhiect. -, ner rell in nnn-whi-6c. ) 
Categories 
F 
5-year-olds 7-year-olds 9-year-olds 
DoWt know 55(11) 10(2) 10 (-2) 
Simple labeffing 45(9) 75(15) 30(6) 
Elaborated labeffing 0(0) 5(l) 25(5) 
Focus upon the relationship 0(0) 10(2) 35 (7 
TOTAL 100(20) 100(20) 100(20) 
The results show a significant age-related difference in the ability to report one's 
own feelings at impoliteness from other people ( X2 = 30.66,6 df, p<. 001). About half 
the 5-year-old subjects cannot identify their feelings at impoliteness from others, while 
75% of 7-year-olds label them simply. Nine-year-olds are better at reporting such 
feelings than the other two age groups. Again, 9-year-olds tend to focus on the 
relationship between the two partners more than younger children. 
Responses to the question: "How does a person feel when you are polite 
to him? " were categorized into the following categories (Agreement, 8817, -) 
Don't know 
Simple labelling 
e. g., "bene" (fine) 
Elaborated labelling 
e. g., fiche si senta bene, che sia pi' tranquilla, che si calm' un pochino" (that u 
he feels fine, that he is more relaxed, that he calms down a little) 
Focus upon the relationship 
e. g. 9 "Si sente 
felice e spera che io sia ancora cortese con lei" (he feels happy 
and hopes I will be polite to him again), 11si sente che anche lei e gentile con 
me" (he feels that he is being kind to me too) 
The data are reported in Table 6.15. 
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TABLE 6.15 
How does a person feel when you are polite to him? 
Percentap-es of reSDonse at three aize levels (number of subiects. ner cell in nqre. nthc-, -, i-, ) 
Categories 5-year-olds 7-year-olds 9-year-olds 
EDoWt 
know 30(6) 15(3) 10(2) 
Simple labeffing 55(11) 65(13) 35 (7) 
Elaborated labeffing 0(0) 5(l) 15 (3) 
Focus upon the relationship ocl 15(3) 15(3) 40(8) 
, TAL 
L 
TOI 100(20) 100(20) 100(20) 
The results did not show any age-related significant differences in the description 
of the other person's feelings at politeness from the subject. Most children in all age 
groups can identify the feelings of the recipient of their politeness, at least at the simplest 
level. Although the difference is not significant, 9-year-olds mention the relationship 
between the two partners more often than 5- and 7-year-old children. 
Responses to the question: "How did this person feel when you were 
impolite to him? " were categorized into the following categories (Agreement, 961/() 
Don't know 
Simple labelling 
e. g., "male" (bad) 
Elaborated labelling 
e. g., "un poarrabbiata, ma poi si ý calmata" (a bit angry, but then he calmed 
down) 
Focus upon the relationship 
e. g., "un po'delusa dal mio comportamento" (a bit disappointed by my 
behaviour) 
The data are reported in Table 6.16. 
TABLE 6.16 
How did this person feel when you were impolite to him? 
Percenta2es of response at three age levels (number of subjects per cell 
in parenthesis, 
Categories 
Don't know 
Simple labelling 
Elaborated labelling 
Focus upon the relatio 
TDTAL 
5-vear-olds 
50(10) 
45(9) 
0(0) 
5(l) 
100(20 
7-vear-olds 
30(6) 
60(12) 
5(l) 
5(l) 
100(20) 
9-vear-olds 
15 (3) 
5000) 
20(4) 
15 (3) 
1 (X) (20) 
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The results show no significant age-related differences in the descripfion of Lhe 
other person's feelings at impoliteness from the subject. Half the youngest subjects ý. vcre 
not able to respond to this question. The proportion of children who were able to identik, 
the addressee's unpleasant feelings at impoliteness from them increases with age, 
although this difference is not significant. 
Responses to the question: "When one is impolite, what does he feel? " 
were categorized into the following categories (Agreement, 100%) 
Don't know 
Aggressive feelings 
e. g., "pensa di non essere gentile perche e arrabbiato e non vuole piu' essere 
con gli altri" (he feels that he has been impolite because he's angry and does 
not want to stay with the others any more), It pensa a un drago catfiN, o" (he 
thinks of an evil dragon) 
Sense of guilt 
e. g., "momenti brutti! pensa a cosa gli succedera dopo! " (bad moments' hc 
thinks of what is going to happen afterwards! ) 
Other psychological interpretations 
e. g., "pensa ad altre cose" (He thinks about other things = he is not paying 
attention) 
The data are reported in Table 6.17. 
TABLE 6.17 
When one is impolite, what does he feel? 
Percentaizes of response at three ne levels (number of subjects per cell in parenthesis) 
Categories 5-year-olds 7-year-olds 9-year-olds 
Don't know 50(10) 35(7) 20(4) 
Aggressive feelings 15(3) 40(8) 45(9) 
Sense of guilt 20(4) 10(2) 10(2) 
Other interpretations 15(3) 15(3) 25(5) L 
TOT, TOTAL 100(20) 100(20) 100(20) 
The results did not show any age-related significant differences in the identification 
of the feelings of impolite people. Aggressive feelings are more frequently reported by 7- 
and 9-year-olds, but the difference from younger children is not statistically significant. 
In general, significant age differences were found in the identification of the 
child's own feelings over both politeness and impoliteness from others. Although most 
children of all ages can identify their own feelings about politeness, only 9-ý, car-olds 
focus their report on the whole interaction, also involving the partner's fcclings. Half of 
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the 5-year-olds cannot identify their feelings at impoliteness. Most 7-year-olds can label 
their feelings at impoliteness from others only simply, while 9-year-olds can both label 
their feelings in complex ways and focus upon the relationship. Most children in all age 
groups can identify the feelings of the recipient of both their politeness and impoliteness, 
at least at the simplest level, although differences between ages are not significant. No 
age difference emerges in the identification of the feelings of impolite people. 
In summary, age-related differences can be found in the identification of the 
perlocutionary effects of politeness upon the Self, but such differences cannot be found 
in the identification of the perlocutionary effects of politeness upon the Other. To clarify 
this point better, it may be of interest to compare the proportions of each category of 
response in the four social context presented by the first four questions. The percentages 
in Tables 6.13,6.14,6.15, and 6.16 were thus reorganized according to type of context 
and type of reponse category and presented in four figures. The four contexts are 
indicated in the figures as follows: 
SP+: subject's feelings when other is polite to him 
SP-: subject's feelings when other is impolite to him 
OP+: other person's feelings when subject is polite to him 
OP-: other person's feelings when subject is impolite to him 
The samples presented in the figures are not independent, so a few qualitative 
observations about the distributions are proposed. 
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Figure 6.1 
Proportions of "I don't know" responses 
in four contexts 
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Figure 6.1 shows that the response "Don't know" predominates among 
5-year- 
olds in all contexts. In addition, 5-year-olds seem to 
be more at a loss in understanding 
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the perlocutionary effects of impoliteness than the perlocutionary effects of politeness. 
The amount of this type of response is similar in the two subsequent age levels. Children 
of all age groups find that the most difficult task is to understand (or report) the effects of 
their own impoliteness upon their partner's feelings. 
Figure 6.2 
Proportions of "simple labelling" 
in four contexts 
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Figure 6.2 shows that the ability to find a simple label for the perlocutionary 
effects of politeness predominates in 7-year-olds, closely followed by 5-year-olds. This 
strategy is less adopted for the identification of subject's feelings when others are polite 
to him than for the remaining contexts. Among 9-year-olds, simple labels show linear 
growth across the four contexts. Are the above contexts increasingly difficult to 
represent? 
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Fig. 6.3 
Proportions of "elaborated labelling" 
in four contexts 
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Figure 6.3 presents the data for elaborated labelling. It is apparent that this 
strategy predominates among 9-year-olds. No 5-year-old child used elaborate latxels to 
represent the perlocutionary effects of politeness. Among the oldest children, elaborate 
labels are more frequently adopted when impoliteness is concerned. 
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Figure 6.4 shows that the ability to speak about both participants in the interaction 
when describing the perlocutionary effects of politeness predominates among 9-year- 
olds. In addition, the description of subject's feelings when others are polite to him is the 
social context which more frequently elicits this behaviour in all age groups. ne 
description of the other person's feelings when the subject is polite to him is the second 
context which induces this behaviour. The description of the other person's feelings 
when the subject is impolite to him is the context in which focus on the relationship is 
least frequent. 
Drawing aH the above observations together, it may be said that the four contexts 
present varying degrees of difficulties for the child's mind. The easiest task seems to be 
representation of the subject's feelings when others are polite to him and the most 
difficult task seems to be representation of the other person's feelings when the subject is 
impolite to him. This difficulty may be related to the difficulties shown by children in 
identifying when one can be impolite (see results of Table 6.8). Children of all age 
groups find representation of the other person's feelings when the subject is polite to him 
quite easy. The task of understanding the subject's feelings when others are impolite to 
him is difficult especiafly for 5-year-olds. To summarize, the perlocutionary effects of 
politeness appear to be more easily understood by children than the perlocutionary effects 
of impoliteness. The subject's own feelings seem to be more richly represented than the 
other person's feelings. 
This study was undertaken in order to test two hypotheses generated by analysis 
of Flavell's model on communication. The first predicted that children show Self- 
reflection at the Discourse level (Figure 21)), that is - based upon the results of Studies 4 
and 5- around the age of 8/9 years. The second predicted that children show some 
appreciable knowledge about politeness at the Interaction level (Figure 2C), that is - 
based upon the results of Studies I and 3- around the age of 7 years. As regards the first 
hypothesis, the analysis of children's responses presented so far has shown that Self- 
reflection is consistently present only among 9-year-olds - thus confirming our 
developmental hypothesis (see for example Table 6.9). The second hypothesis also 
appears to be confirmed by the present data (see for example Table 6.3). So 
far, the 
components of children's representation about politeness have been separately analysed, 
and the analyses have shown several age related differences. However, they 
did not draw 
together all the components of children's representation of politeness. Thus, it remains to 
be better assessed whether the age of 7 is indeed the crucial age for cognitive 
understanding of politeness phenomena. In addition, a better 
description of the 
components of knowledge about politeness at each age level may 
be useful for further 
research. In order to overcome the limits presented by the separate analysis of children's 
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responses to each question, a further analysis was carried out. It will be described in the 
following pages. 
The factorial structure of children's representation of politeness 
A correspondence analysis was applied to 67 variables x the three age groups 
(Greenacre, 1984). It will be remembered that we had 17 questions, each question having 
four mutual exclusive categories of response Q categories only in one case). This gi-ves a 
total of 67 categories: (16 x 4) + (1 x 3) = 67. Each response could fall only in one 
category. For example, Jane's response to "Do you knwo what politeness means" -was 
"Don't know". This response falls into category I for question 1. John's response to the 
same question was "Being kind". This response falls into category 2. It was computed 
how many 5-year-olds, 7-year-olds and 9-year-olds fell into each category. This gives 
three figures for each category. Thus, the categorization of responses has 3 columns (a(-, c 
groups) and 4 rows (categories) in 16 cases, and 3 rows in I case. All this has been 
presented in detail in the X2 analyses, question by question. 
The objective of further analysis is to verify whether the 3 columns of numbers 
(age) would group together in one factor or would separately group in different factors - 
the latter case providing evidence for an overall age effect on children's representation of 
politeness. The second objective of the analysis is to identify factors grouping categories 
of response which, in turn, may correspond to the expected age factors. The type of 
correspondence analysis selected for our purposes can work on the same nominal basis 
adopted for the question-by-question analyses. In addition, it can both factor analyse the 
67 categories on the basis of the number of subjects falling into them and relate such 
factors to a second variable, in this case age of subjects. Thus, for each of the 67 
categories, three numbers were fed into the program: 1) number of 5-year-olds falling 
into that category, 2) number of 7-year-olds falling into that category, 3) number of 9- 
year-olds falling into that category. It was expected that a consistent amount of 
information about politeness phenomena should correspond to the age level of 7. 
The results show that the best solution is the one-coordinate solution which 
accounts for 74.01% of inertia (Chi-square = 167.57,69 df, p 0.00001). The two- 
coordinate solution which accounts for 25.99% of inertia (X2 55.64,67 df, p= . 
84) 
was not accepted. 
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Figure 6.5 
Correspondence Analysis: Plot of the column variates (Age) 
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The plot of the column variates (Age) shown in Figure 6.5 indicates that each of 
the three age groups occupies a different area of the space along a one dimensional, 
significant solution. This indicates that Age is the significant factor for this analysis-- A 
second dimension slightly distinguishes the three age groups for a factor other than age, 
but it does not reach significance. 
The plot of the row variates (categories of response) shown in Figure 6.6 indicates 
that the space can be divided into the three one-dimensional areas differentiated by Age 
along a left-right direction: left, central, right. This result alone is very important because 
it indicates that the components of children's knowledge of politeness do vary according 
to age. 
Description of the components of children's knowledge about politeness in each 
age group will clarify the point better. The categories corresponding to the numbers of the 
plot in Figure 6.6 are reported below. 
Left area: Ignorance 
The Left area is composed of 19 items, mostly referring to subject's ignorance of 
politeness phenomena: 
R26, Politeness must never be forgotten. (very isolated item) 
R5, I don't know of any examples of my politeness. 
R45, I don't know how to treat impolite people. 
R50, Simple labelling of subject's feelings at politeness from others. 
R65, I don't know the feelings of impolite people. 
R13, I don't know different ways of being polite. 
R61, I don't know how a person feels when I am impolite to him. 
R67, Impolite people feel guilty. 
R49, I don't know how I feel at politeness from others. 
R25, I don't know if politeness can be forgotten. 
R53, I don't know how I felt at impoliteness from others. 
R6, Examples of subject's politeness are to be kind or good in general. 
Rl, I don't know what politeness is. 
R41, I don't know how to repair impoliteness. 
R33, I don't know how I can understand if I have been impolite. 
R34, I can understand if I have been impolite because mum says 
it. 
R1 1, Examples of others' politeness are to say polite things. 
R47, Be more polite in dealing with impolite people. 
R10, Examples of others' politeness are to be kind or good in general. 
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It can easily be seen that the components of children's knowledge of politeness are 
very few, at the age of 5 years. At this age level, children know that politeness belongs to 
the general effort "to be good" and that it can be of use in dealing with impolite people. 
They are aware of the existence of linguistic politeness only if it is uttered by other 
people. They also have some knowledge of the perlocutionary effects of politeness upon 
people's feelings. Yet, such understandings may be likened to brief spots of lights in the 
darkness as most categories grouped together for this age group are the "Don't know" 
type of response. 
Central Area: "The basics of politeness" 
The central area is composed of 25 items referring to basic knowledge of politeness 
usage. 
R19, Special words for being polite are politeness formulae. 
R37, I don't know how to persuade people when politeness fails. 
R54, Simple labelling of subject's feelings at impoliteness from others. 
R46, No personal means for treating impolite people (abandoning the interaction, asking for adults' help). 
R58, Simple labelling of addressee's feelings at politeness from the subject. 
R24, Politeness is needed to share a good interaction. 
R62, Simple labelling of addressee's feelings at impoliteness from the subject. 
R29, I don't know if impoliteness is justified at times. 
R39, When politeness fails, insist and be more polite. 
R22, Politeness is needed to comply with adults or social rules. 
R4, Politeness is acting pro-socially. 
R35, One's own impoliteness can be understood from the other's behaviour. 
R66, Impolite people feel aggressive. 
R16, Different ways of being polite are pro-social actions. 
R12, Examples of others' politeness are pro-social actions. 
R8, Examples of subject's politeness are pro-social actions. 
R3 1, Impoliteness is justified to reciprocate impoliteness. 
R38, No personal means for persuading people when politeness fails. 
R68, Psychological interpretations for impolite people's behaviour. 
R44, To repair impoliteness, talk about it (or say sorry). 
R28, Politeness can be forgotten for psychological reasons (anger, distraction). 
R23, Politeness is needed to help someone in trouble. 
R32, Impoliteness is justified during play or in quarrels. 
R18, Special words for being polite mean avoiding bad words. 
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The contents of the above factor are very different from those of the previously 
described one. At the age of 7, children do possess information about the most important 
features of politenss. They can identify all the perlocutionary effects of both politeness 
and impoliteness upon people's feelings, although at the simplest level. Politeness is 
defined as a way of acting procially and shareing a good interaction. Children are aware 
of the existence of politeness formulae and of impolite ("bad") words. In addition, they 
have some knowledge about how politeness can be used and how it works "in action". 
for example, in repairs, communicative failures, etc.. Comparison between the contents 
of the first and second factors shows that substantial knowledge about politeness is 
achieved by the age of 7- thus confirming our developmental hypothesis. Yet the 
contents of 7-year-olds' knowledge about politeness do not include Self-reflection and 
still include a few "Don't know" type of response. 
Right Area: "Politeness and cooperative discourse " 
The right area is composed of 15 items, mostly referring to the feelings of both 
participants in a cooperative discourse. 
52, Subject's feelings at politeness involve consideration of the other. 
R43, To repair impoliteness, be kinder. 
R27, Politeness can be forgotten during play or quarrels. 
R20, Special words for being polite are sympathetic speech acts. 
R36, One's impoliteness can be understood from one's own feelings. 
R40, To persuade people when politeness fails, talk about the problem. 
R64, Addressee's feelings at impoliteness from subject involve the consideration of both persons. 
R60, Addressee's feelings at politeness from subject involve the consideration of both persons.. 
R48, To deal with impolite people, talk about the problem. 
R63, Elaborated labelling of addressee's feelings at impoliteness from subject. 
R59, Elaborated labelling of addressee's feelings at politeness from subject. 
R56, Subject's feelings at impoliteness from the other involves consideration of both participants. 
R55, Elaborated labelling of subject's feelings at impoliteness from the other. 
R14, Different ways of being polite are being kind or good 
R3, Being polite means saying polite things. 
The contents of the factor which corresponds to the 9-year-olds show 
further 
developments in children's understanding of politeness. The focus here seems to 
be upon 
people's feelings and on the fact that people's feelings are not independent. 
Politeness 
and its absence (impoliteness) are related to the emotional states of 
both participants. This 
is an important achievement for the social understanding of communication. 
Onlý, 9-ý, ear- 
olds seem able to do this. Only among 9-year-olds can three 
important contents be found: 
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Self-reflection; confidence that "talking about the problem" is a good strategy in order to 
deal with difficulties in communication; and awareness of the existence of sympathetic 
politeness. Thus, the third factor is vastly different from the two others. The results of 
the correspondence analysis show that, alhough basic knowledge about politeness is 
achieved at the age of 7, understanding of politeness as a socially-oriented, sympathetic 
style of cooperative Discourse is achieved at the age of 9. 
General Discussion 
While the first set of studies of Chapter 4 aimed at describing children's overt polite 
behaviour, the second set aimed at describing the covert cognition which monitors such 
behaviour. It will be remembered that our developmental model of polite communication 
represented overt behaviour as solid arrows and covert cognition as dashed arrows. The 
latter were characterized by the fact that they "entered" the three main elements of the 
social situation represented in the model: the other person, social circumstances, and the 
Self This graphic representation symbolized the fact that cognition about politeness, and 
by and large about communication, is made up of inferences about: a) the other person's 
state of mind (as signalled by his or her behaviour), b) the social conventions most 
suitable for the situation (as signalled by situational cues), and c) one own's state of mind 
and the effects of one own behaviour (Self-reflection). The results of Study I showed 
that, from the age of 6, children can take into account the meaning of the other person's 
behaviour and can modify their own verbal behaviour accordingly, if not politely. The 
results of Study 3 showed that, at the age of 7 years, children try to modify the other 
person's reactions to their first requests by means of more politeness in subsequent 
requests. It may be concluded that around the age of 6 or 7 children can both infer their 
hearers'state of mind and that their hearers will be pleased - and thus mollified - by some 
politeness. It remains to be demonstrated when and how children become able to make 
inferences about politeness in relation to either the social circustances or the Self or both. 
The studies reported in Chapter 5 aimed at clarifying such points better. 
Study 4 was designed to test children Is ability in making inferences about 
politeness in various social circumstances. Children of 5-, 7- and 9 years were presented 
with a social situation in which a request uttered either by an adult or by a child could be 
I Th addressed either to an adult or to a child. The request was either polite or impolite. e 
subjects' task was to identify the addressee taking into account both the social 
circumstances (status of both speaker and potential addressees) and the levcl of 
politeness. The results showed that the ability to make inferences about status (P) and 
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politeness emerges around the age of 7, but is fully developed only at the age of 9. Study 
5 replicated the same experiment with British children and obtained a similar pattern of 
results. The developmental literature reported in Chapter 2 assumed that children's 
knowledge of the social circumstances which require politeness is identical to the adult 
notion of politeness, illustrated by Brown and Levinson's theory of universals for 
politeness usageXhus, in the developmental literature children's knowledge of politeness 
was investigated according to status (P), familiarity (D) and cost of the face threatening 
act (R). Studies 4 and 5 respected this tradition - in one sense. However, nobody has 
ever asked children what they think about politeness. This question is important because 
children may have their own notions about what politeness is for and about what social 
circumstances require it. In addition, only interviews about children's representation of 
politeness can give information on how children develop and manage the Self-reflection 
involved in polite communication. Thus, a final study was designed to explore 5-, 7-, 
and 9-year-olds' understanding of politeness. The results of Study 6 are several and offer 
a complex picture of children's knowledge of politeness. 
First, it was observed that Politeness is understood as being close to kindness 
("gentilezza") in all age groups. Especially for 7- and 9-year-olds, politeness is related to 
pro-social behaviour. Compared with 7- and 9-year-olds, 5-year-olds can hardly define 
politeness and are less able to offer examples of other people's politeness . As for 
linguistic politeness, about 50% of the children of all ages cannot identify special words 
to convey politeness. They mention politeness formulae such as "please", "thank you", 
"sorry", "all right", etc.. They also mention examples of positive politeness such as "how 
did you enjoy your holidays? ", "would you like a biscuit? ", "I love you", "you are a 
great friend", "how are you? ", "Have you hurt yourself? ", "may I help you? ", etc.. In 
general, 7-year-olds tend to mention more formulae, while 9-year-olds mention examples 
of both conventional and positive politeness. These results show that, from the age of 7, 
politeness is viewed as a fon-n of pro-social behaviour. In addition, examples of both 
conventional and sympathetic politeness can be reported by children. 
Conversely, children's knowledge about the strictness of politeness rules is not 
great. This result may help us to understand why, in natural situations, children are not 
very polite. Possibly, the "need" for politeness is not fully understood by many of them. 
Significant age-related differences were found in the responses to most questions 
which required Self-reflection in answering. In particular, only 9-year-olds know that 
they can "forget" politeness, for example during quarrels, because of lack of attention, or 
in anger. While 9-year-olds think that they understand when they have been impolite, 
either from the other person's behaviour or from their own emotional state, 7-year-olds 
mostly rely on the other person's behaviour. Sixty per cent of 5-year-olds cannot report 
personal means to understand if they have been impolite. About half of the 5- and 7-year- 
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olds have difficulty in repairing their impoliteness, while the majority of 9-year-olds 
report that they can repair impoliteness by further words ("talking about it", "saying 'I'm 
sorry"'). In addition, most 7-year-olds cannot report strategies to deal with impolite 
people, while 9-year-olds state that, in dealing with impolite people, the best way is to 
talk about the problem. These results indicate that Self-reflection can be found in 
children's knowledge of politeness phenomena by the age of 9. 
The majority of children in all age groups can identify the recipient's feelings of 
both their politeness and impoliteness at the simplest level. In contrast, significant age 
differences were found in the complexity of the description of the effects of politeness 
and impoliteness upon children's own feelings. The most important age difference is that 
only 9-year-olds link their reports of their own emotional state to that of the other person. 
This phenomenon is apparent for both politeness and impoliteness from others. Age- 
related differences can be found in the description of the perlocutionary effects of 
politeness/impoliteness upon the Self, but cannot be found in that of the perlocutionary 
effects of politeness/impoliteness upon the other. Most children of all ages can identify 
their own feelings when others are polite to them, but half the 5-year-olds cannot identify 
their feelings at impoliteness from other people. It may be added that the easiest task is 
representation of the subjects' feelings when others are polite to them and the most 
difficult task is representation of other persons' feelings when the subject is impolite to 
them. In summary, the perlocutionary effects of politeness appear to be more easily 
understood by children than these of impoliteness. The subject's own feelings seem to be 
more richly represented than these of the other person. Only 9-year-olds can take into 
account the feelings of both participants in the social interaction. 
From the above results, it may be concluded that the common ground for all age 
levels is that politeness is a form of kind, pro-social behaviour and has a positive effect 
on people's feelings. However, many elements of children's knowledge of politeness 
differ from age to age. To draw such differences together, the factorial structure of 
children's representation of politeness was examined by correspondence analysis. 
Results showed that the content and structure of children's knowledge of politeness does 
vary in relation to age. 
The content of the cluster of responses associated with 5-year-olds shows that 
children at this age know very little about politeness - the majority of the categories 
grouped together for this age group being the "Don't know" type of response. For 5- 
year-olds politeness belongs to the general effort "of being good" and has a positive 
effect on other people's feelings. 
By contrast, the content of the cluster of responses corresponding to the 7-year- 
olds shows that at this age level children do possess information about the most important 
features of politenss. They can identify all the perlocutionary effects of both politeness 
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and impoliteness upon people's feelings, although at the simplest level. Politeness i. S 
defined as a way of acting pro'cially and sharing a good interaction. They are aware of the 
existence of politeness fon-nulae and of impolite ("bad") words. In addition, they have 
some knowledge about how politeness can be used and how it works "in action", for 
example in repairs, communicative failures, etc.. 
Nine-year-olds' responses show further developments in children's understanding 
of politeness. Interestingly enough, most responses are concerned with people's feclings. 
Politeness and its absence (impoliteness) are related to the emotional states of both 
participants. Self-reflective responses are mixed with attention to the effects of politeness 
on people's feelings. In addition, awareness of linguistic politeness ("being polite means 
saying polite things") and of sympathetic speech acts are present in the cluster of 
responses for 9-year-olds. 
In brief, analysis of children's representation of politeness shows that substantial 
knowledge about politeness is achieved only at the age of 7 years. However, 
consideration about, he effects of politeness and impoliteness on people's feelings, ScIf- 
reflection, and awareness of sympathetic linguistic politeness is achieved only at the age 
of 9. These results offers further, and possibly final, support to the developmental 
analysis of politeness discussed in the first part of the present work.. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Final remarks 
This final chapter is devoted to a general discussion of the results of the six studies 
on the development of politeness, as presented in the previous chapters. Before 
addressing the issue, however, it may be useful to summarize the line of thinking which 
led to the formulation of the main hypotheses of this work. 
Chapter I aimed at "setting the scene" for the further work. In it, the most 
important features of politeness phenomena were discussed. Special attention was 
devoted to the linguistic theories about politeness for two reasons. The first is that the 
literature on the development of politeness has been influenced by linguists' work. The 
second is that linguists had the merit of giving a detailed description of what polite 
behaviour is, thus facilitating a psychological analysis of politeness. In the opening 
chapter, it was shown that, in speech act theory, politeness belongs to the higher 
linguistic functions as it appears in dialogical, socially-oriented Discourse. It was also 
stressed that politeness can be used to achieve two different social aims. On one hand, 
politeness can be used to convey respect for the hearer's freedom of action (negative 
politeness). On the other hand, it can make people feel good by wishing for them what 
they want for themselves (positive politeness). Various verbal strategies are adopted to 
pursue such aims - negative politeness being more conventionally expressed than positive 
politeness. Chapter 1 closed with an analysis of the mental operations needed for polite 
discourse. This analysis showed that, in any psychological inquiry on politeness, much 
attention should be devoted to the speaker's cognitive efforts aimed at understanding the 
ongoing social interaction - including his partner's state of mind. 
Chapter 2 reviewed the available empirical evidence on the development of 
politeness. It was observed that most studies adopted a linguistic point of view, mostly 
focussing on children's ability to be conventionally polite (negative politeness). The 
empirical evidence which has been published so far shows that by the age of 5 or 6 years 
children possess the basic linguistic repertoire for politeness and can use it suitably in 
role-playing conditions. It was also shown that learning or linguistic disabilities do not 
seriously impair linguistic politeness, which can be found at the simplest level even in 
disabled children's speech acts.. A review of the literature showed that there are several 
unexplored areas. In particular, little attention has been devoted either to children's 
spontaneous use of politeness in everyday social intercourse or to the development of 
positive, sympathetic politeness. 
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Chapter 3 aimed at proposing a general framework for the study of the development 
of politeness. The analysis of the mental operations needed for polite discourse - 
proposed in Chapter I- stressed the need to analyze the cognitive entities involved in 
polite social interaction. To that aim, Flavell's model of social cognition (Flavell, 1985) 
was taken into account. A theoretical analysis of that model applied to polite discourse 
showed that politeness in spontaneous intercourse can be described by the speaker's 
recursive thinking involving both inferences about the other person's mental state and 
Self- reflection. On this theoretical basis, a set of hypotheses for the development of 
politeness was proposed. In particular, it was suggested that the development of 
politeness consists of the progressive integration of the various components of Flw, 'cll's 
model. This development can be described by three main levels. At the first level, 
children do not attempt to "read" their hearers' minds and carry out speech acts 
straightforwardly. This mental condition manifests itself by the absence of politeness in 
spontaneous speech. Children may possess the linguistic repertoire for conventional 
politeness, but do not use it in everyday circumstances. This repertoire can be elicited by 
role-playing conditions, but it is not spontaneously activated by children. At the second 
level, children are able to make some inferences about their hearer's mental states. To do 
so, they must also have some knowledge about the social conventions for 
communication. This hypothetical mental functioning manifests itself in the spontaneous 
use of negative, conventional politeness At this level, children have some understanding 
of politeness phenomena. At the third level, children will be able to carry out the whole 
set of recursive thoughts needed for understanding the social constraints of 
communication and for monitoring it. Only at this stage, can children use all the 
potentials of politeness, both negative and positive. 
Chapters 4 and 5 present the empirical evidence which has been collected to test the 
developmental hypothesis presented in Chapter 3. The three studies reported in Chapter 4 
described children's behaviour in circumstances suitable for eliciting linguistic politeness, 
while the three studies of Chapter 5 described children's reasoning about politeness. 
Thus, the empirical evidence of Chapter 4 bears more upon children's overt polite 
behaviour, while that of Chapter 5 bears more upon children's covert mental cognition 
about politeness. 
The developmental model 
To conclude the present work, it may be useful to summarize how the results of the 
six studies fit the developmental model presented in Chapter 
3. 
Iý 
It will be remembered that the first step in the development of social communication 
was described by a figure in which only the Appeal function was present. It "A'as then 
hypothesized that, at the first level of the development of politeness, children would have 
a linguistic repertoire for politeness but would not be able to be suitably polite in 
everyday circumstances. In other words, it was expected that children would not be able 
or would not feel the need to make inferences about the social situation. Thus, the graph 
reported in Figure 2B shows that the subject simply "acts" upon the other person. 
Figure 2B 
Appeal: Linguistic repertoire 
There are several sources of evidence in the previously presented results on children's 
behaviour supporting the notion that at the age of 5 children do not use politeness in 
everyday circumstances, while they possess at least the rudiments for a polite linguisfic 
repertoire. For example, in Studies I and 3, five-year-olds insist and are still impolite 
after the aduls' refusal to comply but, in role-playing conditions (Study 2), utter polite 
request 50% of the time - thus showing thatpossession of a polite repertoire is achieved 
earlier than its actual use. In addition, the results of the studies on children's cognition 
about politeness showed that at this age level children can barely foresee the 
perlocutionary effects of politeness (Study 6) and that they are not able to make 
inferences about politeness (Studies 4,5). Thus, it is reasonable to think that, at an initial 
stage, children do not apply cognitive efforts to the social situation, as represented in 
Figure 2B. 
The second level of social understanding about communication was represented by 
the figure describing the Interaction function. At this stage, children can both act and 
make inferences about people, taking into account the constraints and characteristics of 
social interaction (continuous line). It was hypothesized that children would be able to 
use politeness in social exchanges. It was also expected that children would mostly use 
the conventional aspects of politeness, which are less flexible and more routinized. 
Covert cognition about politeness should be present at this stage, involving inferences 
about the other person's state of mind and consideration of the social situation. 
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Figure 2C 
Interaction: Knowledge of conventions 
The results of Studies I and 3 on children's behaviour showed that at the age of 6 and 7, 
children modify their speech acts to suit the situation. They are sensitive to their partners' 
reactions and increase the level of politeness to overcome difficulties in the interaction. 
However, they do not explicitly acknowledge their partners' points of view. They seem 
more keen to modify their verbal behaviour in part and to bargain on that basis. As for 
covert cognition, at this stage children have a good representation of what politeness is 
and how it works - showing possession of social knowledge as indicated by the 
continuous line of Figure 2C (Study 6). In addition, the fact that they can modify their 
behaviour according to the other persons' overt reactions signals that they can indeed 
make inferences about their partners (dashed arrow). However, at this age, children are 
not very confident in making inferences either about politeness in social circumstances 
(Studies 4,5) or about the Self as involved in polite behaviour (Self-reflection) (Study 
6). In brief, the results of the studies presented here offer support to the hypothesized 
development from the linguistic repertoire level to the knowledge of convention level, 
represented respectively by Figures 2B and 2C. 
The final level of the development of politeness was expected to be represented by 
the full potential of cooperative communication. In Chapter 3 it was shown how all the 
mental operations involved in Discourse can be described by Flavell's model of social 
cognition. It was also added that polite discourse involves a cognitively recursive 
situation of the kind: "I am thinking of me thinking of you thinking of me". 
Self- 
reflection is necessarily involved. The whole set of operations is 
described by the model 
presented in Figure 2D and evidence fitting it was expected to 
be found only in older 
children. 
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The results of the studies also offer support for the third stage of the model. Thus, the 
existence of the development of politeness beyond the conventional level was shown. It 
was observed in all studies that 9-year-olds do not behave like 7-year-olds. Nine-year- 
olds not only use more politeness (Studies 1,2), but also they use it differently from 
younger children. In their spontaneous verbal behaviour, 9-year-olds explicitly take their 
partners'points of view (Study 1) and make flexible use of sympathetic politeness to 
keep up a good interaction (Study 3). It may be said that, although some initial attempts at 
monitoring the interaction can be observed in 7-year-olds, only 9-year-olds can monitor 
the interaction by means of politeness - especially by sympathetic politeness (Study 3). It 
remains to be demonstrated whether 9-year-olds' behaviour can be explained by the set of 
covert cognitive inferences reported in Figure 2D. It must be remembered that, as a matter 
of fact, Flavell's model was theoretically based but not empirically tested. Thus, it was 
hypothesized that Self-reflection - which is needed for all the mental operations 
underlying cooperative Discourse - would appear only at the age of 9. The results of the 
studies on cognition and politeness showed that, as expected, only 9-year-olds can both 
make inferences involving recursive thinking (Studies 4,5) and reflect upon themselves 
in social exchange (Study 6). 
In brief, the development of politeness proposed by the theoretical analysis was 
empirically demonstrated for both its overt/behavioural and covert/cognitive aspects. 
Perhaps the most interesting piece of evidence of this work is that, from the age of 9, 
human beings know that politeness is more related to one's inner feelings than to social 
conventions. We must hope that this precious notion will not be contradicted by future 
social experience. It is adults' responsibility to preserve it by allowing children and 
adolescents to experience a social world in which the majority feel the need to"make 
people feel good' 
Figure 2D 
Discourse: Sympathetic politeness 
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New directions for further research 
The presentation of the work carried out so far leaves at least three major issues 
open: Is the development of politeness fully accomplished by the age of 9? What new 
areas in the development of politeness must now be studied? What new predicfions maly 
be made following the developmental model presented here? 
First of all, let us spend a few more words on the soundness of the above 
developmental model. It was shown here that, by the age of 9, children have mastered all 
the components of politeness. They have a polite linguistic repertoire, they have 
knowledge of the social conventions which require politeness, and they may also be 
sympathetically polite. In brief, it has been proposed that, at 9 years of age, children ha've 
the whole set of mental operations needed for polite behaviour (Figure 2D). If the 
analysis of Flavell's model is reasonable, the same set of mental operations should also 
apply to different contents. However, the criticism that the developmental sequence 
proposed here holds only for politeness and cannot be applied to different circumstances 
may be raised. 
One way of testing the model further is to show that the development which has 
been observed for positive, sympathetic politeness can also be observed in other 
domains. For example, to stay within our area of interest, it may be hypothesized that 
only 9-year-olds are able to understand the impolite use of politeness. Politeness can in 
fact be used as a weapon to manipulate, attack, or hurt the other person's feelings. It is 
possible to say very aggressive things by disarmingly polite statements. 
It is very difficult to react appropriately to "wicked" ways of being polite, as in the 
following examples, "My colleague presented his theory beautifully, and I feel 
dmbdassed at even asking this stupid question .... 
(followed by a shrewd question 
criticizing the theory)"; or "You are getting wonderful marks in maths. You are really 
good at it. Did you say that your family are good friends with our teacher? "; or I 
wouldn't like you so much now if you were good at ... 
(some type of positive 
achievement, such as writing a book, making money, being popular, etc. )II ; or 
like the 
dedication of The complete book of insults: (McPhee, 1982): "To my family, without 
whose solicitous concern and helpful suggestions this book would 
haveb hnished in half 
the time". 
If the main structure of mental abilities to be polite is present at the age of 
9, our 
developmental model would predict that only around this age would children 
be able to 
understand the effects of politeness used to hurt other peoplets 
feelings ("making people 
feel bad"). If they are lucky, 9-year-olds do not even have direct experience of this waý, 
of using politenesswhich is rather an adult-like, sophisticated social game. 
As one would 
not really expect that 9-year-old children actually to use politeness 
in twisted xays, It' 
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they can indeed understand the nature of the game, our developmental model would be 
confirmed for a different content. 
The above is only one example of how our model-testing can progress further. 
From the work presented so far, we may gather the impression that here the development 
of politeness is considered as finished by the age of 9. It is true that it has repeteadly 
been suggested that the basic abilities for polite bahaviour are not fully achieved before 
this age. However, we, would rightly criticize the notion that everything stops at the age 
of 9. Even if future studies confirm the developmental model for the ages considered 
here, we do not really expect the development of politeness to be fully accomplished by 
9. What, then, is acquired beyond this age? 
First of all, children's semantic and syntactic development enriches their polite 
language. Adolescents'and adults' linguistic expressions of politeness are more 
sophisticated than younger children's ones. For example, during pre-adolescence and 
adolescence, children may spontaneously learn to use politeness in humoristic, ironic, or 
even "twisted" ways. They may also be able to be more indirect than younger children. In 
addition to the above evolution in locution, the development of politeness tx-, yond the age 
of 9 may also be linked to the three preconditions of social communication: Existence, 
Inference, and Need. 
Understanding of the "existence" of a certain class of social (or socio-linguistic) 
phenomena is primarily related to people's experience of them. Thus, one would expect 
that children's experience about politeness phenomena would increase according to age. 
For example, during their school years children may learn a second language, including 
its politeness markers. It would be of interest to study children's acquisition of polite 
forms in second languages. As for pre-adolescents and adolescents, one may ask whether 
the acquisition of polite forms in second languages follows the same sequence as that 
observed for the acquisition of politeness in first languages. If so, in the process of 
second-language acquisition, even grown-ups may have a polite repertoire first, then they 
may be able to adapt it to social circumstances and only later they produce some 
sympathetic politeness. More interesting is the question of second-language acquisition 
during childhood. On one hand, it may be possible that the experience of a second 
language makes children more sensitive to the social underpinnings of politeness. On the 
other, the ability to be polite in second languages may be related to the underlying 
developmental level of social understanding. Examples of questions derived from our 
model which may tap the issue are: if we compare 5-year-olds who are leaming a second 
language with 5-year-olds who are not, will the former group show more knowledge of 
conventions of politeness than the latter? And if we compare 7-year-olds who are 
leamin(-, 
a second language with 7-year-olds who are not, will the former group 
be more Self- 
reflective about politeness than the latter? 
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A second, not purely linguistic aspect is that children's experience of social 
conventions increases after the age of 9. For example, according to Shantz (198 2), the 
growth of children's social experience can be described by four hierarchically embedded 
areas. Social development can be viewed as progressing from the narrowest to the largest 
domain. Children first experience partners For example, they become aware of their 
partners' sentiments, emotions, wishes, intentions, preferences, thoughts, etc.. Later, 
they become familiar with dyadic relations involving various degrees of familiarity and 
authority. With increasing age, the social relation experience enables children to 
understand the social roles which derive from larger social systems, for example, teacher- 
pupil, doctor-patient, etc.. Finally, some social systents experience is achieved, involving 
awareness that social rules are relative to different social groups. Thus, it may reasonably 
be expected that children's knowledge of the existence of various sets of rules for 
politeness increases beyond the age of 9. In particular, children have to understand social 
relations which are not usually directly experienced at the age of 9 and cannot be directly 
inferred from the knowledge of the dyadic relations (P, D) which non-nally involve 
children themselves. For example, 9-year-old children may not know much about the use 
of politeness in adults' settings, such as offices, universities, hospitals, parliament, 
factories, etc.. It would be of interest to see whether they apply their dyadic relation 
knowledge to the use of politeness in the adults'world. Also, the understanding that the 
rules of politeness are not absolute but relative to social groups may be a later acquisition 
in which factors such as social class, education and, also, travelling habits of the family 
may be more important than purely developmental factors. 
Increasing age may also affect the ability to make "inferences" about the self and the 
social world. For example, the inferences which were required of the subjects in Studies 
4 and 5 were quite simple. Adults and even children older than 9 may find them trivial. 
For the purposes of the present work, it was sufficient to show that ability to make 
inferences about politeness, even at a simple level, only appears after the child shows 
knowledge of conventions for politeness. Our model would predict that, beyond the age 
of 9, children are able to make inferences increasingly more complex than these examined 
here. 
An interesting new area for further study is related to the "need" to attempt polite 
behaviour. This area is almost entirely unexplored. Although from the age of 5 children 
are sensitive to politeness in the other person's behaviour (Studies 
3,6), only at the age 
of 9 (Study 6), do they have a clear notion that politeness is related to the 
feelings of all 
the participants of the interaction. It may be possible that the strength 
by which the nccd 
to be polite is perceived is related to the ability to represent the perlocutionary cffccts of 
politeness and impoliteness. From this point of view, older, more experienced children 
may be more polite in naturalistic circumstances than 
9-year-olds. To test this hypothesi. s, 
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for example, Studies 3 and 6 may be replicated with older children and even adulLs - with 
ad hoc modifications. 
Conversely, the sensed "need" to be polite may be related to motiý-afional as wcII a.,, 
cognitive ctors. The motivation to be polite - let alone its development - seems to be a 
totally unexplored area. Thus it is difficult, if not inappropriate, to make developmental 
expectations on the issue. However, there are a few points on which some speculatiVe 
hypotheses may be indicated. First, there is the question of children's "sociability", or 
special sensitivity to the social world. The major problem in this line of research is to 
define and measure "sociability". In any case, the main question for our purpose is: do 
more "sociable" children learn to use politeness more quickly than less "sociable" ones' 
If so, our model would predict that sociable children would also be able to carry out the 
recursive thinking needed for polite communication earlier than non sociable ones. 
Second, the literature on psychopathological development in Chapter 2 showed that 
neither learning nor language disabilities severely impair the simple use of politeness. If 
we control subjects for cognitive abilities, do we still find that some people are more 
polite than others? In other words, are we able to show that there is a specific 
motivational, non-cognitive factor in the use of politeness? It is possible that we are able 
to find individual differences in the use of politeness between subjects at the same socio- 
cognitive level. Third, if this were the case, we would still have the problem of 
explaining such differences. This speculation must not be pursued too far in the absence 
of specific, testable hypotheses. But further research may reveal the need to look more 
closely at the role of personality and affective factors in the development of politeness. 
We may find that there are people who develop an interest in making people feel bad, 
people who are indifferent to others'inner states, and yet others who prefer to make 
people feel good. 
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